THE ARTIST AS AGENT.

Pat Panton.

1985

SYNOPSIS March 21st 1985.

My concern is with what it is to be an artist. I believe the matter can best be considered in terms of a theory of agency since it is my contention that any claim that a person might make to be an artist is a claim that he is making about his agent-concerns.

I shall accordingly endeavour to establish certain conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist.

This is by no means to make a special case of artistic agency for it will be my especial care to show that any person who claims to be an artist is necessarily constrained by the conditions of his situation as one human agent amongst others. That which marks his agency as that of an artist is the character of his concerns. An artist is one whose reflective and practical activities are oriented towards some making whose character is necessarily pictorial.

I shall show that the agency of an artist has a public aspect, for an artwork is necessarily a public object. This has implications for the artist which he may not evade; furthermore the viewer is himself, as agent, obliged to recognize the active nature of his response to artworks. Artist and observer are in a communicative relation whose locus of intelligibility is set by the pictorial constraints of the work of art. An artwork is a pictorial form of thought. I hold that since an artwork is a manifestation of the reflective and practical concerns of the person who made it there is good reason to take the agency of the artist into account in consideration of the properties of the artwork.

CONTENTS

II. THE PUBLIC ASPECT OF THE AGENCY OF AN ARTIST

III Pictorial Concepts

IV. THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF THE AGENCY OF AN ARTIST

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Acknowledgements

I should like to thank my supervisors, David Milligan and Andrew Harrison, who have advised and borne with me with a generosity of time and effort far beyond the line of duty. My thanks also must go to Ed Kinsey, my colleague, for letting me discuss and use his work and for raising many questions which have proved central to my concerns. I would also like to acknmowledge the help of my colleagues Sue Jackson, Janette Kerr and Richard Sampson in the preparation of illustration material.

I must also extend loving and apologetic thanks to my children, for being patient for so long.

But above all my debt is to Peter, my husband, not only for his criticism, enthusiasm and patience withal, but also for putting many hours into typing many drafts of the text.

I hereby declare that this dissertation 'The Antibiotic Agent' is my own work and is the product of independent research

Peter Parker May 28 1985

A Note on the Form of Address.

I trust that nobody will register any offence at my reference to the male throughout the text. It should in no way be taken as an indication of any other purpose than that of avoiding the tiresomeness of the impersonal, the awkwardness of 'his/her', or the overtly political option which would be expressed by reference to the female. Any such platform would seem in the circumstances redundant. The equality of the sexes is not the question.

A Note about the Illustrations

Wherever possible I have placed the illustrations in such a way that they may be referred to without turning the page. In all cases the plates are disposed upon pages facing the text. I have been fortunate throughout to have the use of Ed Kinsey's drawings. It seemed to me important to present his work as near as possible in the context of the notebook in which he did them. I have therefore tried to disturb the sequence of his cogitations as little as possible. However, although the work done at this stage is discussed in terms of its being consequent upon the largely reflective activity of prospecting, I have thought it valuable to use his drawings in such a way as will be most informative of the process as a whole. This is why some sketches are included in the section on prospecting where perhaps it might otherwise be objected they do not properly belong. Since the development of Kinsey's prospect is clearly sequential I have not given a descriptive account of these studies; the progress is pictorially clear. I have also been fortunate in having access to two of the paintings which relate directly to certain of the studies. Monochrome photographs of these works are presented in juxtaposition to the preparatory drawings in the section on painting.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

My concern is with what it is to be an artist. If a person claims to be an artist it is my contention that such a claim is to be understood in terms of that person's agent-concerns. Thus, firstly I am not concerned with characterizing a condition of being, but rather with establishing conditions under which we may posit agency as that of an artist. There are two points essential to my account of the condition upon which it is possible to posit the agency of an artist. Firstly, Art is something we do. It follows that I must reject the idea of an artist as one subject to inspiration; inspiration is, in the present connection, a function of action. Secondly a work of art is irreducibly pictorial, however widely or particularly it may refer.

In attending to this matter I stand at the conflux of two fields of interest for I come to the enquiry an interested party, with all the problems and advantages attendant upon that situation. As a painter, the territory is familiar and the questions of concern are of concern to my work. It matters that I try to come to terms with them; it is a case of really wanting to know.

Furthermore the matter seems to me to have a significance beyond itself, for the questions of concern for a painter are of philosophical importance. In setting out upon an account of the agency of an artist I hope to show, by examples of some particularity, both the implications of any claim a person might make for being an artist, and, also, that findings upon the particular case are of some value to a wider account of human agency.

It will be clear throughout the text that I have been a good deal influenced by the work of John Macmurray, not however, for

what he has to say about art, as for his regard to the nature of the self; the nature of a person. Concerning art, his view would appear to be inimical to mine, since he is inclined to accede to a concern with art as an "activity which is no activity"; [1] being, as he would have it, primarily reflective. My view is that all the activities involved in the making of works of art whether they are overtly physical or predominantly reflective are orientated ever towards a particular outcome. Whilst he and I would therefore not concur on this point, I do believe his view on the practical primacy of human agency is germane to my concerns and he might, had he been alive yet, have been persuaded of my views as relevant to his thinking. I believe they are. The relationship of reflective and practical activities in making artworks has to be regarded as integral in the activity; yet if it is possible to speak of primacy of one mode of activity over another, then, since the artist is necessarily engaged upon making things, pictorial artefacts, it would be reasonable to regard the concerns an artist has as primarily practical. I do not need to take a specific stance of Macmurray's notion on art, and I shall not do so, for it to be clear enough in the course of reading the text that there is a case for regarding the activities of artists as comprehensive and clear examples of human agency. My attention to the activities associated with specific concerns that artists explore will thus be in terms which invoke the tenor of his thinking on agency, while offering an account of some relevance to an expansion of ideas, which were ahead of their time and which I believe are of a significance even now not widely appreciated.

My concern will be to characterize the agency of the artist, with whatever follows from it in terms of regard for the material product of such agency: the object which is the work of art. I shall look to questions of agency from the standpoint both of the artist, as agent, and from the standpoint of the observer as agent, for human agency of whatever character, has a public aspect.

The scope of my enquiries will be structured in terms of four conditions under which we may posit the agency of the artist. In each of four chapters a condition will be examined in the context of different examples of things that artists do. This will serve to relate my special concerns to a broader philosophical context for in looking to the constraints of the examples I shall find myself confronting problems familiar in philosophy, which in some measure at least, will prove to be illuminating to my concerns.

These are the conditions:

I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies his concerns as pictorial. An artist creates pictorial space.

II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies a communicative stance.

III. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies an artefact, a product, characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective and practical endeavour. This product is a pictorial form of thought.

IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies the product of his endeavour as a manifestation of his agency as personal.

The implications of accepting each and all of the conditions as outlined are in their several aspects interwoven and far-reaching, as much in consideration of the agent standpoint of the spectator as in exploring the agent standpoint of the artist. Acceptance of the conditions requires that the activities of painters, sculptors and so on, come under scrutiny from several points of view. The constraints of making upon the reflective activities of the artist cannot be set aside. Neither, conversely, may the practical activity be regarded as excluding reflective activities. From the standpoint of the spectator it will become clear that he cannot disregard those agent-concerns of the artist, since the very work present to his attention is their manifestation. Conversely the artist must, whether he would or no, accept that a communicative stance is a condition of his agency as an artist. He cannot evade it. Involved in that ineluctable obligation on the part of the artist is the equally unavoidable recognition, on the part of the spectator, that what is presented to his attention is a pictorial statement, having about it the marks of the agency of the artist as personal. And this is to say something important about the kind of entity an artwork is. These points show that although each condition is informative on particular aspects of artistic agency it would be mistaken to try to regard any one of them as wholly independent.

I shall be at pains to point up the integrated nature of these aspects of agency in my thesis concerning the activities of artists.

I should like to disclaim any intention to set out a general theory of agency. The particularities of the case are such as to make a general account difficult. Indeed it would seem inadvisable, perhaps mistaken to try it. Having said that, neither do I want to make a special case of the agency of artists however particularly it is to be characterized. What can be shown to be true about artistic agency does, I shall argue, have wider application. It might well be that consideration of particular examples can contribute to the general field of concern with Agency; but parallels would not always be aptly sought. The order of the text will follow in sequence as the conditions are presented. Each chapter will be prefaced with an outline of its substance. I shall be able to consider only a few of the vastly many different things artists are concerned about. My illustrations are drawn from a variety of sources. I am indebted to Ed Kinsey for his generosity of spirit in submitting to the barrage of questions day by day over many years on the nature of his concerns as a Landscape painter. His work features significantly as a consequence and I can only hope that I have done him no injustice in my dealings. In attending to the structure of a drawing exercise it seemed right and proper, however, that I should do the thing myself. The drawings are designed to show the progress of a pictorial idea as it relates to observable objects and is undertaken in an attempt to cope with

some of the difficulties of the task and, more importantly, to expose the weaknesses in some notable theories about drawing. This, from my point of view, is an account put forward a good deal for the sake of my students, whose worries are usually worth attending to.

CHAPTER I.

A CONCERN WITH PICTORIAL SPACE

I. Introduction.

In this first chapter I will attend to the first condition under which we may posit the agency of the artist: in whatever sphere of activity, the agency of the artist implies his concerns as pictorial.

An artwork is a factitious object, irreducibly pictorial in kind. I am unrepentant about giving new life to a word which in its usual connotation is not very polite. Yet some apologetic is in order. The derivation is unexceptionable (facere: to make, O.E.D.) As "made for a special purpose, not genuine, not natural, artificial", it seems apt that I use this word in connection with artworks. They are indeed "not natural"; we do not find them, we make them but they have their own peculiar nature as manifestations of activities of certain kinds. While we speak of artworks in terms of veracity we yet accept that they set out to be "genuine", yet the constraints of truth conditions are not applicable to their discussion. An artwork is quite certainly not some kind of shadow of reality; that an artwork is indeed an artifice is a necessity; yet that does not make it a sham (see IV.3.2.2). It is in keeping with my concern for the nature of the activity and for the irreducibly pictorial nature of works of art that I now prove the worth of this term. In remarking works of art as factitious objects I am aware of invoking deep fears, long held, about the nature of agency involved in their making. I do

not dispute the derogatory force associated with the use of this term. The artist has ever been held in extraordinary awe and the secular protestations of the present generation should not blind us to a persistent superstition about the 'special powers' vouchsafed by inspiration and invested in artistic 'genius'. Much of the 'Singspiel' that accompanies articles about artists, gallery 'blurbs', films and art videos depends for its viability upon an unquestioning acceptance of the artist as a special sort of being. There are grave dangers in leaving such beliefs intact. The dangers are themselves a perennial topic, as Thomas Mann has so convincingly shown in his novel 'Doctor Faustus'.

My purpose is to consign that old Familiar, the Daemon of the Creative act, to his own everlasting perdition. I shall in no sense detract from the wonderment of creative activity; but I shall show that the very marvel of the matter has its possibility in agency of a wholly human sort. This is appropriate circumstance for awe, for where there is no appeal to the notion of Special Beings, there is - for there can be - no side step in the communicative requirement. And that, truly, is a matter of abiding and general concern to artists and philosophers alike.

That an object is factitious is, of course, no guarantee of its being an artwork; it could be a poem, for example. To produce a factitious object which is an artwork is to be concerned with exploring constraints of pictorial space. In this chapter I mean to consider the notion of space as it fundamentally occupies the attention of the visual artist in his endeavours to settle the direction, in reflective and practical terms, of his working

concerns. It is a logical point and not a phenomenological one, that we cannot concern ourselves with pictorial matters of any sort whatever except upon the assumption of pictorial space. Furthermore to posit concern with pictorial space as a condition of the agency of the artist is to say something informative not only about artworks and about artistic agency, but also it is to implicate, in an active way, the agency of the spectator.

These notions, of pictorial space and the artwork as a factitious entity, are entwined in the notion of artistic agency. A factitious object is invented, created; an artefact which depends for its being upon being made. It has thus some observable form, which much that that implies with regard to its existence in the world as an object amongst others. Yet an artwork is, in ways characteristic of it as a factitious pictorial entity, both material and imaginary. It is materially real enough but an adequate account of pictorial space cannot be provided in material object terms. Neither is the space of an artwork to be found in the head; there is no 'ghostly snapshot'. We may say this: a painting, sculpture, drawing and so on, is literally a form of thought; imagery manifest. An artist may make use of whatever starting place he pleases. The world serves his creative turn. Such making has at times been compared with the works of Nature. Consider Cézanne's Kantian remark, 'I want to make nature and art the same. Art is a personal perception..... which I ask the understanding to organize into a painting."[2] As it were, "the active mind ordering its objects, or representations",[3] it matters not what the subject of attention is nor what the influences or impressions might be; the agency of the artist requires that the thing made, in prospect and eventual form is a

factitious, pictorial entity. Merleau-Ponty illustrates it thus, "...it can be said that a human is born at the instant when something that was only virtually visible, inside the mother's body, becomes at one and the same time visible for itself and for us. The painter's vision is a continued birth."[4] There must become some thing and the agency of the artist is critically unfulfilled if he is not about the essential pictorial business of effecting that becoming.

In order to recognize a concern with pictorial space as a condition of artistic agency we must see that any artwork requires that we unconditionally accept from the outset the constraints of organized space as integral to the work and not separable from it in any way. This has implications for the observer and it has implications for any artist. A number of approaches will help us to understand the importance of the matter.

Certainly the concept of pictorial space is of concern in the spectator's approach to the visual arts, for the spectator's role is primarily to be characterized in terms of a stance implied in the compositional structure of the work of art. To illustrate the direct importance of this matter I will take one example in order to discover what happens when we are persuaded as spectators to try to ignore the constraints which fix the pictorial integrity of an artwork. This will then be related to other cases, which will severally enable me to show the implications for the observer as one who, as agent, actively seeks the intelligibility of artworks.

Then, to demonstrate the matter as of fundamental concern for any artist I shall myself undertake a drawing exercise, such as might be set a class of new art students. Some of the problems of creating pictorial space will reveal themselves in so doing and

the main substance of the chapter will be taken up with their discussion. What should be remembered is that the value of this drawing exercise, which is common enough in an art student's education, is that it isolates and exposes problems which any artist of whatever experience, must encounter not just in making this sort of drawing, but on a more deeply complex level for a great deal of his working life regardless of the reflective and practical context. The activity undertaken in this exercise will therefore be discussed in terms of the following considerations. Beginning with a brief outline of some ways of thinking about and of creating different sorts of 'pictorial space' I shall attend to three matters of concern.

1. The feeling of apprehension experienced by the artist at the moment of putting a mark on a clean canvas or sheet of paper. I regard this difficulty as evidence on the part of the artist of his awareness of his agent-concerns as being committed, in respect of there being an artwork intended, and unavoidably uncertain as to how exactly it will develop. Does the first mark on a canvas begin the 'full concrete activity of painting'? What is the first moment in making an artwork?

2. This raises the question whether I should have attempted to discuss the artist's work in terms of his intentions. My decision not to take on the business of explaining the agency of the artist in terms of current Intention theory is explained in terms of my whole thesis being testimony to the business of making artworks as a deliberative endeavour. The agency of the artist implies that endeavour as intentional. Admittedly that is worth consideration in itself but I do not feel that any discussion of intention at the present time could avoid a review of the very

considerable, and for my purposes largely peripheral, field currently receiving fervid attention; and this would not be the place for that. I shall therefore use the term as in ordinary parlance. However, I shall give some consideration to the question whether the activity involved in doing an objective drawing should be characterized as a goal-directed activity.

3. I shall then consider the drawing insofar as it is about an object, attending to a prevalent anxiety about the notion of drawing accurately which usually takes the form of supposing that there might be a right way to draw the object. Students worry about this. Their difficulty I shall argue is a great deal due to a mistaken belief that drawing can be characterized as primarily a matter of learning to see. This Learning To See Theory (LTS)[5] certainly regards the activity of drawing as oriented towards improved knowledge of the perceived world. The idea is, broadly, that if observation is accurate, a transcription is possible whose success depends upon the extent to which a two-dimensional account can create an illusion of a three-dimensional object. I do not question the processes involved in such an undertaking as having their part to play in certain sorts of drawing. However I cannot consistently regard learning to see as the first and last concern of the artist, even in making the sort of drawing in which transcription is involved, since this would be to challenge the irreducibly pictorial nature of the drawing itself. Depiction is not to be regarded as evidence for some piece of seeing.

I shall rather summarily put to one side a certain well-known assertion of Gombrich concerning the use of constraints and schema,[6] since it is all too easy to show that he is

ambiguous; there are, I suggest, quite enough difficulties to deal with without attending too closely to possible extrapolations upon an unclear case. I do not, of course, dispute that an artist makes use of schema, and devises constructs of all kinds. The problem is that Gombrich's argument is intended to upset the learning-to-see theory of drawing but it founders in that it could as well serve to support as to refute the notion of drawing he is out to contest. I shall argue that the point of the drawing made by the student is not to see how well the world matches his making, any more than it is to find out how well he can see or how well his construct describes the world. The student comes to understand that the object he can see is just a starting place for his prospect. That prospect, the creation of any kind of pictorial space, obviously involves the use of contructs. But there is no need to regard their undoubtedly necessary role as standing in need of comparative criteria. Making, in my view has very little to do with matching.[7] To suppose that it has is precisely to limit the activity to skills of transcription. There is no way forward along this path - it is best abandoned. To point up the appropriate ways in which constructs may more or less well be set to work I shall go on to look at some drawings by Van Doesburg, Mondrian and Paul Klee. The first two artists may be seen to be employing methods of drawing which they feel to be a way of creating, out of the observable objects of study, pictorial space of a new kind whose pictorial intelligibility is to be characterized as a manifestation of the Theory of Neo-Plasticism. We shall see, incidentally, the pedagogical error of relating a pictorial matter too closely to its visual beginnings. Neo-Plasticism provides good examples of the case to

be grasped as a fundamentally pictorial issue.

I then turn to Paul Klee, in pursuit, (Pedagogical Notebooks, The Thinking Eye, V.I), of "The Essential Nature of Objects", in order to look at the conceptual issues of importance to him in his search for the essential nature of an object.

I.2 Constraints of Pictorial Space as they concern concern both Artist and Observer.

The artist as agent must concern himself with pictorial space. Whatever the field of expression the product of reflective and practical activity is an object fundamentally governed by the constraints and compass of pictorial space (see I.3.3 and I.4.I). The artwork has pictorial integrity. It has a surface. This integrity of surface governs the way the viewer regards the spatial relations of the work, in two or three-dimensional terms, as it might be, as pertaining to the pictorial context of the work and the manner by which it engages the attention of a viewer, in its conceptual context.[8] As may be seen in many Seventeenth Century Dutch paintings, [9] what may be explored for a number of reasons is a breakdown of the distinction between painted space and actual space; the eye is readily advised. A sculpture, it might be supposed, is incapable of the same kind of integrity, but the supposition is wrong. The sculptor, no less than the painter, is concerned with the constraints of pictorial space. However I shall not deal specifically with a sculptor's problems since they deserve a good deal more attention than I can presently give.

Pictorial space, for any artist, is a fact of life. It might be called an aesthetic fact, to be sure, but as far as we may take a person to be an artist we may take it that his agency is

necessarily engaged upon its creation. Thus while the notions of space he works with may be construed aesthetically, his working concerns are rightly construed in the context of his agency.

The space of an artwork however expressed is a complex. The elements which together make it a complex have a relation to each other. The framework or format the artist decides to impose in making a two-dimensional work,sets the context within which the marks he has made have juxtaposition. The new student has to be warned not to regard the format or frame as some unrelated, mere, boundary. An example will help. I might ask: if I draw a square and put a circle into it, how many shapes have I made? When this question is put to students they do not always see that I have made not two shapes only, but three: the square, the circle and the complex unit in which the third is given in the shape of the space the circle creates within the square. The nature of the relation between these parts of the complex image is integral yet without the context of the format - the square - they are not in relation. For the contextual format to be other than it is is for there to be a quite different image which exacts a different response from its viewer. I shall explore further matters pertaining to the factitious nature of pictorial space at greater length in the section taken up with the exercise of an objective drawing. Before I outline some of the notions involved in a concern with pictorial space, it may help to illustrate the importance of the matter, not only to the artist, but also to the observer since, as Chapter II. will show, the concerns of the observer are by no means remote in the agent-concerns of the artist. Let us see what happens if we try for an example to make three-dimensional something which is necessarily two-dimensional.

It may seem like a thing nobody would attempt, but a persuasive attempt has been made to do just that. This raises a number of issues, not least significant of which is the possibility that the attempt might, under certain conditions be successful. Recently a furniture design project explored the idea of making 'masterpieces' - or Furniture of the Painting.[10] Thus we might possess, it might be supposed, a De Chirico chair, a Cézanne table. Consider first the objections which are easiest to grasp. Apart from the difficulties of sitting on the chair or putting a glass on the table, with any degree of confidence, which is itself very irritating, there is a deep contradiction in attempting to put into volumetric terms on object whose pictorial sense - distortion and all - rests in that object's being necessarily two-dimensional (see I. 7.2). This example is useful in that it very nicely makes my point about contextual nature of pictorial space but it also raises a number of other interesting and related points. It happens that, for one thing, we can only see that this furniture is by way of being 'from the painting' by standing in one place to look at it; seeing it as if we were seeing it in two-dimensions. As regards the matter of thereby having a Cézanne table or a de Chirico chair there are two ways of avoiding absurdity. It is still possible to buy chairs and tables such as those painted by the Masters. You might try and see what it would be to paint their portraits in the manner of Cézanne or de Chirico. It would be an instructive thing to do. Otherwise you might simply buy yourself some cheap reproduction of the paintings. That is really the only way that I know of possessing a 'de Chirico Chair' or a 'Cézanne Table', other than actually



Vilmos Huszar
Interior schemes for Bruynzeel family, 1920
De Stijl V.5, May 1922

* 11 see footnote

owning the works or their furniture. However, the matter is not quite despatched, for we may take the matter further:

As the illustrations opposite show, it has long been thought possible to consider interior design in painting terms.[11]

Indeed that seems to work well enough. Walking into a painting is somehow conceivable. But why? It is not a trivial point to say that one example works and the other just doesn't - though it may seem rather absurd. The real point here is that pictorial space sets very particular constraints. To 'turn' an essentially two-dimensional object into a three-dimensional object is to misunderstand the nature of the pictorial space in question. If a painted interior is meant by the artist to work as a wrap-around pictorial space, then why should it not work as such? Of course, it does.

The question remains: what sort of thing would we be getting in buying these pieces of furniture? We have seen that we should not thereby have bought ourselves a de Chirico Chair or a Cézanne Table; but we would be buying objects whose starting point had been paintings. As such this would put the Chair-piece or Table-piece, rather curiously, somewhat on a par with the paintings. Just as the paintings refer to the external world of chairs and tables, for the sake of the pictorial space of the paintings, so the furniture-pieces refer to an external world, whose objects are in this case paintings, for the sake of the pictorial space of the furniture-pieces. These pieces may seem to work for the spectator on the basis of allusion; for we get the point only if we know that to which they allude. The allusion is wrought on the basis of a three-dimensional transcription of two-dimensional objects. To propose the other possibility, of

the furniture-of-the-painting, is contradictory as we have already seen.

To give another example of its being a mistake to regard artworks as being too closely about reality, we might take the work of a modern painter Georg Baselitz. [12] Recently he has used inverted images. His paintings seem therefore to be about things which are upside down. The spectator tries to turn upside down to see them but finds that the images don't work right way up; they only work as upside down images when seen from rightway up, which is to see them as upside down. It seems right to say that Baselitz's paintings create for us an image of upside-downness which has its sense only in terms of seeing it as being upside down. All sense is lost by up-ending the image, or the spectator. The spatial inconsistencies have their point, which is a point about reality: the presence, the attention of an observer[13]. Baselitz I suspect makes us believe in some real space in the world which need never to have existed. That it does or does not, however, is important for this reason:reality is visually puzzling. From the painter's standpoint this is a matter which is pictorially intriguing and valuable. From any standpoint concern with the particular structure of a given pictorial space focuses such questions about reality whose meaning can only be satisfactorily taken in pictorial terms. So, to return to the furniture; admittedly it turns out never to have been anything but a pretty and maddening caprice, an impossibility as furniture. But we can at least say that what it does show us, which is much more interesting than the initiators of the enterprise may, or needed to, have foreseen, is the extent of our response to the operation of the format upon the images selected

for attention by the painter. That which he wants to do is constrained from the outset in all its visual aspects of pictorial space, which needfully includes the format he opts to deploy (see III. 3.5.2). From the observer's point of view that is why it is necessary to stand in one place to see that the furniture is Of The Painting. We need to see it at the right angle. But that is to see the painting; and that is why I have not bothered to include any illustration. The 'furniture' can help us to recognize something about the pictorial space of the paintings we might have thought we already know. Furthermore we know from this that unequivocally, "the viewer is compositionally as well as functionally implied". [15] Further consideration of the spectator as agent is the subject of Chapter II.

I.3. An Objective Drawing Exercise

When an art student is set an exercise of objective drawing this is what happens: an object, or group of objects, is set out on a surface so that the students in the class each have a clear vantage point. The group is usually set up in order to emphasize some particular pictorial problem. The students may be asked to consider now they might deal pictorially with the effects upon the object of a strong light source; the surface textures of the objects of different substance, and so on. From the teaching point of view we may regard the exercise as set up to help the student to develop the ability to cope with certain kinds of problem.[16] He will be asked, for example, to make careful observations in a given medium of the objects before him and to take account of related or associated phenomena; to bring to his

observations an imaginative conception of the group of objects and associated phenomena (see I.7.4). He will, moreover, also be expected to give evidence in the drawing of some apprehension of formal attributes as conventionally associated in the visual arts with objects as ordinarily perceived ('form', 'tone, 'line' etc). What is of fundamental importance is that the student produces a piece of work which shows his personal point of view concerning the perceived objects, in a two-dimensional statement which is a visual object in its own right.

I.3.1. A disclaimer concerning the terminology:

Objective drawing is the name given to an exercise. The exercise is designed to develop the capability to make pictorial matter of perceptible things. Thus a relation between the student and the perceptible thing is given in the agent-concern of the student. The concerns must be with the thing he is going to make. The drawing is a factitious object. The term 'objective drawing' should not be understood in this connection as indicative of a particular philosophical stance with regard to the real. The question, regarding the matter whether there might be some objective reality, is at issue here only insofar as it has a bearing upon the artwork. For the present it is my purpose to describe an exercise, exploring the terminology only in that it seems to extend our understanding of this aspect of the agency of an artist: the making of pictorial space.

The student is encouraged to experiment. Thus he might pay special attention to some qualities, some relationships, some part of his imaginative prospect of the objects of study. He is encouraged to take his account as far as he thinks justified

with reference to any of these aspects of attention. He is encouraged to concern himself with the practicalities of abstraction, thus furthering his own level of understanding about abstraction. The drawing he completes will itself be an entity, an artefact; its own internal relationships are crucially important and the cohesiveness of approach achieved in his work is considered a measure of the success of the exercise.

I.3.2 Success and Veracity.

It must be said that talk about success is recognized to be problematic. The drawing teacher cannot set upper limits to achievement; it follows that he cannot assess the ultimate success of this exercise in terms of having 'correctly' solved problems (see I.6). There just are no set answers and since the problems are in the main not such as to conform to the limits of definition there really could not be right answers. Nevertheless he may try to set minimal limits to achievement. There is no doubt that occasionally a student's drawing fails to convince. A number of factors are involved in doing the drawing: basic handling abilities facilitate performance; what is expressed takes its authority from more than one source and presenting evidence of a variety of influences requires intelligent and sensitive consideration and handling. It is as well to state that there is such a thing as a bad drawing. But what do we look for in a good drawing? What follows is by no means only the case in respect of objective drawings, as such. We should recognize that any artwork whatsoever may in its early stages involve a great



deal of drawing. Drawing should be regarded as the core study in any concern with the making of works of art. For a while it was relegated almost to oblivion in the Schools of Art, but happily its importance is being recognized once more. It is, as I shall show in Chapter III. 7.2.3. vital as a form of thinking in the agency of the artist in any connection. A good drawing has veracity; it is without prejudice to its non-propositional status, a true account of something. This by no means limits the drawing to the function of transcription for it may as a drawing be true of a great many things, not all of which have perceptible characteristics. That which marks such a drawing may show us things we should be unable to discover about the object by looking at the object itself. To take an example of a mundane sort, an engineering illustration is able to show us, by means of a cutaway view of a component, that which neither I nor the camera could disclose. Interestingly such a drawing is far better at showing, at putting the spectator into contact with, this component than a photograph ever could be.[18] Such a drawing shows us how something is, but the way the drawing looks is not the way the object looks to us (although we readily believe that this is just the way the object looks to us). The veracity of that drawing is that it convinces us about the way in which that object, in some necessary aspect, is made and functions.[17] If such a drawing should be confusing to look at we cannot grasp what is being conveyed regarding the object. Such a drawing would in this respect be deficient. A thoroughly bad drawing of this kind fails completely to be of use.

That the objectives are easier to state in the case of an engineering illustration does not prejudice the argument for other



cases, regarding the veracity of a drawing as being a mark of its being a good drawing and the lack of it as a mark of a bad drawing. I enclose a drawing which I would rate a thorough-going bad piece of work. What makes me say so? For one thing, it is anatomically sadly improbable and since, apparently, a literal, naturalistic presentation is intended, then he might have taken the trouble to work out the likely disposition of one set of haunches with regard to another as they occupy the bench, or is it a tree? The drawing is lazy, unconvincing. Not only that, I find myself wanting to add comments of a less than respectful kind, in balloons. Something about the ideas at work in the drawing is risible and offensive. It is however, not that the man can't draw, for he is well enough reckoned on technical competence; it is that 'The Three Graces' suffer the artist's customary derisory treatment; all is reduced to coyness, stockbroker's blondes discovered on the patio. Drawing itself is turned prostitute. For a contrast let us confront a drawing by Egon Schiele. Rebarbitive, not the least bit risible. The drawing is convincing, painfully right. This is, as the other drawing is not, a work in good faith, of shattering veracity. (see Chapter II. 4.4 on testimony).

For the art student, as he sets out to make an objective drawing of any object, what is asked of him is an honest approach to his own concerns. There are no short cuts in drawing, and the clarity and directness of Schiele is hard won. Nevertheless an honest and searching enquiry is not the prerogative of the emotionally riven: neither need it wait upon experience (see I. 3.4).

I.3.3. Setting up the Exercise.

I have given an outline of the teaching objectives of the exercise. I want now to undertake for myself the exercise as it might be undertaken by any student, or for that matter any artist as he follows up his various concerns. The point of the exercise is to demonstrate a fundamental aspect of artistic agency which is that an artwork is, as a pictorial statement, a manifestation of the several concerns of one person. In this thesis as a whole I shall be exploring the necessity of certain of these concerns to the agency, as such, of any artist. This section deals expressly with the manner in which an artist pursues an attention to the perceptible object in terms of the sort of pictorial statement he is wanting to make. Certain constraints attend his endeavours. The perceptible attributes of the object before him; question of pictorial space; the manner, in terms of medium and construct, in which his statement is to be construed. These points have been raised already (see I.2). I mean now to take them further. It would be impracticable for the present purpose to indicate the number of drawings which might ordinarily be involved as preliminaries to a study or set of studies so I will try to show in my drawings how such a study might proceed by giving a partial indication of the stages of its development and of only some of the possible directions in which I might extend its progress. Later, in Chapter III I do try to show more of the progress in the different context of the pursuits of a landscape painter.

An Objective Drawing Exercise.

Apart from the fact that my drawing skills are less uncertain than theirs, my task is comparable with that faced by my students,

for the problems I shall encounter as I work are problems we would have in common working side by side. Although any medium may be used provided it is suitable to a two-dimensional study, I shall use pencil; this allows me to convey tonal differences particularly well. Not using colour simplifies the exercise for the purpose both of its description and ease of reproduction. As we can see, some objectives are already set. They act as constraints upon what I can do.

There are ten illustrations, including the photograph taken of the object after I completed my drawings, which were done from life. I did not work from photographs for the reason that to have done so would be to have supposed it possible to save myself some of the selection processes precisely necessary to the understanding of an important part of the exercise. The photograph is two-dimensional. I have, in drawing, to discover what is involved in presenting a two-dimensional account of three-dimensional objects. But we should not put the two-dimensionality of the photograph on a par with the two-dimensionality of the drawing. Drawing involves a process of transcription which I need to be engaged in to some extent in this exercise, although it is not the sum of my concerns. (This point will be argued more fully in 1.7.3) Now the photograph does not stand to the object as the drawing stands to the object. For one thing a photograph is not a transcription but a partially recorded visual image. Copying from a partial record of a three-dimensional object is not going to meet the brief, even so far as the skills of transcription are concerned. However, since it would be impracticable to include the object in my thesis the photograph is provided to give as clear a partial record of the object as possible.

In a paper on the nature of photographic material Kendall Walton makes a persuasive case for regarding the photograph as transparent, "A photograph... is not just a means of producing pictures. It is also an aid to vision."[18]

Now what I am not about, as will become quite clear, is the business of seeing an object more clearly. My business is with making factitious images; thus it would not be at all to my purpose to work laboriously at a copy of a photograph. This would, if Walton is correct, mean that, whatever else I was after, it could not take me very far in my pictorial concerns. Even in the event of my being concerned with transcription, drawing from life and drawing from a photograph are fundamentally distinctive as endeavours; Walton distinguishes "seeing through photographs and seeing directly" as "different modes of perception." Even given his case that in seeing a photograph of an ancestor we "really do, literally, see our..ancestors..",[19] which might perhaps be hard to accept, we must accept that perceptual contact can be mediated in a variety of ways, including photographs. But that what a photograph is doing, and a painting or drawing is not, is effecting a way of "maintaining contact, perceptual contact, with the world". Thus to work from a photograph of an object is to be in pursuit of precisely that which the exercise is not designed to produce: perceptual knowledge of the object. Whatever Walton says about the nature of painterly realism, which I might not wholeheartedly support, he does seem to me to say that about photographic realism which allows me to say that the photograph does not stand to the object as the drawing stands to the object.

I.3.4 The Exercise as undertaken by myself.

(For comment on the frames, see over.)


SAVON
ŒILLET-MIGNARDISE
CARNATION
ROGER GALLET
PARIS
FRANCE

Frame 1.

A photograph of the object as perceived. There are two sources of light; one from top left and the other indirectly from bottom right. The object is a soap box, quite richly decorative - I chose it myself and like it very much; I liked the soap too.



2



3·i



3·ii

Frame 2.

Once I turn my attention to what I might do I have to consider the pieces of paper as a space, empty. Any mark I put down has reference to the shape of the paper. I will give myself a format, or frame. (Since the illustrations have been put in groups, this stage is perhaps hard to envisage.)
Frame 2 indicates that I start with a blank sheet. The point is that there is a need to establish a scale. I shall continue to work within this format.

Frames 3i & 3ii.

Having set the format, or frame, a further question of scale has to be decided. The scale of drawing relative to the frame makes a surprising difference, compare 3i. & 3ii. Frame 3ii. fills the space and is very significant; the remaining spaces are also made significant (cf. p.16). This is perhaps because the spaces which remain in frame 3ii. have more obviously noticable boundaries. In frame 3i. the impression is of much greater space; a much slighter image.

3i. The image almost vanishes from view. If I wanted to emphasize the vastness of its surrounding space and its own insignificance as an object, this scale might suit me. However, the space left by so small an image is rather formless, the object too small to be visually interesting - it does not accord with my feelings for the pictorial possibilities of the object on the table.





Frames 4i & 4ii.

4i. I opt to keep to the scale of frame 3i. Now I consider it as an object in light. Note that as soon as I start to draw I have to memorize, for the moment I start looking at my piece of paper and drawing I have stopped, although momentarily, looking at the box. I have to retain some image of the impression to record anything. I also have to create; to relate line to line, tone to tone. Also I must still concern myself with the perceived object. I find a means of relating pencil tones which satisfies these conditions. I am transcribing for the moment.

4ii. Now the 'remaining' space becomes very important. I am still much concerned with the box I can see but what I do next has reference not only to the space and light around the box but also to the 'space' and 'light' in the frame. In this frame the object dominates the space, tonal emphasis underlines this dominance. The greater emphasis of features found in frame 4i, i.e. these areas in shadow, can either be left alone, as no more than a heavier working of frame 4i, or it can lead to further notions, such as 'dominance'. A mood has already been created but it is tentative. The question now is how do I deal with it? Cautiously I consider the possibility of allowing the drawing to express a deliberate mood. What kind of mood will rest upon what happens next. Transcription is not now at the forefront of my concerns. Yet it will probably recur.


SAVON
ROGER GALLET

Frame 5.

I decide to put in the graphics. The labels are decorative. This adds both to an impression of perspective at the same time creating a decorative emphasis to the whole, although to emphasize the graphics requires a slight distortion of perspective, which I am slightly doubtful about. However, the tone is decorative, intricate. I am strongly tempted to leave it here, being much taken with decorative objects. Yet the question of mood might be further resolved, not in terms of surface design but in terms of the structure of the object in particular conditions of light.

I decide to ignore the graphics and concentrate instead upon frame 4ii. again, upon 'dominance'. Two possibilities emerge. I could work on another kind of mood: say, the threatening aspect of 'dominance' or I could instead look for formal relationships of plane and line.

Being unhappy with the notion of dominance in this context (it feels quite inappropriate) I become fascinated for the moment with the second possibility; the relationship of forms.

Looking back at frame 4ii, it occurs to me that I might within the terms of the exercise play a little game with the shapes and tonal relationships. As a melody can be inverted so might the juxtaposition of related images.



6i



6ii

Frames 6i & 6ii.

6i. Comparing this frame with frame 4ii., the 'inversion' is clear enough. The emphasis of the images is now in counterchange; the only purpose, so far as I can see, being to give me a clearer indication of a certain relation between the place surfaces within my drawing. The perspective is 'lost' and the earlier mood quite dissipated. Perhaps mood as such is no longer a feature. I am not sure, however, that another is not being created. For the moment I will go on reducing the images, concentrating not upon mood, as such, but rather upon line and plane. A game is on and I must see where it leads me.

6ii. By now I have reduced the image to a recognizable minimum of line. It cannot be further reduced, or abstracted, without its becoming exceedingly difficult to relate the drawing to the box on the table. Now, I am allowed to take an account as far as I judge it fit; I could therefore abandon any attempt to refer further to the box on the table, so long as I could justify doing so in the terms of the exercise.

The problem rests with me to consider my feelings about the box on the table, the object of study; with its own relationships. I have feelings about both objects. It seems to me important to further a visual account which relates, as it seems to me truly, insofar as it is ever possible, to the drawing as a drawing and to the box (see the discussion of veracity. I.3.2)

I have to assess the progress so far and to decide where frame 6ii. has brought me. It seems that this frame establishes the most purely formal account so far. In frame 6ii. I have done

something not done before; I have reduced the form in its space to line, a minimally inclusive account of the pictorial form of the object and the space it occupies. There could be, of course, other 'minimal' accounts besides this one, and the questions attending the issue of what it is to pare down the observable content of a drawing to a minimum, the constraints of the case, are indeed of considerable interest to me.

But I do not like the account at all; I think it is even a little worrying as an image and since I am increasingly involved in the drawing as an image I am forced into a dilemma, for despite my concentration upon a predominantly formal construction it seems to me that I am still concerned with mood - what I have in frame 6ii is a drawing which does express rather a disturbing mood. Now the formal progression seems unavoidable yet wrong because it denies certain important responses to the box I am studying; this in turn adversely affects my regard for my reduction of form and something else, not knowing at this stage quite what 'something else' might be. What is lacking in the formal approach seems to be a feeling of sympathy; some important relationship between the drawn and the seen is not expressed by drawing in this manner, so coldly, as it seems to me. This is pictorially rather unsatisfactory.

I must retrace my steps to consider frame 5 once more. This one I enjoyed. Enjoyment is always a little suspect, perhaps because it can lead to indulgence and thereby to errors of judgement. However, the rigorous attention to form cost me the awareness of other key qualities so I will examine this earlier frame and see if it might be seriously developed. It seems to me

that if I leave out the decorative graphics I have in this case left out an awful lot; it seems that this intricate relationship to the box-form is significant. Consider the undoubted fact that it was the design on the box that sold me the soap - change that and I might, nearly, as well buy Palmolive. What is now and perhaps always was of concern is the persuasive charm of that design. At the risk of being self-indulgent frame 5 will be the subject of further development.


MIGNARDISE


SAVON
MIGNARDISE
GALET

Frame 7i & 7ii.

7i. In frame 7i, something of the form is retained by running two graphic images together, the lettering and the illustration (the 'flowers') and, in doing so, using the semi-circular light patch on the right side of the box, (see frames 4i & 4ii) I have turned one quality to account in the service of another. That is to say, the formal qualities of the earlier drawings are employed in combination with the graphic and decorative aspects of frame 5. The illustration, however, is only hinted at in frame 7i. I seem to have worked 'OEILLET' both as word and image at the expense of other associations. It is a good word to draw with.

7ii. This is better; the form of the box and the form given by the light are taken care of by the semi-circular disposition of lettering. I can afford to 'lose' the box at the bottom corner - this still allows a suggestion of something contained, some indication in the graphics of that which the box might be designed to hold. What I want is to convey some notion of that unseen object, for which the entire package is advertisment. If I miss that element in my drawing, I have missed, if not everything, a great deal. Whether I know beforehand the precise contents of the box or not is as such perhaps really not important.

I should in any case know it was a box - certainly I would want to know its contents - I do know that boxes can be opened. The contents of the box, whether known or guessed at are after all of some importance, in that they become a matter of curiosity, itself a considerable force, capable of creative expression. Consider poor Pandora. What troubles had been spared the world had she but remembered pencil and paper.

One thing that could be said about having made such a set of drawings is that the outcome presents some kind of record of multiple response. This set of what designers term 'rough visuals' has involved my skills, and feelings. But above all it has exercised the capacity to develop in pictorial terms a factitious product of reflective activity. The connection between the perceived object, the box, and the object I have made is complex. My drawing refers to the box (see III. 3.2 re 'aspecting'). It also had, whatever its reference to that object, its own pictorial relationship of form. The object on the table has to be seen as necessary to the object I have created yet it would be an error to say it could be sufficient to inform the created thing. In a way I could say that if anything was necessary to this outcome it was the wish to make a drawing combined with the trained capacity to respond to an object on the table in the way I have. That capacity is not dependent upon the box, as the object of study since any other object would or could stimulate a response - indeed the exercise positively requires that such skills and capabilities be developed and employed regardless of the choice of object. "In the formative vision everything is equalized, i.e. enters into relationships, because by their nature the artist's experiences synthesize." [20]

I have described the activity in this section of the Chapter. The next section is concerned with further discussion of some of the conceptual and practical problems raised by consideration of the objectives of the exercise. The exercise of objective drawing as undertaken in the example serves to illustrate the fundamental importance to the artist, in whatever area of creative concern, of the fact of pictorial space.

The possibility of this fact depends entirely on the reflective and practical endeavours of the artist. Whatever his concerns with stimuli, of whatever kind, he attends to them for the sake of that which he must, "on pain of loss of self", [21] bring into being. The agency of an artist is, necessarily, the engagement of his personal concerns in the making of artworks; individual objects of factitious, pictorial space. Otherwise his agency as an artist is unfulfilled.

If we consider the matter of drawing a box in this way, we can see that what is going on at all stages of the exercise supports this. It is a peculiarity of the case that whatever the stimulus or starting point the emergent statement of the agent is conceptually un-resolved as a statement yet, simultanrously, it is a factitious object. That is to say, each little study in the series shows a progress; a partial resolution of ideas. In each some feature of the preceding study is retained; some feature of the next anticipated. Yet although there is imperfect resolution of ideas each study is a pictorial fact; a manifestation of reflective and practical activity at a point of development; malleable yet, but with pictorial fixity. The last study is intended to state as much as I am concerned to deal with in the terms set by my choice of object and the ideas about drawing it with which I have been engaged. Any number of alternative accounts would of course be possible under someone else's hand; I make no claims to having given a definitive approach, even on my own account. [22] What the example is intended to show is that this kind of making is involved from the outset in the business of figurative representation of a fairly straightforward

sort, such as might be agreed to be true of objective drawing. I would again stress that concern with pictorial space is involved in the agency of an artist whatever the form of making in which he is concerned.

I.4. Spatial concerns of a pictorial sort:

Some examples.

We need now to look at some considerations relevant to the notion of pictorial space before going on to expand upon what is involved in its making. I have characterized pictorial space as factitious; a created space. Once involved in its making an artist must attend to certain spatial concerns.

I.4.1 Real Space; the real space of the ground.

For example, in the drawing I chose to work within the format of a rectangle measuring six cm. by seven cm. Related to that format we must then attend to the real scale of the images set within the rectangle. Thus in my format (see illustration frame 6i, I.3.4) I might place two tonal areas, one being 1.5cm. at its widest; the other, 2cm. at its widest. The relationships of scale between any and all of the elements may be described in terms of real space. Recollect the illustration of this point made earlier (see I.2).

I.4.2. Illusory Space.

The contrivance of real space which presents the images in such a way as to suggest relations of scale which may deny the relationships of real space in that they would appear to be other than they actually are. The painter devises illusions of depth,

distance, height, and so on, so that, to the eye of the observer a sky arches above a distant ruined castle in an Eighteenth Century Romantic Landscape. In my drawing 5 (see I.3.4) I am about rather a similar business. It would be a mistake to think of illusory space as a matter of concern only to a painter of boxes or Romantic Landscape, or that he could possibly be disregarding, as he creates his illusions, of the constraints of the real space of his canvas. We should note, although I cannot illustrate the point, that, in painting, real space also involves the dimension given in the use of colour fields. Picasso's 'Seated Woman', 1927, would not only appear to be other than it is were it not for a considerable expanse of cadmium red; it would be in a real spatial sense, other than it is. Colour must here be considered, surprising though it often seems to students, in the context of a three-dimensional spectrum. Thus we are adding a third dimension into the two-dimensional format although it is within the real constraints of a two-dimensional format that the colour dimension has its effect.

Still on the matter of illusory space, the latter drawings on the objective study series, from 6i (I.3.3) right through to 7ii, while clearly not concerned with pictorial verisimilitude are certainly concerned with creating mood, atmosphere. In this respect, I am about a similar business to the landscape painter using chiascuro to set the tone of his painting. The spectator knows from this the stance with which he should as onlooker approach this prospect. You could say that part of what I intend in the last drawing is to re-create in you the rarefied pictorial pleasures of my having purchased a certain brand of soap. Such pleasures are not, I would have said fully to be expressed in

drawing no. 5, but something more may be included by drawing as I did, at 7i and 7ii. Furthermore, that 'something' is not like sprinkling the drawing with perfume; it is to do with your seeing my pictorial point. My pleasure is to be grasped as an image.

The factitious character of pictorial space is well, though not only, illustrated by those works in which no reference to the world of objects, no external meanings or symbols, attach to the disposition of images on the canvas. I refer especially to the works of abstract painters. Their meaning is to be found in the context of their pictorial configuration. The format and the elements within it are made one; a cohesive complex image in which no element has independent meaning. The painters who address themselves to the problems of abstraction give us the clearest examples, but of course what is true of these formally particular paintings regarding their pictorial cohesion, turns out to be no less true of any painting whatever.

I.5. Nervous Apprehension as a Mark of Pictorial Commitment.

Since I hold the view that the agency of the artist is deliberative in character, it is relevant to my present purposes to consider the artist's feelings as he takes on the business of making an artwork. A certain commitment on the possible product, the artefact, can occasion feelings of unease. I want now, therefore to ask a leading question:

What is the first moment in an artwork? Starting from the example of objective drawing we will now consider a matter which causes problems regardless of the particular pictorial context. I have put it that the making of pictorial space is a condition of

artistic agency. It follows that we cannot, if this condition is unfulfilled, posit the agent as artist. It is in these circumstances not surprising if as an artist confronts a clean canvas, or piece of paper, he experiences a moment of nervous apprehension. I suggest that this moment of difficulty is commensurate with a commitment towards making an artwork; that it goes so far as to involve some apprehension of the particularity of the pictorial entity intended. Some part of the difficulty may be due to the knowledge that this commitment lies in the agent's power of decision. I am concerned to show the interdependency of reflective and practical activity in the making of an artwork. An artist has, in addressing himself to the making of an artwork to settle the direction of his pictorial concerns at some point, and the question arises as to what might be called the first moment at which he does so: the 'first moment' in a work of art.

It has been put to me that on the face of it the first moment is no different from any subsequent moment in which deliberative action is required. I believe that a case can be made for there being certain distinguishing features. The question I want to consider is what it is that distinguishes the first moment, in starting a drawing or painting, from subsequent moments in the activity. This is a matter to which I shall return in Chapter III. in connection with a discussion of the relation between the reflective and practical aspects of the activity of painting. We shall attend here to its relevance to a discussion of what it is to become concerned with creating an entity of some particular pictorial sort. Let us move from the drawing of the box and consider the question by way of further examples. We might suppose that one answer to the question is that the first moment, so-called, involves marking a hitherto unmarked surface. This is

to change the visible space at once. It gains a pictorial fixity directly. Subsequent marks take account of that mark but they develop rather than initiate a progress (see II.4.3). This might seem to meet the question; we have indeed noted this sort of progress in the objective drawing exercise. However, there are problems. We have to consider whether we should ask if the first mark occurs at the first moment, or whether the first mark constitutes the first moment. A concern with pictorial space may be an on-going preoccupation but at some point the artist has to give his preoccupation form. Should we characterize the beginning of a work in terms of its first visible evidence, or should we perhaps think of the beginning as some moment of commitment to a particular pictorial prospect? The question is really to do with what it is to take up a particular stance with regard to the nature of the prospective work. The feeling of unease which attends this deliberative activity is, I shall argue, evidence of the artist's recognition of a necessary condition of his agency, his personal involvement in the creation of some pictorial entity.

First I want to consider the mark as constituting the moment. To suggest that the first mark inevitably occurs at the first moment may be wrong as some examples will show. Suppose the first moment of a drawing involves me in contemplating drawing but does not involve my making a mark at all; it may not involve observable action for some time and may perhaps at this stage be rather like a random receipt of impressions. An early stage of this creative process could involve no more than a moment of awareness, which might lead to the decisive act of drawing. Such a progression might take seconds or years. I might tell someone "It has taken me forty-five years to start this drawing".

But now let us suppose that the mark is the only mark and wholly constitutes the drawing; this cannot be to say that the mark is the moment unless we can show that marks which artists make have no reflective or practical history. Since my case concerning the artist as agent implies a concern with pictorial concerns as a constant preoccupation, this will clearly not do. Let us consider a different kind of case. Suppose I have equipped myself with both paint and brush in order to repaint the dining room. If instead of the first and fiftieth stroke being succeeded by others in the appropriate way to the purpose of re-painting the dining room, I go on after a moment's consideration to create instead a miracle of trompe l'oeil or just a wild but decorative flourish, then that mark, so innocently made leads not to a painted wall merely, but to a wallpainting. Now it must be admitted that I cannot say the first mark of such a work was made at the first moment of settling the question of the character of this particular pictorial space. In this example something rather curious happens; the first moment of the wallpainting has succeeded a mark put down upon another purpose. Something about that mark occasions me to change what I was doing. The first moment of the new activity follows in this case upon the last mark of the original, other activity. Thus the first moment of a new activity is subsequent upon that mark and requires it, but I contend it is still separate. Yet it could be said that since the mark occasions a new activity and is also not set aside but part of the activity, it would appear that that mark does occur exactly at the moment of change. The problem is to know how to deal with the link which seems to be appearing between the end of one activity and the beginning of another. Since the outcome of

the two activities is distinctively dissimiliar there is something amiss with any review of the mark which does not distinguish between its status as the last of one kind and the first of another kind of activity. I have changed the entire nature of my activity, for I began by painting the dining room and I shall finish by having painted a mural. I have become concerned not with the dining room space but with a pictorial space. (The dining room may have in the end to be relocated).

There is, of course, a discontinuity which pertains rather to the moment at which I realize what has happened than to the mark itself. Since it would be absurd to entertain any notion of the mark as changing itself, it might be better to think instead of some of the difficulty attending the first moment of a drawing or mural being associated with that moment of consideration, which might involve some of the nervousness about the unknown aspects of what might happen that accompanies the commencement of any artwork. Although the wall in the dining room has long gone past being in any sense a blank canvas by the time I have changed my intentions, changing the circumstances of its treatment might be tantamount, as an experience, to confronting the clean surface of a new canvas. The first mark of the work is accompanied by practical and reflective commitment. It is the first indication of the sort of entity the artwork could conceivably become. It is the coming together of the many factors which produce that mark; a perhaps sudden awareness of the possibilities of the product of unnoticed occurrences: this realization it is which, both after that mark is put down but most especially before sets up a peculiar nervous apprehension. It is only experienced in conjunction with the active intent (see II.4.1). To feel it is

to be at the beginning of the business of doing a painting or drawing; to begin a painting or drawing is to feel it to some extent, even if the feeling is not inevitably unpleasant. D.H.Lawrence, "It is to me the most exciting moment - when you have a blank canvas and a big brush full of wet colour, and you plunge."[23] The possible withdrawal from the activity at any stage makes no difference to this being so. To have reached this moment of difficulty is to apprehend something unavoidable: the malleable and sensitive nature of the process of making an artwork and the fact that commitment is required to see it through. Thus it would seem that there is some distinction between some first moment and the first visible evidence of the painting. But what distinguishes this moment from subsequent moments of decision in the activity? The reflective considerations which precede the practical activity of painting are no guarantee of a painting, but we may yet say that an inadvertant mark can occasion such considerations. It is also the case that nervous apprehension is ordinarily experienced in diminishing proportion as the practical activity advances. The conception of the artwork is least well-formed, is at its most vulnerable at that first moment for I do not know yet how good an idea it can become and cannot in the least bit begin to find out until that mark is made.

This is still not enough to account for the difference between the first and subsequent moments of apprehension in the activity because, since I cannot know how good it is until the work is finished, a measure of uncertainty remains until that moment is reached, and sometimes beyond. What we can say is that this earliest noticeable moment differs from others in being the last before the engagement upon some practical pictorial endeavour.

I will conclude this section with a disclaimer. In saying that this moment is distinct from subsequent moments in the activity and that this moment does not occur simultaneously with the first mark of the painting I might appear to be positing some separation between the idea and its practical outcome, such that the idea might be one thing and its realization something else. What I do not want to say is that my apprehensive feelings are due to fears that the idea can never be matched by my efforts. Such a view might set up 'the moment' as a kind of bridge between the reflective and the practical and as the means needful to some concrete realization of the idea. There is, as I shall show, in Chapter III, in the introductory section, a good case to be made for considering the stages involved in producing an artwork distinctively, but this in no way allows us to suppose that ideas stand distinctively before or above, or against their realization at any point in the process. The notion of pictorial space is artefactual in orientation. It seems to me vital to stress the lively nature of the preliminary processes. We may say this: ideas may not have to be fully expressed to be possible as ideas, yet for them to be pictorial ideas requires that we regard the possibility of their practical expression as of central importance. The difficulty of that first moment, or if you will, the last moment before some pictorially particular practical activity begins, is due to nervousness regarding the consequential nature of the decision to paint X, draw X and so on. It is this which in the example of the dining room marks the end of the decoration of the walls, merely, and the beginning of the wall-painting. This is what is involved in the artist's recognition of the kind of his agency and the weight of his commitment to the making of pictorial space.

I.6. Is the Deliberative Activity of Making artworks a Goal-directed Activity?

I shall not enter into a discussion of Intention Theory in this enquiry. Although it is likely that useful observations might be made about Intention by looking at what goes on in the making of artworks, it would be to become involved in a range of problems many of which, as such, are not my present concern. Suffice it to say that my thesis is testimony to the activities involved in the agent-concerns of the artist as deliberative and thus, intentional in character. "If we wanted to say something about art that we could be quite certain was true, we might opt for the assertion that art is intentional. By this we would mean that art is something we do, that works of art are things that human beings make." [24]

In a deliberative activity, such as making an objective drawing, questions arise concerning the nature of that which is desired either as an outcome of, or as a formative influence upon the activity. The drawing teacher has certain art-educational objectives which include that the student learns to develop pictorial objectives. It is possible to think of such desires, or wants, in terms of their being goals. We might regard art-educational objectives in rather his way, though I doubt that the drawing teacher would want to specify limitations as to ends. The success of the exercise must always be hard to gauge (see I.3.2). There are numerous activities for which one may ask reasons why [25] and be unable to give an answer of any great clarity in terms of their being goal-directed or not. To be the person doing an objective drawing rather than the drawing teacher who wants him to do it is to be engaged upon just such a

problematic activity. An artist may have a number of goals in doing what he does; alternatively he may have a single goal. But thirdly, it is possible to paint pictures, or draw in a deliberative way, and not to have specific goals. In an example of the second kind, the activity is directed towards the achievement of a clear end, for example, meeting an order: ten line drawings, 10"x5" by April 5th, on a specified topic, say, "Feral Cats". In the first kind I might engage in similar activity just because I want to; that is to say, all kinds of reasons attend my action, all manner of hopes and fears accompany my progress yet no single or separate goal sets a direction upon my activities. For example let us suppose that one afternoon I decide to do some line drawings - I have a new pen and some good paper and this is incentive enough; there is nobody waiting on the results, and I have been set no specification; no deadline. What are my goals as I draw? It might be said that there is an overriding goal which is 'to do a good drawing'; or that the determination to master the materials was a goal. Granted that my drawing will only be as good as my hand-skills (and vision) allow, it seems odd to speak of these aspects of the activity as 'goals', because, really, if I embark on the business at all, then I could hardly be hoping not to do a good drawing. It seems to be a part of my engaging in the activity that I hope to enjoy what I am doing, which would involve that I manage to do it well which would be to say that insofar as 'doing it well' was part of the prospective and on going activity it was integrally so, like hoping to enjoy myself, and so not capable of being set apart as a goal to attain to. I remarked 'vision' for it seems to me that in

wanting to do it well there are other things, different considerations to the mastery of technique and material with which I am concerned as I work. Suppose, to return to "The Box", my interest is for the moment mainly in discovering a relationship between forms in diffused light, it might be a relationship of tone rather than form or vice versa, and furthermore my interest is not as we have seen, primarily with the object, qua object, but overridingly with my drawing. If the limitations of skill and material define my performance in some measure, and necessarily so, then, wanting to do this rather than that with the materials must equally constrain my performance. That what I want to do both informs my activity and, equally, is informed by it shows the goals, if such they can be called, to be as integral to the business in hand as 'wanting to do a good drawing'. Wanting to do a good drawing is a condition of wanting to draw. Within the activity as described we can say we have a variety of goals but not that they stand to the activity as ends stand to means, because the interdependency of goals with the activity allows no such relation.

Now although I might easily draw or paint without having any goals at all, yet I would certainly claim to be drawing deliberately. Now let me put forward an example to meet the third case. Suppose I consciously know only that I mean to draw. (Clearly I am not about to do 'An Objective Drawing'.) We can take as given the known limitations of materials and skill. I start out with no idea at all how things will turn out but I do know this: I am not cleaning a room, making a cake, or meeting a deadline. My activity is consciously that of doing a drawing.

I can simply allow the process to take over. All that will stop me is that I either like it well enough not to want to go on; or I like it far too little to continue with it; or there ceases to be room on the page. While it is actually quite rare for me at any rate to proceed wholly in this way, it is quite possible, nevertheless; and usually one works at least for some of the time in this way.

The point is that it is possible to speak of a deliberative activity which drawing is, without having to regard the concerns involved as if they were targets. Generally speaking it would be mistaken to suppose that for an activity to be deliberative is for it to be goal-directed.

I.7 Some Problems raised for the Student.

The business of drawing an object has been given its fair share of attention but a good deal of it is mistakenly conceived. Let me now turn to consider some problems raised for students as they come to the exercise of making an Objective Drawing.

Students often get worried about not getting their drawings right. Their unease isn't entirely due to concern over inadequate hand-skills. It is likely that it is due to the fact that they are thinking about drawing in a misguided way. In setting up this exercise we ask that the student brings an imaginative conception to bear upon the objects arranged for study. We need to show that the importance of an imaginative conception is that it helps the student to decide about the kind of drawing he will do. What counts is the use to which he puts it, in terms of his drawing.

I.7.I. The Error of regarding Learning to Draw as Learning to See.

Along with the idea that there might be one way of 'getting it right' go two quite naive but neverthless seriously mistaken and related views of what it is to draw an object: that drawing what you see is the same thing as drawing what is there; or that it is possible, more, a requirement that you replicate what is there. Both these views have their foundation in the idea that learning drawing is primarily a process of learning to see. I will look at this idea first. Against this I shall consider the so-called opposition to it. The doctrine, put forward by Gombrich,[26] and all too memorably collapsed into the statement that "Making comes before matching", [27] is supposed to show that the Learning to See theory is mistaken. However, while it will become clear that learning to see is only part of the story, it is part of the story nevertheless. As my own exercise demonstrates, (see I.3.4) the mistake is to regard it as the point of the activity of drawing. The theory that drawing is Learning to See has been concisely put by J.McPhee and R.Degge, "Drawing and seeing are closely related. Learning to do the one is to learn to do the other."[28] This is true in one sense; finding what I want for my drawing obliges me to look very carefully at the object. In drawing the box, for example, I certainly began to notice more things about it and as I noted the phenomena I certainly considered the possibility of modifying the drawing (see II.4.2). However, it would not be true to say that I slavishly obeyed my eye. To the demands of the eye must be added the constant review of its judgement. Seeing, in this matter, is for the sake of the drawing. Drawing is not nowadays done for the sake of seeing.

Interestingly, we might regard Leonardo as having been more particularly engaged upon the business of drawing in order to see, his concern being primarily, not with drawing, but with the status of knowledge. But I do not regard this as central in the education of the modern art student in the exercise of objective drawing. He learns to explore a pictorial prospect. His discoveries about the object might be crucially important but we should see their importance in terms of the drawing.

I.7.2 A Drawing is not an Inventory.

New students very often suppose, when asked to draw a model, a landscape or group of objects, that they are being asked to replicate 'What is there'; it is an easy move for the nervous or reluctant to demur over this. "How can I get that lot down on paper?" And put this way the problem in fact is sharply defined for us. We can of course see, it is quite clear, that such an attempt would be difficult if not downright absurd. However, it is worth my actually showing how, for one thing, it might founder in impracticability. If we should get so far as to agree that "getting it on paper" meant, not using super-glue, but depicting these objects in two-dimensional terms, we must see that depicting "that which is there", in all its fulness of being, even if achieved must be visually quite incoherent. Consider the example, the soap box; I must record its top, its sides, its back and find of course some way of depicting its (to my eye) hidden material structure; I must remember to put in all the graphics, front, top, sides and back - and underneath, I had forgotten that, not forgetting I need

a way of depicting the chemical structure of the inks and fixatives use in the graphics... and so on. Even to itemize the components takes time, and is astonishingly boring; but bear in mind that it is possible to do that and to be understood because I could conceivably write a coherent inventory. Now if I am to draw the box as it is, all that information has to be presented within some pictorial compass of the box's dimensions. What I am obliged to show is the actual disposition of its parts. If I could make these bits in three dimensions I should have made a box (recollect this point in connection with the Furniture of the Painting, see I.2) but to present a two-dimensional account in the above manner would even if posible, be completely incoherent. A drawing is not an inventory.

I.7.3. Drawing as a Configuration.

So much for what the student is not asked to do; we can reject the notion that depiction has only the properties of the subject depicted. Having got so far is to have realized something important about the activity of drawing from life. The realization usually takes the form of a question, "What, then am I putting down on paper?" Partly what has been put down are points, lines and tonal distinctions which can only go up, down, across, diagonally and in circles and which, related to each other, form a pictorial unity. However it is not only the student who believes that the marks on the paper also should refer to the object of study in some way. But if a drawing is merely a configuration, in what way does it relate to the perceived object? Without going

into a discussion about perception, for it can legitimately be assumed that he takes the object to exist and to be where he sees it and for it not to be an hallucination, there are still problems in being able to say what it is to make a drawing of, to represent, an object which does not attempt to be a replication of 'what is there' even in two dimensional terms, but of which it is true to say that the drawing will of course have reference to some part of what is there. He has also to recognize that the point of the drawing is not to produce an illusion for some spectator such that he believes he is in some sense seeing the object. We might compare the terms of the exercise with Wollheim's clear refutation of Gombrich's position that to see a drawing as a representation is to enter into an illusion. Wollheim has this to say: "to enter into an illusion depends by and large on a subversion of our ordinary beliefs; whereas to look at something as a representation seems not to necessitate either denial or erroneous belief vis-a-vis reality. For 'the epistemic consequences and presuppositions' are different"[29] Indeed they are, for they necessarily start from a concept of pictorial irreducibility. It is at this point that the student understands a technical matter about transcription which is that from the outset he can be given some, but cannot be given comprehensive information regarding the existing object. He can furthermore, produce even less for he understands that he is already having to be selective about what he notices of the given information. His drawing refers to what he has selectively observed of the object as it is presented to him. Andrew Harrison, in his paper 'Stories and Pictures', [30] attests to the importance of recognizing that a picture can be accurate in its own terms, " pictures can represent things as they

are by imposing on how we attend to them, selected patterns of attention. What a picture represents in an object is necessarily an aspect of it; it matches.....not the object as it can be seen in various ways, but how it may be seen in particular". I would add the not-inconsiderable rider that crucially, it refers to his choice as well as to the group from which he makes his choice - and that is a pictorial matter. He is drawing with reference to some part of what he sees, therefore, and has by now apprehended the crucial distinction not only between what he sees and what is there, but furthermore, between both of these considerations and his pictorial prospect. Technically he develops the ability to transcribe what is known to be three-dimensional in two dimensions. He does learn to 'beat the eye' in order to establish coherent reference to that which we also see. He 'reduces' a still-life group to a relationship of actually flat areas of tonal variation and this is coherent insofar as he can persuade another person both to recognize the appearance of the still life group in the appearance of the drawing and to apprehend the surface of the picture for its configurative interest. Configuration and representation go together in pictorial business. Accuracy does count for something. Observation can easily be faulty. However, the drawing is informative not just about the way the object is, but to the way in which it is being considered. Learning to see has a part in the art student's education, but it is what he is doing it for that counts. He learns to look for matter germane to his pictorial concerns. That is the sort of learning to see he is involved with (see I.3.3).

I.7.4 Configuration and Constructs.

Let us turn our attention to the Gombrich argument now to see how it could help the puzzled student. Learning to see (LTS) has been disputed by Gombrich on the grounds that the ability to draw something presupposes the ability to produce a visual configuration; that this capability involves the use of schema. Thus a student drawing a box comes to the task equipped with either an inherited schema or else able to invent one. This enables him to draw the box. Gombrich's position is maintained by J.Koh, [31] who says that L.T.S. operates as if drawing was producing the kind of transcription involved in making replicas. The question Koh asks is "How is Jones to transcribe his sense-data of the three-dimensional world into a totally different mode which results from some dark marks being made on paper?" According to Gombrich the "injunction to 'copy appearances'" is really meaningless unless the artist is first given something which is to be made like something else. Indeed it is a problem for Jones if that is what he thinks he is being asked to do. But mere transcription need not be what is being asked for in telling Jones to look at the object. If I tell Jones to look at the object, to look at appearances, if I say to Jones, "Look for the drawing in the object.", then of course he must attend with the greatest concentration to what he sees but the point of looking so attentively is in this case not to increase his knowledge of the object as such, but to further his factitious intentions. Seeing is for the sake of drawing. Drawing is not for the sake of seeing. This prompts me to qualify and expand upon Harrison's position, for it seems mistaken to regard even an objective drawing as a "method of picturing", as "helping us to see the world itself..in

different ways." However, it is important that the context of this remark is pointed up for the target is Nelson Goodman's notion of possible worlds.[34] Were Harrison to start out from the terms of that most elementary exercise of objective drawing, he would then have the best possible line of attack. The factitious nature of pictorial forms of whatever character must logically, as such, count as material additions to the world and not as fictive alternatives to it. It is the material sense of the pictorial fact which exposes the very idea of possible worlds as a piece of fabulous nonsense. This I venture to suggest is the substance of Harrison's important objection: not being gods, we cannot conjur extra terrestrial rabbits:[34] Returning to the troubles of the art student, of course I think that Jones may well be learning to see but what he is learning to see is what he wants to make or conjur of the object present to his attention. Does this mean he comes to the task of objective drawing by way of construct? Well, this is partly right but taken as the whole story, once again, wrong.

It is possible to give to a drawing of the object a visually coherent account of the object's appearance; for examples of this concern expressed par excellence we should refer to Dutch painting of the Seventeenth Century. But it is a fundamental requirement of the student engaged in this activity these days that he "brings to his observation an imaginative conception of the object." (see I.3). Here we may examine what some have supposed to be at work in the business of making visual configurations. Perhaps I can discover what it means to speak of bringing the imagination to bear upon the business of drawing objects by referring back to my own drawings, looking at what it was like to do this. In Frame 5

I speak of creating "a decorative emphasis... rich, intricate in tone... I am strongly tempted to leave it here, being much taken with decorative objects." In Frame 7ii "What I want is to convey some notion of that unseen object for what the entire package is advertisement. If I miss that element in my drawing, I have missed, if not everything, a great deal".

Although there is absurdity in the notion of trying to draw only what is there, there is obvious point in submitting a rigorously observed account of the object's appearance to an imaginative projection. Such a projection may reflect a particular mood which may relate equally as well to the feeling of the artist towards the object he sees as to the uses to which he may imagine the object might be put; this may relate to particular aspects of impression: its decorative design (which, as I point out in Frame 5 attracts me a good deal) and since I have had the lid off, to get at the soap, the perfume still about its interior. All manner of associations have bearing upon such apprehension of the object. What is looked for is the authority and persuasiveness with which the student reveals such imaginative associations as pictorially telling. What must be stressed is that the 'imaginative concept' of the object does not stand before the mind's eye, waiting to be matched, but that the conception grows with the activity, informing it and responsive to it; it is a lively notion, never static, possibly incapable of completion. (A proper consideration of that issue is the subject of another section. See III.3.1, 'Prospects'). We must also separate the methodological construct given, from the imaginative concept of, the object. The rigour of this exercise is in the diversity of

the demands made upon the student. He is required to observe and to isolate phenomena: perhaps to look only for line, or the distortion of form in shadow; for reflections; for texture and so on. The point is he is in other words required to transcribe for the sake of picture-making. What he is not doing is devising some sort of code, by whose means the perceived object is to be understood via his drawing. For a strong impression of the matter consider Mondrian," In nature the surface of things is beautiful, but its imitation is lifeless. The objects give us everything, but their depiction gives us nothing. Art was always too concerned with imitation, despite the artist's good intentions".[32]

Plainly there are physical objects, and equally plainly as objects they are no more to the student than any other group of objects might be, but there are also for the student his considerations, his associations with the object, the consciousness of something not wholly accounted for by the set group of material things on the table. The capacity to conceive of a construct is not itself dependent on this group of things rather than that. The student might put a bizarre construct upon a given group. He might, for example, take as his theme 'The Three Graces', a classical subject using one or more ordinary young women as models or, perfectly seriously, one or more garden gnomes. The point is merely that given a creative intention of such and such kind, a wide variety of given physical, material objects are available to serve as material to it. It is, for one thing, precisely this as a trained capability the exercise of Objective Drawing is designed to develop. Yet can we regard this capability to set constructs in quite the way that Gombrich suggests?

What can be said is that what the student is doing could be characterized in the context of a theory of some sort. Roger Scruton says that we can say that a drawing is "about its object" as a "sentence is about its subject", and in so doing we acknowledge that this is to posit the object as "referring beyond itself, where the 'object' is in this case the drawing itself." [33] This is to add into a student's tasks some recognition of the need to be able to apply theoretical constructs to a consideration of his pictorial intentions. It seems on the face of it, quite reasonable to regard the drawing as reflecting theoretical influence. For one thing we might be reluctant to suppose that the object we can see (the drawing) was totally divorced from theoretical considerations upon which the student directed his attention. We would want to say that such consideration counted for something in the final account of the pictorial object as we see it. But should this be taken to mean that pictorial concerns are primarily oriented towards some 'fit' with the world by way of theoretical constructs? If so then we should have to say that "we have now not a picture that we look at, but a puzzle that (by inference) we unravel".[34] The student is testing possibilities, both of his own skill and of the feasibility of his notions of what can be done with his ideas as they relate, not only to the arranged group of objects, but more importantly, to his powers of invention and abstraction.[35] For the moment I want to examine this aspect of the activity; must we not say that it is at this point true to say the student is centrally concerned with some construct? Of course we must. For what he 'makes of the job' depends upon more than a response to the plans of his instructor; upon more than a response to the objects. His concern is

creative; no such group of objects is more nor less to him than a point of departure. His construct, or constructs, further his concern.

I.7.5 A Lesson to be drawn from Consideration of Neoplasticism.

The dangers of accepting the Learning to See Theory of drawing are clear. I want now to turn to a notable theory of art, Neoplasticism, in which the uselessness of accepting Gombrich's assertion is rather well shown. My intention is to show that the artist's business with constructs is, first and last, pictorial. Where his concerns become theory-oriented, there is a real danger of pictorial stultification; where art is given over to ideology the irreducibility of pictorial concerns may be compromised. Neoplasticism must be regarded as a pictorial concept, notwithstanding the welter of written material devoted to is explication. There is no difficulty in accepting the case for the construct. How could we deny it? It is certainly tempting to interpret the concerns of the painters caught up in the movement to the reductive position which we can quite easily regard as being put forward by Gombrich. But we need not, indeed we must not concede any such thing, since to do so is inimical to the case for the nature of artworks as irreducibly factitious. There is a good example of what happens when an artist puts pictorial irreducibility in jeopardy. The formalism giving rise to reification of the Pure White Cube or the Square serves all too easily as a negative constraint on possibilities, because in taking on the status of the 'ism' it becomes a political matter, with ideological associations and constraints. In contrast,

creative; no such group of objects is more nor less to him than a point of departure. His construct, or constructs, further his concern.

I.7.5 A Lesson to be drawn from Consideration of Neoplasticism.

The dangers of accepting the Learning to See Theory of drawing are clear. I want now to turn to a notable theory of art, Neoplasticism, in which the uselessness of accepting Gombrich's assertion is rather well shown. My intention is to show that the artist's business with constructs is, first and last, pictorial. Where his concerns become theory-oriented, there is a real danger of pictorial stultification; where art is given over to ideology the irreducibility of pictorial concerns may be compromised. Neoplasticism must be regarded as a pictorial concept, notwithstanding the welter of written material devoted to is explication. There is no difficulty in accepting the case for the construct. How could we deny it? It is certainly tempting to interpret the concerns of the painters caught up in the movement to the reductive position which we can quite easily regard as being put forward by Gombrich. But we need not, indeed we must not concede any such thing, since to do so is inimical to the case for the nature of artworks as irreducibly factitious. There is a good example of what happens when an artist puts pictorial irreducibility in jeopardy. The formalism giving rise to reification of the Pure White Cube or the Square serves all too easily as a negative constraint on possibilities, because in taking on the status of the 'ism' it becomes a political matter, with ideological associations and constraints. In contrast,

(*a*) *Sketch based on Domburg church* (*b*) *Sketch based on* (*a*)



however, if, for example, we consider Mondrian we can see how he is at all times perfectly clear about the absolute need to turn the construct to pictorial account, since it is first and last a pictorial affair. For Mondrian it is ever the interaction or relation, colour, form, line and tone which he explores. "The relation is the principle thing".[36] he declares. It is a pictorial relation. The vocabulary of Neoplasticism is geometric - a new kind of pictorial space.[37] What Mondrian seems able to accomplish is a synthesis of theory and artefactual sense. He sets out with an assertion, "Modern man must strive for pure aesthetic creation, ridding his art of the individualistic detail of natural form. All linear forms should be reduced to vertical and horizontal." In the sketches of Domburg Church the sense of the composition is exactly an expression of these polarities. He achieves a synthesis of the observed with the pursuit of the "Universalization of Nature" insofar as he achieves pictorial intelligibility. Very much less successful are the studies by Van Doesburg (1925) which set out to show how such aesthetic transfiguration takes place. The trouble is, it doesn't. Retaining the photograph is enough to ensure that it cannot. And it cannot for reasons of there being a contradiction in his terms. While his aim is to illustrate neo-plasticism principles Van Doesburg is putting the design, the drawing, in the context of the appearance of a cow; so that it looks dangerously like a bad case of L.T.S. This is clearly far from his intention. Salvation is not to be had in seeking reference to the "absolute truths of Neoplasticism". Let us pause to review them. 'Le Neoplasticism' - an unhappy translation by Mondrian in 1920 from the Dutch term

T. Van Doesburg, sequence showing an object aesthetically transfigured according to Neo-plastic principles (from Grundbegriffe der Neuen Gestaltenden Kunst, *1925*

(a) *Photograph*

(b) *Form preserved but relationships accentuated*



(c) *Form abolished*



(d) *Image*



'Niewe beeldung', this is what Piet Mondrian wrote about the movement in 1923 (ponderous and rather incantatory, this was intended as an explanation of its views to the general public). "Neoplasticism broke with form altogether by abstracting it and reducing it to the pure elements of form. The closed curved line, which did not express plastic relationship, was replaced by the straight line in the duality of the constant perpendicular position, which is the purest plastic expression of relationship. From this it constructed its universal plastic means, the rectangular colour-plane. Through the duality of position of the straight, it expresses equilibrium (equivalence) or relative and absolute. It opposes the colour-plane to the non-colour plane (white, grey, black), so that through this duality, the opposites can annihilate one another in the multiplicity of the composition. The perpendicular position expresses the constant, the rhythm of the composition expresses the relative."[38] Returning to Van Doesburg's illustrative 'interpretation' we are bound to say the Freesian wins, hooves down. Far more convincing are his own later works, in which he is fully engaged in the relationships in the picture plane. Once he addresses himself to the pictorial forms with formal progressions across a plane surface, we can at last see that in the repudiation of "Nature's given forms" he is no longer attempting to "match" his picture to the perceived world. He, at last, practises as back in 1923 he merely preached, "The picture must be entirely constructed from purely plastic elements, that is planes and colours. A pictorial element has no other meaning than 'itself' and thus the picture has no other meaning than 'itself'."[39] We need neither agree with nor dispute Van Doesburg's concepts of meaning in order to see that

Gombrich's assertion is no help whatever. Making is not a matter of matching whether it be nature or ideology. Since there is no guidance from Gombrich as to there being any problem about the way in which his maxim is to be read, we can only suppose that he has not recognized the matter of real importance. It would appear that he has failed to grasp the truth that if the painter's construct serves primarily as a way of seeing the world in any of its manifestations, the factitious pictorial point of his activity recedes. His agency as an artist is critically unfulfilled. Merely to point to the fact that artists use constructs is not informative.

I.7.6 The Pictorial Character of Concepts of Form.

In this connection we should take account of the fact that the student brings to his drawing of the object not only his imaginative conception of it; he is also required to make some note in terms of formal qualities. Note that such notions of form as artists use have the status of agreed terminology. Thus when referring to the line or tone of the object, in this case the box, I do not mean that the box has, inherently, line or tone. Yet in talking about the box as a subject of an artwork such terminology provides an account of the pictorial concerns of line and tone. How can we come to understand these terms without taking them to refer to qualities posessed by objects? This question informs Klee's notable theory of Form, which had so great an influence on the teaching at the Bauhaus School of Design during the nineteen-twenties. Quoting from Klee's Pedagogical Notebooks [40] we need to be careful not to misunderstand what it is that he is

concerned with in his pursuit of "essences". The editor of the Notebooks, Jurg Spiller, writes, "In considering a work of art he (Klee) asks whether it reflected the essence of the object or only its outward, optical manifestation... 'The complex development from seed to flower raises the question of how growth as a texture of dynamic occurrences can be represented "in its Essence".' ". Formal accounts of 'essences' require in his view, and consistently enough, 'ideal' rather than 'material' solutions. For such 'ideal' means he posits line, tone, value, colour. A careful note covers an obvious objection, "..they are not free from matter; if they were it would be impossible to 'write' with them. When I write the word wine with ink, the ink does not play the primary role but makes possible the permanent fixation of the concept wine. Thus ink helps us to obtain permanent wine. The work and the picture, that is, word-making and form-building, are one and the same." What is Klee after here? We might compare his drawings of the seed pod with the way in which we would regard those made by a botanist for whom structure must be described in line and tone; or equally well, a cut-away drawing of a machine part, sections which cannot be reached by the camera being constructed in conventional drawing systems. But Klee is, of course, not doing this. He is taking the seed pod as a way of exploring, not merely the observable phenomena, but the concept of growth as a concept of pictorial importance. He regards this as an essential concept both in that it is for him informative to a pictorial understanding of this particular form, and, furthermore, to the nature of drawing itself. Thus for Klee there exist parallel concerns. The means by which he satisfactorily deals with them have, on his own terms, to be "ideal". The "ideal"



'*Cut fruit.*' Constructive drawing illustrating the progression within the normal tensions of elementary forms. *Cf.* 1927/m 5: *Cut fruit.* Oil.



Cross-sections of a calla lily, studies on the synthesis of essence and appearance.

means of accounting for such essences are the terms of the discipline: tone, value, colour. The "ideal" provides a construct for characterizing essential concepts. In a similar way a cut-away section illustration provides an ideal means, a construct, for describing the parts and function of the machine part. Klee's point must be that (a) a pictorial account of the seed pod is best characterized as an account of the concept of growth: a necessary aspect of its being and in that sense, of the essence; this is the concept that is central to Klee's concern with that plant. (b) The concept of growth is formative to a pictorial concern with drawing. It is clear that we have here a parallel of concern to Klee between the growth of a plant and the undoubtedly lively nature of the growth of a drawing. Regarding the gestural nature of drawing in these terms is wholly consistent with his thinking on the activity of drawing. "Movement is the source of all growth. The work of art, then, results from physical movement; it is a record of such movement, and is perceived through movement, (of the eye muscles)."[41] We should not forget that Klee's Notebooks are explorations undertaken in pursuit of the nature of the pictorial and were written in connection with the programmes of study to be undertaken by art students. In responding to the exhortatory tone of the notebooks, notwithstanding their possible ambiguities, what I do not believe should be read into Klee's "notes on essential qualities" is that he necessarily invokes an acceptance of there being such qualities inherently in objects (see III 4.2.1). This might give us pause; apart from the philosophical difficulties attending such a position it would also carry with it the, to my mind, objectionable assumption that the drawing would be right if

it could replicate the Real object; wrong if it did not. This would not only be an odd view for him to take of drawing; it would also imply that other drawings must be wrong (see II 2.2). But what is likely is that, actually, Klee is after what this plant can yield as germane to the activity of drawing itself.

I.8. Conclusion: The Agent as Artist.

To conclude: in this Chapter I have tried to give an account of a condition in the fulfillment of which we may posit the agency of an artist.

A good deal of the account has been taken up by arguing from the standpoint of the artist; since the artist is the subject of the thesis, this may be quite unsurprising. However, that artistic agency necessarily implies his concerns as pictorial is of interest from the standpoint of the spectator. In particular it is a point of shared significance that the dimensional constraints opted for at some stage of the progress of the artwork set the stance not only of the artist but also of the person who looks at the work.

Firstly, I endeavoured to show that the integral nature of the spatial contexts thus worked are disregarded at one's peril, so to speak, of misconstruing a matter fundamental to any account of the work's intelligility; that is, the pictorial form of the artwork. The example which in quite valuable ways showed this to be so is the Furniture-of the-Painting.

Secondly I chose to undertake an objective drawing exercise myself, because for one thing although I have many times been

required to do such exercises, I had not until now done it other than to worrit a pictorial prospect of mine. This time I had both to do that and to describe the operation. A good deal of this thesis is being conducted in the manner of an explanatory excursion into areas I have actually occupied for years; it has often felt more like an exploration. This drawing exercise could be regarded as something of a test of my own claims for the agency of the artist. Since it is a central tenet of my thesis that consideration of the properties of artwork involves consideration of the agency of the artist, my doing a drawing seemed unavoidable. I have for the most part had the much greater pleasure of discussing the work of others. However, the exercise should primarily be regarded as having furnished me with the means of focussing attention upon the factitious nature of any artist's concern with observable things; with any form of stimulus to his attention.

Thirdly, the agency of the artist is such that to begin to work is to become personally committed to it. That the activity as described is ineluctably the pursuit of individuals, however great the company so occupied, it is small wonder that some nervousness should overtake the agent at the commencement of some pictorial endeavour - I have heard of a man so distressed by indecision and awareness of his commitment before a blank canvas, that he took his own life. His state of mind may have been unusual but it is not I believe presumptuous to suggest that he recognized and could not bear the full measure, as an artist, of his pictorial commitment as personal. A painter must paint, must thereby communicate, on "pain of loss of self". It was his tragedy that he could not begin and thus he could not as painter, or person,

continue to be. To be sick is not necessarily to see things all wrong; it is perhaps to be specially vulnerable to things correctly seen. It is the fear of not-being, fear of a failure of agency which besets even the most robust; the moment of agent-commitment to a pictorial endeavour of which nobody can relieve him. The start of an artwork is to be regarded in terms of the agent's commitment to some pictorial particularity.

Fourthly, it is clear by now, I hope, that if an artist sets out to make a work we should be getting him badly wrong in supposing him not to be engaged in deliberative activities. Yet it is also clear that talk of means and ends here is often inappropriate; an inadequate way of looking at the deliberations at work.

In doing a drawing of an object what counts in the end is the drawing. Whatever may usefully be said about the way such a drawing refers to an object it is to misconstrue the activity either to posit drawing as learning to see or to regard doing a drawing as an instrumental activity, as it would be if it were primarily regarded thus, or equally, in being thought to be oriented towards constructs; if by that it were thought as exactly analogous to the activity of mapping. An artist's matter is his work, the artefactual statement. The exercise is not primarily designed to make a student more observant, neither is it hoped to make of him first and foremost some special sort of cartographer. It aims, of course, in many ways to develop these and other skills; to put the student in pursuit of a personal prospect, necessarily factitious; pictorial in kind. To miss that point is to misconstrue the agency of an artist. The work of Paul Klee unequivocally demonstrates that what is sought in attending

to natural forms is not the appearances of things: drawing is not merely the means to transcribe the visually perceived. It is for the sake of pictorially essential concepts that he so addresses himself to the concept of growth as an essential concept in pictorial consideration of Nature. Understanding the growth pattern of the Calyx of a Calla Lily is a matter of pictorial significance, however the pictorial is characterized. The particularity of pictorial space as a defining term of the first condition of artistic agency is that insofar as we may posit agency as that of an artist we acknowledge that it is concern with creating pictorial space with sets the orientation of his concerns with any matter.

Finally, this chapter shows only the conditional nature of a concern with pictorial space, but also indicates in outline those concerns with which I shall be dealing in the next three chapters. The public aspect of artistic agency hinted at in writing of the moment of apprehension attending the beginning of an artwork is the subject of Chapter II; the need for an artefact will be stressed in that chapter and, supposed in the notion of the factitious object, will further be explored in Chapter III in terms of a more detailed discussion of the agency of a painter, as exemplified by considering the progress of a landscape painting. Chapter IV will be devoted to a discussion of the personal nature of the agency of an artist, implied in the commitment of some factitious object. The extent that not to create, is, in terms of the agency of the artist, not to be, is a central implication of the last chapter. I regard each of the four conditions of artistic agency (see p.4.) as having a bearing on the others.

This first condition it is that characterizes the agency with which I am concerned in some particularity. Recognition of the communicative stance; the relation of reflective to practical activity which further characterizes the agency with which I am concerned; the personal nature of human agency - all these conditions are of general significance. I do not regard the artist as agent as a special case in these respects. To describe the artist as agent is to regard each and all of these conditions as necessary. To describe the agent as artist is to relate these conditions in terms of his necessary concern with creating pictorial space.

CHAPTER II.

THE PUBLIC ASPECT OF THE AGENCY OF AN ARTIST

"Do not regard a human being merely as a person by himself; but also as he is vis-a-vis another person." [1]

II.1 Introduction.

Before going on to explore the relation of reflective to practical activity in the production of an artwork I want to elaborate upon the point raised in the last chaper (see I.8). This is that drawing, which is a practical manifestation of thought is, besides being a personal statement, capable of exacting public response. When any artwork is put into an exhibition it becomes accessible or at least available to the critical notice of other people. In Chapter IV I will deal more fully with the personal character of the artist's statement. This present chapter will be devoted to the public aspect of the artist's agency.

This is the claim: the public nature of a work of art is an ineluctable aspect of an artist's agency. Whether or not the painter, for example, primarily intends it, the content of a canvas is capable of exciting the response of an observer in some measure of understanding, sympathy or revulsion towards or against it. In other words concerns of the observer are susceptible of engagement in concerns of the artist. Community of ideas is unavoidably involved in the agency of the artist. This is a complex situation. In order to explore it we will need to

give heed to the following points:

I. It is a necessary condition of the agency of the artist that it has a public aspect. It is not however a sufficient condition.

2. The communicative relation between an observer as agent and the artist as agent is constrained by the content of the artwork. There must be an artefact.

3. The artefact is the locus of the communicative relation.

For this to be an effective, or 'successful' relationship the artwork must somehow draw and engage the attention of the observer. The production of an artwork engages the artist in reflective and practical activity. The integrity of his performance depends not merely upon the level of technical mastery achieved in it but also upon the quality of testimony manifested by it. To neglect either aspect is to disvalue the deed. This is of consequence in the sharing, or community, of ideas of a pictorial nature: human agency, in respect of its unavoidably public aspect, is internal to the artefact as painting. It is the cohesion between these aspects of his agency, insofar as that cohesion is observable, which engages the observer's attention. The fact of a work's being possibly withheld from exhibition, or destroyed by the artist does not prejudice my case; rather it reinforces it. Destruction at least in part supposes the unwelcome possibility of exhibition. Withholding works supposes, among other things, the eventual possibility of exhibition.

I need some way of approaching these points. The communicative relation depends in this connection upon the extent to which that which one agent produces, in the form of an artwork, engages the attention of another agent. It is informative to regard the situation in terms of an artwork's having, or not

having authority. Indeed I believe it is a concept of critical significance to my thesis. However, I recognize that since the concept of authority has application in widely disparate areas of concern I will need to justify employing it in connection with the communicative relationship of artist and observer, through the content of the artwork.

I shall show that, whatever the domain of usage, the possibility of the concept of authority is grounded in the idea of there being effective agency between persons. This makes it possible to address situations which are dissimilar, situations in which it yet makes sense to employ the notion of an authorititive relation between people. I suggest that in whatever sphere of use it is the noticable cohesion between thinking and doing which is central to the ascription of authority to persons, actions and conseqences of actions. In cases such as presently concern me, the extent to which the ascription is apt provides the gauge of the communicative relation as it is effective, between the artist as agent and the observer as agent, through the content of the work of art.

This is the critical matter for consideration. It supposes an artwork must first attract attention if the conditions necessary to the effective agency of the artist are to be fulfilled. Second it is a minimum requirement of an artwork's engaging and not merely attracting the attention that the reflective and practical activities involved in its making are not at odds with one another. Thus it is of the utmost significance that the notion of authority at issue sets a two-fold requirement upon the artist: technical mastery and testimony. He neglects either to his peril. To illustrate this cohesion at work I shall

be considering the conceptual concerns and visual preoccupations of Henry Moore as explored by him in a book dedicated to W. H. Auden, taking for an example one of a series of etchings called 'Elephant Skull, Male Torso'.

II.2 How the Agency of an Artist brings him into a Relation with the Agency of an Observer.

The first point to consider is the complex nature of the agency of the artist insofar as it recurrently involves a public aspect.

A paradox attends the agency of the artist. This concerns the public nature of the product with which he is involved and the consequent relation with others in which he places himself. For that which may be of no professed concern to him as he works, that is the agent relation between himself and other people, is yet and must be his concern in painting since the painting is a publicly accessible object. Artworks are by nature public. Therefore the public aspect of his work is an ineluctable part of his agency. This is not a special case of artistic agency. It is to remind the artist of matters of unavoidable concern for him. We may consider the agency of the artist as having two aspects:

I. The artist as agent relates to the world (objects, experience, nature and so on), for the sake of the artefact.

2. The artist relates as agent to other people through the thing he does. The artefact is the vehicle of his agency.

These two aspects are distinguished in the following way:
Regarding I. It is both a necessary and sufficient condition of his agency that the artist relates to the world for the sake of the artefact (see ChapterI.).
Regarding 2. Since although the public nature of the artefact makes it a necessary condition of his agency that the relation between himself and others is of concern to him, we must acknowledge that such will not wholly constitute his concerns. We cannot therfore posit such concern as sufficient condition of his agency. For the artist to have committed himself to the production of the artwork is to have committed himself however unwitting, or unwilling, to the possibility of communication. This is not to say that it is only artistic actions which have the feature of being public and therefore, of effecting communications. It is to say that it is a matter of central importance to the visual artist.

II.2.I Making use of the Concept of Authority in order to characterise Aspects of the Communicative Relation between the Artist as Agent and the Observer as Agent.

It is necessarily true that the publicly accessible artwork puts the artist in a communicative relation with other people. The necessity of the communicative relation is an unavoidable consequence of his activities. It is by this means possible to ascribe authority to his work.

The authority of an artwork depends for its ascription upon the extent to which the artist engages the attention of others in that which he has made. When I speak in this connection of authority I posit a relationship dependent upon the effective content of the artefact as a publicly accessible object. A note

of caution is in order; whether or not an artwork is somehow authoritative is ascertainable through the communicative relation. The communicative relation by no means guarantees the ascription of authority to an artwork. Merely attracting the eye, is, as I shall show, not enough (see II.5.2).

Before we look to the role of the artefact in this communicative stance it would be a good thing to show that, in appraisal of that stance, making use of the concept of authority is not inappropriate. Much is written about authority in the context of Law, Education, and Sovereignty and it may be that, since scarcely anything has been done on the application of the term in respect of the Arts, it will seem that my using it in this way constitutes a rather strange borrowing.

What has my concern with the concept of authority to do with those concerns far more discussed in connection with that notion? On the face of it, very little. The bases of enquiry would seem to be quite dissimilar. Questions of authority, as a concept relevant to the spheres of education, politics and so on, very often arise out of a wider concern with the way society works, or with the idea of a society as such. The concept is thus invoked within particular contexts of public action. Very often what is at issue is some criterion for there being a right or correct thing to be done. This poses questions regarding the right or otherwise of an individual, or body, to do this or that, where such doing has consequences for other people. In whichever way the concept of authority is construed whether in terms of a sociological notion of control[2] or in terms of there being some internal relation between 'authority' as a concept and a domain of action; as a "force" in some "milieu of existence"[3] as de Jouvenel

describes it - there is little to suggest any immediate connection between such areas of application and that in which it might be apt to ascribe authority to works of art. Yet the term is used in this way and it is only a puzzle to us if it is supposed that the possibility of the concept of authority is grounded in some one sphere of use. What is needed is to show that there is common ground even where it looks least likely.

II.2.2 A metaphoric Borrowing denied.

First let me admit to the apparent oddness of the present application. It would be very peculiar to ascribe authority to artworks on the basis of being involved in a "team of action" in which the artwork, mediating the position of the artist, and some spectator were engaged in some task; it would be odd to regard the artist as having the 'right' to command spectator attention. It would be obscure to ascribe authority to artworks on the basis of there being a right or correct way of painting (see I.7.6). If for a moment these peculiarities are admitted as difficulties for me and it is supposed that the 'proper' field of application is such as would accommodate such usage without any strain, then perhaps it is fruitful to pursue the idea that for the term to work in the field of the visual arts is for it to work as a metaphoric borrowing. Let me consider this as a possibility. The force of any metaphor is the extent to which the new application of a term of otherwise established use heightens awareness both of its abstruse connection and also of its origin. There has to be some sphere of use in which it is in some important sense

'straight', that is, rightly correctly, or truly applied. In some respects like a good fiction, it depends on good facts.[4] For an example, suppose my sort of use depended for its metaphoric force upon some right and proper domain of use. On what core of referential meaning would it thus depend? In this particular connection it would appear to have to rest upon there being a close association between the ideas of influence and authority. To conjoin these notions would be to put forward a limited notion of authority. In terms of the visual arts it would be to recognize the metaphoric borrowing as taking its sense and meaning from just that connection being made. An example would be to say: if Y ascribes authority to X, then Y is or has been influenced by X. Thus if X is an authoritive painting then, if Y sees X, Y will paint differently next time, have a fit, burn the gallery or so on. Quite possibly, but in a later section to this chapter (see II.3.1), I shall show that such a likelihood need not preclude the possibility of there being some painting, X, which is not

Footnote 4

Stories and Pictures.

Andrew Harrison's argument in summary. A good fiction is both intelligible and plausible according to the pattern of factual and fictional assumptions that form the frame of expectation in which it is possible to follow any narrative. A good story deals not in possibilities, but in such probability assumptions as a telling requires. thus 'good facts' are necessary insofar as they create the conditions needful to that requirement. What is presumed in the telling of the tale is the attention of someone for whom it is told.

influential for Y, in any of the ways described, but which yet seems to qualify for the ascription of authority for Y. In this context that model will not work because it misconstrues the notion of authority. Indeed there is a case for saying that influence and authority are wrongly conjoined in more orthodox applications. Y may acknowledge the authority of X without being influenced to act in any way other than he, Y, intends.

Is it in any case right to suggest - as admitting to metaphoric borrowing would presuppose - that there is indeed a right and proper use for the concept of authority? If so must it be confined to those areas already described? My answer must I believe be No and Yes. I would say, No, application of the concept is not confined to any particular field of use; there is no special sphere of reference to which all other uses reduce. Yet I would say, Yes, there is that about any kind of use which presupposes some common ground of possibility. This is not to accept my less common usage as a metaphoric borrowing, however - it is indeed to contest it, for the ground of the possibility of the concept of authority is not and cannot be an instance of its use. We may properly attend to the question, can an artwork be ascribed authority, by rejecting the notion of a metaphorical borrowing and turn instead to the question which, in orthodox usage perhaps need not be raised, but yet which, having been raised here, allows me to make perfectly good clear use of the concept of authority. This is the case as I believe it to be: questions about the nature of society, whatever form such questions might take, presuppose the agency of persons; human beings in effective relation. The self as agent is ineluctably involved in a communicative stance.[5] My concern for the artist,

as agent, acknowledges this to be necessarily the case. The enquiry I am pursuing starts with that which is presupposed in many discussions of the concept of authority. That which enables Winch, Peters, de Jouvenel, Weber and many more to attend to the pursuit of the ground of the concept of authority that notion of persons in relation with which I am concerned in setting out those conditions under which we may posit the agency of the artist, positively requires me to make use of the concept of authority. It is essentially communicative notion. My use of the term should be regarded as a means of setting out the implications for the artist of the public aspect of his agency. Two possible sources of difficulty remain. The first is readily met and leads directly to a discussion, already mooted, of the relationship of influence to authoritativeness.

a. concerning the non-intentionally authoritative stance.

b. concerning the non-verbal authoritative stance.

II.2.3 The Possibility of the Non-intentionally Authoritative Stance.

It might appear strange to remark as authoritative an object whose production involves the agent concerned in a stance towards others which is by nature an ineluctable matter. He may not, in making the work of art, have a deliberate intention to be authoritative in relation to other people. We can say that there are certainly many situations, in which authority is an issue, in which we do not ordinarily doubt that the object or person to whom authority is ascribed is wittingly so involved. It is certainly the case that the policeman at least hopes he 'knows his duty'.

It is surely true that the politician concerns himself in a witting exercise of authority. To take an example from the performing arts, the actor certainly means to command the attention of his audience. In this matter the actor shares common ground with politicians and policemen. Even in circumstances in which actors or politicians are less than fully aware of the range of their authoritative influence they would feel that their actions could only begin to be judged authoritative insofar as they were confident of being, in fairly specific terms, in a measure of influential communication with others. For a painter, communication is a necessary matter, as we have seen and it is possible for it to be an unwitting matter; a necessary part but only a part of his concern to be effective. We need to show whether we can ascribe authority under conditions in which possibly no part of the agent's concern with his work is intentionally motivated towards the exercise of authority.

The comparison of cases would seem to indicate that in some situations of use there is indeed a direction to the way in which the authoritative relation operates: instigator and, as Eeyore might put it, [6] Instigorated, where instigation is no accident. However, I have noted that even in the self-awareness of the politician there are gaps in the extent of his realization of the range of his effect. We can further say that there are cases of authority being ascribed or recognized in which the intentions of the one of whom such ascription is made do not include that of exerting an authoritative influence. Consider the following example. The woman who is an authority on sandstone may, probably will, be deferred to in matters pertaining to the use and study of sandstone. Yet her central concern may not be to be deferred to,

even although she might well regard herself as capable of saying as much if not more than most on the subject. Now we would say of her that she is in virtue of her specialist knowledge probably very frequently intending to be in some sort of communicative relationship with others. In discussion, lectures and so on she surely means to be understood, at the very least and taken notice of, for the sake of her subject. If we want to separate the authoritative aspect of her performance or reputation, in terms of the communicative relation being an ineluctable aspect of her agency, from the sort of situation in which the one closely involves the other, then we must ask this question: does intending to be in a communicative relation with others involve intending to be authoritative? Another example will show that it need not. My wanting to have lunch with X would as far as I am concerned only unusually involve my wanting to exercise authority over him. Of course if my wanting to have lunch with X has to do with discussing a problem, Y, on which he has expert knowledge, then I will regard him as some sort of authority on Y. But X will, just like the sandstone specialist, be more concerned with sorting out the problem on Y than with his own statu as an authority on it. The possibility that he does fancy his statue as an Authority need not affect the case, though it would not do much for my lunch.

What then can be said about ascribing authority in these cases? I believe that we can ascribe authority to X or sandstone specialists or to works of art, indeed, wherever it makes sense to speak of somebody engaging the attention of others. The degree on absence of the intention so to impress is as such not very important. What is important is that we recognize the active

nature of response in the relationship between agents in which the concept of authority is invoked. There are two sides to this matter; the importance to the observer as agent and the central importance to the artist as agent.

II.3 The Active Nature of Response.

The function of the authoritative relation is that one agent engages the agency of another. This obtains regardless of context and extends, by implication, the effective range of the artist's concerns. The response of the spectator to the authority of an artwork is not merely passive. That in the more usual cases ascription of authority is awarded in response to some deliberative instigation would seem to indicate that in most cases response is a needful aspect in the authoritative relation. Cooperation [7] is necessary to its function and this goes somewhat beyond more passive acquiescence. Even in cases of oppression accession though apparently passive buys relief or is an attempt to buy relief from unwelcome consequences and is to that rather minimal extent the exercise of an option and is active rather than passive. In the context of the authority of the State cooperation is sought since it is recognized that without it the authority of the State dwindles. Whether active participation is negative or positive it takes place within some practically oriented conceptual framework. In the ascription of authority to artworks the spectator is a participant in visually manifest conceptual frameworks. The authoritative relation is a two-way consequence of the public aspect of a painter's agency. We need not know the extent to which the communicative stance of an artist is

deliberative. We can call a work authoritative without claiming anything regarding the artist's intention to command authority. The authority awarded to an artist rests upon the extent to which he stays the attention of others through his works. When we speak of such authority we posit a necessary relation between the agency of an artist and the agency of the spectator through the content of the artefact.

While it is not inevitable that a work command authority it is a condition of the public nature of the artefact that there is some level of communication between artist and spectator. It is appropriate to consider the extent to which a work is effective as communication. The extent of a work's effectiveness is aptly considered in terms of its having authority. Though it is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the agency of an artist that if he commands authority it must be through the artefact, it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of a work's being deemed authoritative that there exists an effective relationship between the artist and another agent whose thinking is actively engaged. Response is active; it is a kind of giving. The importance to the artist in this matter is crucial to his agency. The painter may not intend the authority, the command that his work turns out to have for other people, but he cannot evade the possibility for his agency entails a public aspect. Stanley Cavell would regard him as one "pulled out of the ranks by a message, which he must, on pain of loss of self, communicate".[8] While not wishing to dwell too much on the possible revelatory character of a painter's concerns, for they may not always be of that sort, there is point in regarding his personal agency as bound up in work to the extent that "loss of self" is truly a threat

should he produce nothing or in trying repeatedly fail. The point put by Cavell and with which I concur is that communication is positively part of artistic agency even where it is true that "telling someone else" may be, as such, an unwitting matter for the painter; for saying something, working something out, making new, is the stuff of his agency. After all, we regard his activities as intentional. The artefact is our best evidence of his intentions and as such may wittingly or otherwise at least as well command our attention as the best rhetoric of politicians.

II.3.I The Relationship between Authority and Influence in the Visual Arts.

The difference between the painter and the politician in this connection is not in the constitutive public aspect of their agency; both are necessarily affected by this phenomenon. The difference is in the degree of deliberation with which each under the condition of his agency concerns himself in exercising influence over another. For the politician this is an essential part of his trade; so the link between his authority and influence is direct and should be regarded as a characterizing condition of his agency. It is far less clearly defined in the communicative stance of the visual artist. This is by no means to suggest that the artist's work carries no influence; but the notion is far more complex and diffuse. It would be misguided to work too hard in pursuit of a connection which is of its nature elusive.

Even the restricted connotations of an art-historical approach to the Influence are problematic. To say that if X has been influential then X

also been authoritative does no more than beg the question and we cannot fix terms for an answer. Certainly we are in difficulties if we want to say that X is authoritative in that X is or has been influential, since Influence has manifestations so diffuse as must make a putative connection with the concept of authority unavoidably tenuous.

An exception to this is Propagandist Art for which the notions of Authority and Influence are interrelated (see II.5.I).

II.3.2 Mastery and Testimony: a Challenge to an Orthodox Account.

If, in the public aspect of the agency of the artist it is a function of the authoritative relation that agent concerns are at some level sharable it must now be asked what is involved in their being shared.

Authority as communicated by artworks differs from some other fields of use insofar as it does not involve, in a central way, the use of language: I now turn to a consideration of an implication for the view regarding the use of language as the ground of the concept of Authority. I shall argue that the danger of acceding to this view lies in the inadequacy of the account it is able to provide of the notion of Authority. This is a matter of the utmost importance for an artist. It is also of general significance.

First, let me approach the periphery of the problem: painterly terms are not the terms of written or spoken language.

When an artwork is regarded as having authority, that it is discussed, is discussable, by no means implies that the authority the work has is grounded in the fact that we use language to

remark it. "A Mozart's thinking results in something playable, not statable." [9] In Chapter III I shall devote more time to the discussion of the intelligibility of pictorial ideas (see III 6.I); but for the present it needs only to be made clear that when we refer to an artist as 'having something to say' we are attempting to characterize verbally a form of testimony which is not made through the instruments of language. We remark upon content but it is not the content of the proposition. We count it a statement, but one without the syntax or grammar of the word. That the idea of 'content' or 'statement' is a linguistic idea does not make the content of the painting linguistic; the statement it presents is not linguistic at all. Perhaps it would be less confusing if artists did not use the term 'statement' at all. However, they do use it and without any linguistic overtones.

Since the means used to make the painting and the ideas presented manifest by these means are not verbal means, verbal ideas, it is reasonable to reject the suggestion that any authority the painting might have is reducible to some account of the painter as an animal possessed of language [10]. It is true that of course he is. But it is also true that that in itself stands alongside rather than at the root of the present case. Besides the painting there are numerous other communicative forms of expression which if they merit the ascription of authoritativeness do so within particular terms which may not be such as centrally involve the human capacity for using language. [11] An authoritative performance on the tennis court, on the clarinet, the potter's wheel, through dance forms, are but a few instances. That one

person's performance is authoritative while another's is not so obviously requires us to seek an explanation which cannot be satisfied so narrowly. I said that the question of non-verbal communication is but peripheral in the case at issue. What it leads us towards however, is the heart of my thesis concerning the public aspect of artistic agency.

In consideration of language and authority within a sociological construct, it has been argued that the ground of the possibility of the concept of Authority is that Man is possessed of language. [12] A central aspect of this being so is that this necessarily involves him in following rules; all systems of authority it is claimed, can be regarded as involving the making, recognition and following of rules. Rule-following is integral to the use of language, as indeed to painting pictures from time to time, but that this is so, does not, it seems to me, argue that their use in language, or dance, tennis or painting constitutes the ground of the concept of Authority. A better account can be given, not sociologically in terms of Man as a being who characteristically follows rules, and talks and writes, but of Man as an agent, a person necessarily in communicative relation with others. This involves him in the business of sharing greatly diverse ideas by widely diverse means. The commonest requirements of human agency indeed involve talking and writing to one another and these entail the use of rules. Other forms of communication no less entail their use. Rules are a function of technical mastery, instruments of communication; at <u>least</u> that much is rather obvious. What seems from a review of the field to be less obvious is that there is something desparately unsatisfactory about setting up a context in which technical mastery provides the entire framework within which to account generally for effective

dealings between people and by means of which to explain the use of the concept of Authority. The fact is, it is rather less than half the story. If sharing is to play the role which we shall want to give it, we must rearrange, perhaps change, our thinking on the concept of Authority, such that mastery in the executive part assumes its proper place. Sharing, after all, is a rather niggardly affair if all it comes down to is a question of regulation. Recollect the tensions on the floor at children's parties.

What we need to recognize is just how thin an account this must yield in any attempt to characterize any one of our widely diverse dealings within an account of the agency of persons in relation. The communicative relation is the key: a necessary aspect of human agency.

The possibility of the concept of authority is thus grounded not in any uses of the instruments of communication; certainly not just in the characteristically human activity of following rules as such; it rests upon the possibility of an acknowledgement on the part of an agent of the veracity of a cohesive idea or system of ideas put forward by another agent in a shared corporate domain of action. To say as Peter Winch does, that "Authority is essentially bound up with systems of ideas, and systems of ideas essentially involve the possibility of discussion and criticism" [13] is, or should be, to recognize that the context in which discussion and criticism have their importance is one which calls upon testimony in some form for here is a context of effective human agency. It is a conviction in the communicable relation of thinking to doing in some domain of action which occasions the ascription of Authority to a person, system or object whether in the field of Politics, Education or the Arts.

Communicability begs some form. In attending to the context of the communicative relationship between artists and spectators, I turn now to the need for an artefact.

II.4. The Need for an Artefact.

It is clear that when it comes to talking about systems of ideas, about artworks as having or not having cohesion between thought and action, there must be some artefact of which we can say this is or is not the case. This may seem very obvious but for artists it has not always been an area entirely free of difficulty. I want now to begin to state the problem by examining interdependency of thought and action in the creative process. Starting from the standpoint of the authoritative work having to be a cohesive work we come up against certain problems.

First, if we hold that cohesion between thought and action is manifestly a mark of its authority are we to exclude from the field of application all artworks which are incomplete?

Secondly, are we to call authoritative only those works done by artists who know their own minds?

Thirdly, can we say that a work which presents a unity must be one and the same with the product of the artist who knows his mind?

Finally - what can be said in respect of 'good faith'?

II.4.I Authority and the Incomplete Artwork.

I. In the area with which I am concerned I have already stressed that the idea that develops requires, in order to do so, the practical awareness of the agent. His consideration of practical possibilities is basic to this kind of thinking (see I.5). That perhaps nothing appears by way of a practical outcome makes no difference to this being the case. But would such a state of affairs provide us with an example of disunity; an incomplete work of art? I want to say that this must be so unless we are to include in the class of works of art all ideas relating or contributing to their making. Of course it may be less troublesome to suggest that it is possible to have a pretty complete idea of a work without actually engaging in the processes of producing an artefact. But this is not to say that if the artist gets to the stuffs and surfaces his ideas will not be modified, for I believe it must be, even in the case of the clearest practical forethought. It is simply not possible without engaging in the practical activity fully to develop such ideas as he is concerned with. Yet in the practically based thinking there is, as functional to the concept at work as is scaffolding to a tower in the making, some informed anticipation concerning its development; what might happen and, with experience, some hopeful expectations, alongside a proper respect for the likelier visitations of calamity. We might say that such fulsome preconsideration is rare, but it is possible. We must differentiate these pre-intimations of works of art from complete works. Some artists might object that the difference is trivial, since it depends on how you choose to classify a work of art; some would argue in favour of all such thinking being quite

as justifiably called works of art as any material expression which gets called a work of art. I dispute this. No material expression of whatever kind can be synonymous with the practically oriented thought as described.

We are obliged to link the notion of authoritativeness to the need for an artefact. Interest in the presence or absence of authority in this regard serves, I think, to mark out an important point. The concept of Authority is meaningful only in the context of practical ideas shared, argued or disputed between persons. The only means of establishing such a relationship between the artist and anybody else, that is open to the artist, lies in the thing he does. If we are to speak of a work's having authority, since the artist's thinking is itself oriented to the practical then both we as well as he must attend to the object of his thought, the practical outcome. If that object is a performance then we will find authority, or not find it, in the performance itself as manifesting the thinking of the performer. We must be constrained by attention to that which the artist makes. Stories told by artists about their ideas may carry the authority of a good story and convince us perhaps of the authority of the idea; but outsiders to the process require access in more direct fashion. The mediation of even the first-hand account is no better than a story of an idea. What I want to say is that an artist may have some clear thoughts about possible works of art without producing an artefact but the reflective process does not alone qualify as a work of art. If we are to speak of the authority of a work of art we discover ourselves bound to restrict our account to productions. This would seem to indicate that in answer to the first question, in seeking to account for

authority in works of art we must confine our enquiries to artefacts, in which category I would include Performance Art. However, there is in that question a suggestion that if a work is incomplete, half-finished, then it cannot count in this enquiry. This is very far from the case. What counts as finished is very doubtful and, in any case, a half-finished drawing is capable of the utmost authority. That there need be some perceptible artefact is the case; but its strengths or weaknesses do not depend upon its degree of finish. They depend upon the extent to which the work presents weakness or strength of idea whose quality comes through for good or ill in the material expression. Such unity is discoverable only within the context of the work itself.

II.4.2 Are we to call Authoritative only those Works made by Artists who know their own Minds?

The question of what the painter thinks he wants to do, central as it is to this discussion, indicates that we need to say something about his awareness of such purposes, endeavours, tasks and so on as inform his activity. I shall not be trying to show that the artist has advance knowledge of an outcome but I will, rather, be trying to show the importance to the artist in his practical thinking, of settling the character so far as possible, of his conceptual preoccupations. I shall deal later (see Ch.III.6.) in some detail with the vexed question of what a pictorial concept might be and the question of preoccupation will be an important one. For the moment a note of explanation will suffice regarding my use of this word. For an artist or anyone else, being aware of preoccupations is not the same thing as is



52 *Elephant Skull* plate XXVII. View of male torso 1970

ordinarily meant in speaking of being preoccupied. In the ordinary sense, of course, 'we have preoccupations', that is, we return to the same concern time and again.. We say, "He was preoccupied.", meaning he was intent upon something or other and not easily distracted. For an artist the question must be "Why?". Note that a psychological account of that question is not the one he wants. What he does want is to know how, as an artist, he is preoccupied thus. Consider an example: Henry Moore's concern with "basic substance" as not the concern of a physicist or a biologist or a chemist but as of a sculptor. Moore speaks of his "preoccupation with making shapes in space on a flat sheet of paper - pushing and destroying the surface to create the effect of solidity, depth, and distance." What he intends in his work is that his preoccupations with material similarities of substance between very different structures and organisms is to be resolved into a two-dimensional statement. In the example of Moore's etchings, 'Elephant Skull', we can see his concerns as a sculptor coming under graphic constraints. Regarding the connection between the 'Elephant Skull' and the Auden illustrations, Moore says this, "What excited me about the elephant's skull and made me want to study it by drawing was the surprising contrasts of form contained in it - some parts were very thick and strong, others were paper thin - and its intricate and mysterious interior structure, with perspectives and depths, like caves and caverns and tunnels." [14] Moore's concern with substance must be worked out by him in terms of the pictorial construct he puts upon those recurrent concerns. An artist concerns himself with considerations of general pictorial significance. Yet he deals with the particular to do it, "an actual hand, or known shoulder,

even a particular pelvis" shows us that the general concern is served best if we can be brought to apprehend the individuality of things.[15] However general the significance of the idea may turn out to be, the statement he makes is necessarily particular. (I shall return to this point; see IV.3.2)

Thus, though we ordinarily speak of being preoccupied as if it were a state of mind, the artist must go further than this. Accepting that his being so absorbed has the usual psychological features, he is for example abstracted, difficult to talk to, lets his food go cold and so on, he seeks reasons for being preoccupied whose grounds rest in the character of his agency. He seeks to be pictorially exercised; searches out matters for preoccupation, rather than just finding himself in a preoccupied state. Questions about consciousness are not at issue in speaking of an artist knowing his mind. What is of concern is restricted to the relationship between cohesive practical thought and some recognition of a certain authority in the artwork. The question is: does the artist have to be aware of the extent of his reflective activity for it to be possible for somebody else to remark his work as authoritative?

Let us consider the example of Moore's etchings. What comes through to me is his interest in the weight of the object; the spectacular displacement of the space it occupies; the disposition and texture of its plane surfaces. As a sculptor he is by inclination for most of the time preoccupied with considerations of mass, extension and the disposition of plane surfaces with respect to each other and their surroundings. We could say such a man knows his mind to the extent that he is not in doubt about his matter. Later I will show that we need not

suppose him to have, complete, any firm advance plans for content for the etchings he makes. The illustration shows that these etchings are indeed informative about bone. But also they present to our attention general and quite widely evocative problems of form. We find ourselves standing back from biological data of structure and considering the manner in which this image occasions thoughts of scale, change, balance; we enter into his concentration upon things recollected of landscape; and, in the illustration I have chosen, male torso, elephant skull and landscape coalesce. It is my experience that concern for the human figure is very much like concern for landscape, as later discussion will show. (see ch III.7.3). We quite easily understand Moore making relationships of this sort. As spectators, we also seek out and find significance at a personal level. Preoccupation with landscape provides a sympathetic link with Auden. "The fact that Auden was a Yorkshireman, as I am, and that the Yorkshire Landscape has always been a very exciting element in my life, made a strong link between us". [16] It is not that in making these etchings Moore seeks to tell us how elephants' skeletons or male torsos or landscapes look; we need not ask how like to an elephant's skull can a drawing be. Questions which make sense might be the following: What is the formal disposition of X to Y? Why does a concern for landscape find its way into a concern for bone? What kind of problems does Moore discover and resolve about scale, balance, surfaces in etching this skull? New students of drawing are often told "Don't look for the object in your drawing; look for drawings in the object." Which in a rough and ready way is to say that what matters in looking at the object is the sort of drawing you want

to try and do. Until the student has some idea of his concerns he cannot see how to regard the object; he has nowhere to start. The art student is not concerned with learning to see. He learns how to look (see I.7.I), but not for likenesses.

Knowing "what he wants to do" does not involve him in foreknowledge of how his drawing will eventually look. It does not require a mental image of that by the light of which he might eventually examine his drawing; nothing of the sort. It does mean sorting out the tenor and direction of his preoccupations (see Chapter III.3.2) for a fuller development of this matter). I would say regarding the relation between the artist's knowledge of his concerns and the recognition by another of authority in his work that if the artist is vague about his concerns; has no preoccupation in particular, or is in other ways havering over his concerns, then his work will not convey authority. If on the other hand we feel a work does do this then one of the things we shall feel to be evident is a line of thought, as with the Moore etching, though we should be every bit as cautious of laying claim to its complete comprehension as he himself would be.

So we need not posit the artist himself as fully aware of the extent of his preoccupations. It may, for one thing, be that public response plays some part in his practical thinking, to which in all its uncertainty he addresses himself. For another his thinking is practically oriented. His preoccupations relate to material possibilities and are subject to constraints for their development. There is a certain open ended interdependency at work. How is this interdependency to be understood? I am not suggesting for example that a sculptor's concern with form depends upon his prior experience of plastic substance. Neither do I

think his concern is possible in theoretical isolation for in order for it to be a sculptural concern some account has obviously to be given of substance. The problem is to find a means of characterizing sculptural ideas of form which allows us to show that a merely experiential account is mistaken while at the same time we do not wish to divorce the notion of form from the constraints of physical perception. Moore is preoccupied with the particularity and with generality of touch, of the feel, physical and emotional of the skull's structure; its form furthers his own concern with form. Yet his concern does not wait upon the being of this bone. Rather he seeks out such objects for the furtherance of a concern he has with form. Interestingly, in the first place the skull was given to him by Julian Huxley who from long association knew Moore would find the skull a likely subject for investigation of a kind other than that of the biologist. Moore shows in this example just how to turn somebody else's concerns to pictorial account; first the scientist engages his attention, latterly the poet.

It could seem, despite disclaimers, that what is being suggested is some intra-mental notion of form which may be matched or satisfied by careful selection of material objects; that is to say an idea in isolation. This is not the case, as will be shown in Chapter III, any more than it is the case for Ed Kinsey as he thinks about painting Landscape (see III.3.2, alsoIII.4.2.1) Neither do I suppose it is sufficient to refute this by pointing to any defining terms of sculpture without recognizing the need to know that those defining terms have a conceptual basis which involves the interdependency of a particular sort of thought and action. Thus Moore's preoccupation with landscape is, we might

thereby suppose, conditional upon recurring notions of form; his search for general statements of form is conditional upon his attention to the objective presence of, in this case, an elephant's skull or it might be a landscape. He pursues his ideas in an educated frame of mind, in a state of preparedness; which is not to say that he has advance or comprehensive knowledge of his state of mind.

II.4.3 The Question whether the Cohesiveness of an Artwork is capable of complete Comprehension by the Artist.

Does the observer have a positive role in filling out the coherence an artwork presents?

I have suggested that in some cases a work may in some way exceed the intention of its maker in its appreciation by another person and that one possible account of this state of affairs may rest in the incompleteness of the artist's knowledge or understanding of what he wants or wanted to do in his work. Intention is only being discussed in connection with the question of the authoritative standing of works of art. I am still not investigating the artist's intentions, as such, but rather what it is that prompts someone to remark a work as authoritative. I have claimed that there is a relation between making such attribution and the recognition of an artist's preoccupations and concerns; that such attributions rest upon there being cohesion between the reflective and practical activities manifest in the work. It is true that, in the making, content affects content and is affected as it develops by its relative disposition to what has gone before. That is, any mark upon the canvas makes a difference to

the mark which will succeed it and is thus itself put down with some regard for its predecessors (see Chapter I.5 concerning The First Moment.) But content is often enigmatic and may by allusion exceed its immediate format. The extent of allusion may only be guessed, though its direction, if it is not deliberately ambiguous, may be noted. One of the marks of any work we are pleased to term 'great' or 'good' and without prejudice to what else that might be, is that we are compelled to search out its content, for it may not be available all at once. The observer seeks to understand the artist. Now does this indicate that the artist has the key to all its complexities or is it possible that his power is such that in making a statement he discloses unaware, numerous implications not guessed in advance, but discoverable, hinted at through graphic or sculptural form and, as it were picked up and taken further by an observer?

The making of the work constantly informs and sometimes startles even its maker. He cannot be said to apprehend at the outset the full particularity of his concerns (see III.8.4); even his preoccupations, while needfully sought and explored are with concerns by nature incapable of complete advance knowledge. Now can we suppose him ever to be capable of anything like full knowledge? It would not seem a likely thing for anyone to claim. Neither would this be required for a view of cohesion of thought and action. However if that cohesion is not contained entirely by pictorial or scuptural content then are we to suppose it possible that it takes an audience to fill out the artist's intention? Perhaps the point is that the artwork positively implies the spectator, and thus implies the active role of the spectator. This we will now consider.

There is obviously a case for supposing this to be so in examples of Performance Art. The border line between the visual and dramatic arts is deliberately diffuse in such works as that not so long ago performed by Kerry Trengove digging his way out of a London Gallery;[17] However ambiguous, it is fair to take it that such work was 'art' perhaps not merely by virtue of its venue, announcement and orchestration for art critics, without whom some may reckon his activity might have been awarded another sort of title like vandalism or potholing, plumbing or archaeology. That is perhaps a peripheral matter to my present point though not irrelevant to observations I shall make in Chapter IV, but for the moment I will leave over the contentious aspect of the case and take the status of the event as an artwork as given. Whatever objections we might sustain it has to be admitted that Trengove is at least concerned to demonstrate the inseparability of the act of sharing in the idea to the execution of the material deed. The real point raised here is, must it be only 'drama' in order to require the spectator, as I believe this work does? It would be absurd to shut the spectator out of the theatre; but is there any less absurdity in excluding him from the gallery and, if not, then can we not see that there might be rather more orthodox works of art which no less require the responsive agency of other people for the scope of the artist's concerns and preoccupations to be extended? The authoritative work does more than sit back quiescent in its frame. It somewhat coerces the attention, compels the spectator to take a view, by quite formal, compositional or gestural means revealing its content through his eyes. Although we have noted the fact that many painters are not wittingly concerned with public response to their work it would

seem very strange if it could possibly be supposed that paintings were deliberately conceived as private. Painting is a kind of conversing. Recently it has become difficult to 'converse' with artists but it is important that the attempt is made; it matters to the artist unless he is to subject himself to conceptual isolation, which would effectively be to truncate his agency in a critical aspect, that his public is apprised of the colour of his preoccupations. It will be a sad day that his public ceases to care whether he does so or not. The viewer is still implied, though the terms of implication are far from secure. But we would be rash to suppose these terms ever to have been fixed; static.

Thus, in answer to my third question, "can we say that a work which is cohesive must be one and the same with the product of the artist who knows his mind?", it seems that we must heed the preoccupations of the artist even if they are hard to find; we must recognize that a painting may, while being a manifestation of such preoccupations, exceed the expectations of its maker in the richness of its content. It is difficult to exclude from consideration of the agency involved in the making of artworks the participation of the man-in-the-gallery. While that work us one with the product of an artist's preoccupations, the same work is capable of exceeding the comprehension of the artist in its making and in its public impact. In such sense we may view the work of art, without detraction to its entity, as a catalyst and its authority as dependent upon the extent to which it exacts and engages response. It is that with which I shall next be concerned. (see also III.3.1).

II.4.4 A Question of Good Faith.

Consider now the painting whose technical merits are not deficient and which, we are bound to say, is commanding considerable attention but yet is, I should fervently wish to say, a work whose testimony is disingenuous or even despicable? Earlier I remarked a sorry want of veracity in the drawing by Russell Flint (see I.3.3) and maintain that whatever charge might be preferred in terms of its being a sloppy piece of drawing what matters most is that his sentiments are questionable. The suspicion is that eroticism is being debased for some purpose. There is just the feeling that it might be in line with the easiest of appeals; the trigger to the old familiar mechanism. The same techniques characteristically advertise our daily goods, the target being the point of sale. If this drawing offends it is in its intention to exploit to commercial purpose that it does so. An artist is in a special position of power since the graphic image is curiously both direct and evocative in its appeal. A truly erotic work is the hardest of all to execute in good faith.

This is a matter of concern not only for any artist but also for anyone who pauses before the work. The requirement of good faith is no less rigorously laid upon the spectator. He is necessarily implicated in the erotic content of the work. Yet his particular and personal response to the pleasures, pain and excitement of the content is - however demanded - open to his misuse. My concern is this; that response of the spectator to the erotic painting provides a most compelling model for the inclusive character of the self as it implies the presence and response of another. This is a relationship in which that truth is clearly, manifestly given. Yet any temptation to regard

pictorial content in instrumental terms is as mistaken in this genre of painting thought as it is an any; it is at worst to reduce it to the level of pornography. And that is shamefully to abuse the relation, one's own self and the artist whose work it is. Agency is itself perverted thus. The problem is to attain to some level of objectification since the artist has himself been under the same obligation - painting an erotic picture is not a piece of sexual behaviour on the artist's part. This by no means reduces the emotions involved to Mr. Casaubon's "shallow rill" of feeling.[18] On the contrary a lack of response is a failure for it marks, in Kant's works, "a want of feeling". The full measure of a Nude by Matthew Smith is, in some important sense for me as a spectator, the analogous measure of myself - and that need not be because I am myself a woman. But I cannot remain detached! Pornography can only direct me towards some getting; it is necessarily instrumental. But Eroticism is a term of art which presupposes reciprocity, over all things a spirit of generosity. The communicating authority of an erotic work of art is in this connection yet an irreducibly pictorial matter. That is the difficulty for both the painter and the spectator. In Chaper III I shall pursue the discussion of the need for an objective stance as exemplified in landscape painting and will reveal an important connection between the present issue and the concerns of a landscape painter, already mooted in my allusion to Kant and in my abiding concern with the nature of the self.

Concerning authority, if there is in a work some technical deficiency, some ineptitude then to be sure we feel a sense of uncertainty about that work, but the worrying thing about the disingenuous picture or sculpture is that the unwary, no doubt well-meaning spectator

might never notice a thing - he can be hoodwinked into accepting all kinds of squalid rubbish. There is a lot of trouble in store for the so-called innocent eye. Technical mastery on its own may be spurious but it may easily also be pernicious. What is important is that we take care in ascribing authority to artworks not to rate expertise at the expense of testimony, and no less important, that we exact of any artist a standard of workmanship worthy of his testimony.

II.5 Engaging the Attention. The Standpoint of the Spectator.

An artwork is capable of attracting, in some cases even coercing the attention of the spectator. Yet, as I have pointed out, it is the case that under certain circumstances such a work may, notwithstanding its apparent claim upon the attention, not be worthy of the ascription of authority. Concentration of some of the ways in which this is borne out will be the substance of the rest of this chapter.

Firstly, I will show that there is no difficulty in accepting the ascription of authority in the recognition of an artwork as powerful, where its power may come in the guise of distinctively dissimilar attributes.

II.5.1 The Relationship between Power and Authority in the Present Connection.

It is my contention that we should be prepared to ascribe authority where we would not necessarily acknowledge a work as powerful, whatever form power might take, although there are

cases in which it is both authoritative and powerful. The extent to which the eye is drawn to a work is evidence of the extent to which the work presents itself as a pictorial presence. It is the case that we should not want to separate off the standing of a work from its power to attract attention. Of course it is not in all cases true that the power to attract and engage attention lies in the brute power of the work, per se. There are works with which the artist clearly sets out to exercise power; to direct the attention, to force opinion in particular ways. Propagandist Art provides us with such instances. Consider the attacks of the Futurists upon the architecture of the past; [19] or Dada upon conventions of the Salon: [20] a case of the Art that was Anti-Art. Effective power is required in this case for the successful communication of the Message. The irony of their situation is, historically, that rejection of Authority did not release the Dadaists from their own need to be authoritative; they relied very heavily upon being just that, although they themselves saw the irony of their situation: the problems of the construction of a manifesto based on the principles of annihilation! We have to see their impact in terms of a firm connection between their being powerful enough and thus being influential enough. We may regard influence and authority in this instance as interrelated, and a connection between the two as central to the success of the campaign. (This is without prejudice to the case put forward in II.3.1 against influence and authority being conjoined in the ascription of authority.) Here are now two examples in which, in differing ways, the connection between authority and power seems to be doubtful.

A. Consider the student's painting which has some good bits, some powerful good bits; we can see what he's after, but yet, it is not really what we would call authoritative, although it might be his dearest wish that we should. Let us say something is missing in the way the picture works as a whole. In fact it doesn't work as a whole; technicalities let it down. So it lacks the cohesion of mastery and testimony necessary to any work's communicative success. It is thus not able to be authoritative, although it is, we would still be able to say, quite powerful. In such a case mastery is deficient, but the painting is a work in good faith and this, as such, would command the greatest encouragement from any teacher worth his contract.

B. Consider now the artwork those content does not immediately convey authority but which catches the attention such that on longer inspection and sustained effort, on the part of the observer, it takes on an authoritative aspect. Admittedly something prompts the observer to persevere: yet it seems inappropriate to think about such a work in terms of its making an impact in the powerful way that work by, say, Matthew Smith makes an impact. Is it still quite correct to describe such a work in terms of its being powerful? Intriguing it may be, and elusive. In such a case even though my feeling is that we would be better to speak of its authoritativeness in terms such as these, we cannot dismiss the matter, for an idea may take time in its apprehension; it may eventually have no less powerful a hold in the imagination than that which came by way of a shock to the eye.

II.5.2 Attracting the Attention and engaging it.

The Standpoint of the Spectator.

An artwork is capable of enagaging the attention of the spectator. The agency of the artist implies that this is so. How far is the ascription of authority to works of art a matter of the artwork's attracting attention to itself? It is in order to characterize more closely the communicative stance between the spectator and the agent concerns of the artist, as manifest in the configurations of the artwork, that I want now to look to the matter of what it is for an artwork to engage the pictorial attention of a spectator (see II.2.I). There are, of course, many kinds of communicative stance. In some instances attracting, even compelling attention to the work is a primary concern of the artist. We have noted that in such cases a work may by this criterion be ascribed its authority. However that an artwork is 'powerful' may not have to do with whether it is the intention of the artist to exercise power as such. This just may be an epithet which seems right; the colour, the manner, the subject matter may be powerful in expression. In such a case we find ourselves as spectators powerfully affected. Again authority may accordingly be ascribed, yet we should not wish to regard as a criterion of authoritativeness in such cases the successful exercise of power over attention, whereas in the instance of propaganda we certainly would. The question whether an artwork is powerful and so, by that means, authoritative may be regarded as one amongst others coming within a wider concern to discover the way the communicative stance is achieved. Whether the exercise of power, for example, is intended or simply concommitantly accomplished, what must be asked is what is involved in the artwork's engaging the attention

to the extent that such questions as concern the particular character of the communicative stance are possible. The matter of concern here is to ask what it is for artworks to engage the pictorial attention of the spectator such that the ascription of authority to artworks is possible.

There are two related areas of concern to consider. In the first, these three questions arise from the point of view of the spectator.

For the ascription of authority to be possible must it be the case that the artwork so invested is such as attracts attention to itself?

Would a work be authoritative in that it had the features needful to attract spectator-attention to itself?

Would a work which did not attract attention all-at-once but rather in gradual fashion over a perhaps protracted period be such as would qualify for the ascription of authority?

These are the questions which arise concerning the relationship between the effective capability an artwork might have to attract the attention of the spectator and the ascription of authority to artworks. The questions reveal in assumption: the ascription of authority, being possible only in the domain of shared ideas, has to begin somewhere; an artwork has to be noticed before its ideas can possibly be shared, or be deemed authoritative. The exhibition provides a venue, but in an exhibition one work can all too easily go unnoticed for one reason or another, while another is very much more noticeable. What is it about a work which attracts notice, which gives the spectator pause? That broadly is the first order problem. The second order question concerns the characterization of this aspect of

communicative stance set up by the artwork's availability to the attention of a spectator.

Since the notion of authority is possible only in the context of a communicative stance, is it not reasonable, in the case of ascribing authority to artworks, to posit some relation, or at least, association between such ascription and the noticeable features of the work? Can it not, for example, be said that the fact of the attention of a spectator being engaged by a painting by Matthew Smith must be very much to do with the visual impact of the painting upon the attention of the spectator and that this is dependent upon there being a measure of cohesiveness in the concerns of Matthew Smith as manifest in his painting? Must it be allowed that attracting the attention is on a par with engaging the pictorial concerns of the spectator in respect of there being some communicative stance in which the notion of authority has meaning?

I have claimed that for an artwork to have authority is for it to manifest cohesion of reflective and practical activity in its observable features. Where such pictorial thinking is vague or inconsistent, cohesion will be noticeably lacking. Working in good faith involves some clarity of thought. The ascription of authority to artworks requires some community of ideas between the spectator and the artist.

Let me now turn to a consideration of the first order problem.

II.5.2.I Concerning the Ability or otherwise of an Artwork to attract Attention to itself.

It may be said that for an artwork to make its own running, so to speak, does not limit the ways and means by which it does so. It must be true that for an artwork never to engage the attention of another for whatever reason is to deny the communicative stance necessary to the possibility of the ascription of authority. This is to fail to satisfy the condition of his agency. The spectator has to begin somewhere. Otherwise his agent-concerns cannot be engaged.

II.5.2.2 The Question whether a work should be deemed authoritative in that it had such features as might attract attention to itself.

It may be said that we should want to distinguish the contingency of some spurious command over spectator attention from the engagement of his pictorial concerns in a shared communicative stance. For the latter is grounds for the ascription of authority; the former is questionable. Taking first the former case it is clear enough that features of many kinds may attract attention. An otherwise inconsistent, dull, vaguely considered painting may draw the eye by means of there being a splash of fluorescent paint on the canvas; or a tear in it; other than these features, the work would command not the least attention to itself. Another instance may be the accidental mark or blemish which only serves to draw attention to itself, either in being more interesting than the canvas it has marked, or in being a pity for having spoilt the painting. We should note that

attracting the eye is possible by many means. Holding the eye, sustaining attention and calling it back, perhaps many times, requires more of the artist than that he has the trick of conjuring the eye of the observer into a momentary stare. That the eye is caught is not in itself an indication of a communicative relation between agents. Yet the cohesive work, which may or equally may not be wrought in assertive, bold or colourful terms, has the power both to stay and hold the attention of the spectator.

II.5.2.3 The possibility of Gradual recognition.

I now come to the question as to whether the authoritative work is one whose attributes, in respect of which it is this characterized, are such as must be immediately apparent to a spectator or whether they may be acquainted to his attention in gradual fashion, effecting what one might call a shift in the spectator's initial view of the work. There is no good reason to suppose that pictorial content - just because it occurs in all its complexity on the same plane and is simultantiously present to the attention - must simultaneously engage the attention. There are paintings whose impact is of that sort, but there are many whose content is ambiguous; those whose matter may be available, accessible, not all at once but over time; where education or experience may deepen the spectator's understanding. A painting barely understood may richly reward the spectator of persistence who is prepared to keep on coming back. Such a work as is felt to be worth coming back should not be precluded from the possibility of its being authoritative. It could be said to be authoritative

precisely in the function of holding the interest of a spectator over time and under conditions of some ambiguity.

II.5.3 Engaging a spectator's Attention by a Diversity of Means.

I now come to the second order question of concern in this connection. What is the relationship between the noticeable features of an artwork and the ascription of authority to the artwork? That an artwork has both the power to attract and to hold the attention of a spectator prompts us to enquire whether it is after all just a matter of power; of hitting the retina hard enough to hurt? But this has been shown not to be the case. What is more difficult to discover is what it is, in less strident works, that attracts attention. While the cohesiveness of the work may be said effectively to hold the attention can it be the case that it is this which initially exerts power, or fascination or whatever over the passing glance of the spectator?

Some examples will show that there is a case for making a distinction between the spectator's attention having been arrested and its being held.

It is fair to say that some of Matthew Smith's paintings mount a sort of assault on the retina; His works certainly can be described as compelling the attention. Initially this may either be through his use of rather seamy colour, or because he puts it on in a very gestural manner; or because he seems to do outrageous things with rather formal subject matter. But at the very first glance which, say, is drawn to a particularly lurid gash - like rotten fruit - the spectator takes in other features. What he cannot ignore for long about Smith's painting is the

cohesiveness of his pictorial business. The audacious treatment of traditional material; the choice of colours and the gestural way of putting them down; these are not at odds. They are at one. One feature may make the spectator turn and look. But as he looks he sees one feature is an integral aspect of another and it is that which might be said to keep him looking. Here let us say is a work which both commands the eye and, having pictorial cohesion, stays it, engaging the sustained attention of the observer. A work which can do both may justly be ascribed authority. The work which cannot sustain the attention of the spectator for longer than it takes him to realize that his initial reaction to the work is going to be the sum of his concern with it, has nothing amounting to authority. It merely has the trick of conjuring, or catching at the eye; diverting the attention. These are the attributes of novelty, by definition soon assimilated, soon exhausted. However, I do not believe that I should want to say that a painting or drawing with capacity for holding the attention must necessarily attract it in the very way that a painting by Matthew Smith attracts it.

For it is true that a work may have no brightness about it, no outstanding image, no element of shock and yet it may quite easily engage the regard. Quiet gestures being as capable of engaging the attention as are those of more flamboyance. In music this might be accomplished as a device of cadence, or a shift in key. In the visual arts it is perhaps a matter of a work's being transparent to some common experience, or it is the occasion of something the spectator himself is brought to know. In this connection I might remark the pictorial economy of Rembrandt's etching of Saskia; spare but comprehensive, of a tenderness

whose kind we understand; cannot disregard. There are thus not very remarkably, more ways than one of engaging and holding spectator attention. They have in common that, in whatever mode that attention is caught, whether through the physical impact of colour or by virtue of there being an established emotional common ground between painter and spectator the focus of spectator attention is the artwork; in this case the etching. The pictorial cohesion at work in the reflective and practical concerns of the artist are manifest in the work, and primarily they are pictorial concerns. There need be no unease over this being so, for a spectator must come in some spirit of trust to an artwork. Manipulation of the emotions is always a fear but the device need not be suspected where the painter's primary concern has pictorial veracity. Being true to oneself is, for a painter, to be concerned with this above all else.

The visual impact of an artwork upon a spectator therefore cannot be dissociated from his initial attention to it. Furthermore it is by its pictorial cohesion that it stands or falls in engaging the concerns of the spectator in a shared communicative pictorial stance. The ascription of authority to an artwork is some measure of the extent to which a communicative relationship is achieved.

Lastly, it must be asked, in what way, considered now from the standpoint of the artist, it is the case that merely getting the attention is not on a par with holding the attention, that is engaging it in some shared system of ideas, in the context of the ascription of authority.

II.6 Engaging the Attention. The Standpoint of the Artist as unavoidably Pictorial.

The notion of authority is possible only in the context of communicative relationships between agents. The engagement of spectator attention in pictorial concerns would seem apt context for the application of the concept of authority. However, merely for something to have attracted the spectator's attention does not guarantee his being brought into communicative relationship as agent. An accidental happening can attract the eye. As such, the attention being caught is no guarantee of the communicative stance needful to provide the grounds of the possibility of the notion of authority. A gesture made by the artist, as agent, if it is an accidental gesture, is on a par with any other accidental event insofar as it stands outside the context of the pictorial communicative stance; as is the case if he trips on the gallery rug and splatters his work with icecream for example. But what about an attention-seeking gesture which comes within the communicative context in that the spectator's attention may successfully be drawn to something another agent does? Should that something be significantly connected with an artwork than the character of communicative relation which is established is pictorial. This would contribute towards a longer stay of spectator attention. However if it seems not, as a gesture, to have any interest beyond that which is generated in itself then it may or may not be the case that the communicative stance is pictorial. Where it is not to be so characterized then the context in which it is communicative between agents is arbitrary with respect to the context of the artwork - just as arbitrary as an accidental splash of paint or splatter of icecream. A gesture

of this kind is spurious and does not sustain the attention of the spectator, nor does it lead the spectator beyond itself. Where the gesture is intended to be pictorially significant yet is itself arbitrary with respect to the artwork, for the sake of which the gesture is made, then we may expect no more of the spectator than that he looks at the gesture and when tired of looking at that, looks no further. If a picture is a compositional disaster, salvation almost certainly does not lie that way (see III.8.4).

II.7. Conclusion.

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the public aspect of artistic agency, to show something of its complexity and to study its operation. I have sought to show that the agency of the artist unavoidably involves a communicative stance. The artist as agent is inelectably engaged in a communicative relation with other agents. This relation between an artist and his public is effective, or ineffectual in terms of the attention of the public being drawn towards a consideration of the ideas put forward by some other person whose ideas are, in the case of that person being a painter, manifest in the configurations on the canvas. The extent to which the attention of an observer is engaged by the work of art, as a system of visual ideas may most usefully be discussed in terms of an authoritative relation.

I noted that two features which to some extent appear to mark out the application of the notion of authority in this connection from other fields of use are in fact quite common; the complexity of the agency of the artist, which led us to ask whether authority

could be ascribed where the intention to command it is even in part not clear, is in some degree a complexity shared by other areas of usage. Secondly, the non-verbal nature of the artistic agency which marks it out as an area of communication in which the notion of authority is employed, is to be found in other areas also.

What this application has in common with other areas of use is that the communicative relations, in the context of which the authoritative relation obtains, is a necessary aspect of the agent-concerns of persons engaged in effective relationship to one another. A work, person, performance or plan may be regarded as having authority insofar as it is possible, and plausible to point to there being a noticeable cohesion of ideas and actions. That in the majority of cases the situation giving rise to the application of the term is most usually a task does not prejudice my case. We look to the good faith of the case, whatever it is, and to the practicability or expertise of its mechanics.

As an example to consider I have spent some time looking at the relationship of some of the professed ideas and preoccupations of one man, Henry Moore, to a particular piece of work. In 'Elephant Skull' there is evidence of the operations of making as manifestations of one person's agency as an artist.

What may be said on the basis of these observations? Firstly, there has to be some artefact; some observable, remarkable form of expression before the notion of authority can come into use. The story of the idea of a work of art is not the work of art and is scant guide to any possible authoritative impact of the unmade work. We look for artefactual evidence of reflective and practical action.

Secondly, it is a condition of artistic agency that it entails a public aspect. Unless some communicative relation is effected between artist and observer one essential aspect of the agency of the artist is unsatisfied. This is not to deny the possible satisfaction of the conditions of his agency; but the authority ascribed to an artwork is one mark of the extent to which that work instigates communication.Engaging the attention is the first requirement. Entering into the agent-concerns of the artist is in considerable part a positive act on the part of the agent observer, but if he fails to notice the work he can hardly begin the attempt. Thirdly, this shows us a parallel in general consideration of the case. Whether we are speaking of the authority of artworks or politicians we are bound by the terms of its grounds to suppose the possibility of some community of ideas in the domain of human dealings. [21] Where community of ideas fails or does not begin we may say that in such cases agency itself is partially unsatisfied; incomplete. "Any self, any agent, is an existent being - a person. The idea of an isolated agent is self-contradictory. Any agent is necessarily in relation to the other. Apart from this essential relation he does not exist. But, further, the other in this constitutive relation must itself be personal. Persons, therefore, are constituted by their mutual relation to one another. 'I' exist only as one element in the complex 'you and I'." [22]

Fourthly, just in case the concept of authority should still be thought out of place in the art gallery, I would say that it is perhaps time the concept of authority enjoyed a re-appraisal in general; liberation from those narrow associations which it

retains with the cane and the court-room. If the artist is on "pain or loss of self" compelled to recognize the public aspect of his agency, it is far from mistaken to discuss the fruits of his labours in terms of the extent to which they engage the attention of others; therein is properly a matter of authoritative dealing.

CHAPTER III PICTORIAL CONCEPTS

In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies a product, characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective and practical endeavour. This product is a pictorial form of thought.

III.I Introduction.

In the foregoing chapter considerable emphasis was laid upon the cohesion of thinking and doing as it is shown in works of art. That this cohesion is apparent is, it was claimed, a mark of the communicative standing of an artwork, since it is this which effectively engages the attention of the observer or spectator. In this section I shall consider the progress of the reflective activity of painting. I will be concerned with the characterization of the thinking involved in that activity.

Standing back to reflect is part of an artist's work; it is as much a part of the business of painting as the mixing of pigments and the overtly practical activity of applying them to the canvas. Even in widely different forms of painting, forms as diverse as action-painting and portraiture, setting up standing stones, or throwing down sticks, relection attends the practical deed. From the standpoint of the artist as agent it is important that out of concern for the thing he wants to do he furthers his understanding about the way in which he thinks, (see I.5). In the circumstances of painting it is not possible to sustain any opposition of thinking and making.

However, whilst clearly not wishing to sort the activity of painting pictures into rigidly separable phases it is yet possible to remark a progress in the development of ideas whose expression is necessarily pictorial. The progress involves approaches to the work which range from the predominantly reflective pursuit of a prospective painting to the predominantly practical business of painting itself.

The area of concern is large. I mean to conduct my enquiry around a consideration of aspects of the thinking that attend the progress of landscape painting. In exploring the progress of this painterly idea I shall be able with some clarity to fix the character of agency at issue, thereby expanding upon the terms of the first chapter concerning pictorial irreducibility. By the same means I shall be able to make good my case for the self, the artist, as agent and to despatch the notion of the artist, as a special sort of being. By implication, pursuit of the nature of the Self is inadequately satisfied in terms of Being. It is only by looking to the field of action that we can approach the notion of the Self.

My reason for choosing Landscape Painting to illustrate my case is that it enables me to set out in some clarity certain implications of producing works of art of all kinds. Although what I shall have to say will in no way be presumed exclusive to landscape painting, it will become clear that Landscape art embodies the points at issue in very particular fashion. I will examine the progress of a pictorial prospect of landscape, therefore, in the light of the following observations.

I. "Prospect" is itself a term of landscape. Nowadays we perhaps more readily make use of the notion of a view than of a prospect,

but to use either is to acknowledge a debt to Art. It is part of the artist's task to take a creative stance; to objectify some focus upon a comprehensive world. The fundamental possibility of this detachment is given in the conditions under which we may posit the agent as artist.

In the making of any work of art, the intention to make it is constrained by the fact that the world "comprehends", is inclusive of the artist's corporeal presence. The Wordsworthian "Prospect in the mind", from which I shall substantially develop my argument, sets out the factitious nature of his response. It is not the chief concern of the artist to set a glass against reality, whatever that might be. He intends rather to add something to it, new made, irreducibly of its own kind.

Clearly, I shall not claim Landscape Art as a special domain of objectification. But I shall make use of the notion of Prospect with due deference to its connotations in Romantic Poetry and Painting since their fundamental similarity in this connection lies in the recognition of the nature of the business of making works, not of Nature, but of Art. In this context, the context of Landscape - there is scope, perhaps as in none better, to explore the nature of the Self implied by positing the artist as agent.

2. The painter needs to regard himself in a relationship with the world of which he is part and with the factitious pictorial entity which informs his pictorial intent. This 3-term relation is a central condition of his agency as an artist.

3. An artist's ideas are dependent upon practical expression for their development. It is possible to distinguish phases in the progress which involve both reflective and practical activity.

An artist needs a means of settling the question of his reflective stance. He cannot do this simply by beginning to put paint on canvas, nor yet can he re-discover it out of purely reflective consideration. This looks remarkably like a threat of circularity for him which he must resolve or dismiss - or be unable to continue at all.

4. The reflective work of the artist cannot be adequately accounted for in an account of the artist's capacities or dispositions. The innovatory character of his concerns must always exceed these.

5. In looking to the constraints of the three-term relation upon the artist, it is mistaken to pursue questions concerning the nature of the self-that-he-is in the context of an organic model. It is primarily doing, and not being, which informs an account of the self.

6. The fullest development of a painter's concerns is reached in the culmination of the work.

As indicated in Chapter II a great deal of this has implications for the notion of the intelligibility of works of art, for to refer to an art work in terms of its ideas is to acknowledge the reflective aspect of a practical endeavour. Further, it is to free the notion of intelligibility from the constraints of language.[1] What is needed is some way of looking at the development of ideas which does not necessitate the isolation of reflective, predominantly mental, activities from practical and predominantly physical activities - and which permits of pictorial intelligibility. A related issue is the possibility of postulating pictorial concepts. However, I am

only concerned to ask what a pictorial concept might be in terms of being able to say something of what it is to develop such concepts: it is central to my case that such ideas as are developed are pictorially manifest. With this in mind I shall look at the development of a pictorial prospect and the problems involved, in the context of an orthodox - if by now a little old-fashioned - theory of concept development put by H.H. Price.[2]

Price states very clearly the sort of position a standard empirical account leads to, or can lead to.

Concerning the nature of thinking involved in painting I will continue my enquiries by looking to the question of what is involved in the earliest stages of an idea's development. I shall challenge the account put by Maurice Merleau-Ponty regarding the progress of a concept as necessitating two related stages of development: reflective thinking - which leads to objective knowledge being dependent upon the pre-reflective awareness of a sentient being towards his physical environment.[3]

This I shall explore in the hope of furthering my account of the agency of the artist within a framework of some characterizing force. It will be of note to point up the comparison of the case regarding the nature of the Self put by John Macmurray.

My objective is to characterize artistic agency and to do so by considering the concerns of the landscape painter. I shall show that the reflective and practical, sensible, aspects of his concern can neither be excised from the creative endeavour nor wholly separated in it. The central concern of this chapter must be to show that it is in the context of the personal deliberative agency of the artist that we must attend to the relationship of reflective to practical activity. The reflective stance adopted

by a painter towards his endeavours is part of his work; it has therefore to be regarded not as a withdrawal from work but as itself part of his way of working on his picture.

Regarding the mechanics of the process; the mental stance adopted by an artist towards his endeavour is marked by distinctive phases although temporally they may overlap and confuse. These phases of a painter's undertaking are part of the process of developing painterly ideas.

In Chapter I, I spent time over an objective drawing. This had purposes which may seem in many respects to overlap with the example of the Landscape Painting. But it is clear that whereas an objective drawing excercise serves in many respects to raise problems of a general sort for any artist, it is in important ways a task in isolation, whose point is to indicate the comprehensive scope of artistic agency. A painter's role in making what he does is inevitably constituted by his thought as developed in his painting. The example of painting landscape, perhaps better than any other, serves to show something of the business of being an artist. In this chapter I shall be at pains to show that the painter can only develop the sense of himself in terms of his task - his manifest ways of thinking, in drawing, painting or whatever form his pictorial concerns may take. So this chapter will not only show a process at work; it will also show a progress. In that connection I shall be able to say something informative, not only of the business of making, but also of the artwork as an object, and in this endeavour and its outcome, something of the Self the artist is. Since it is my belief that the best way of approaching is by taking as standpoint the agency of the artist it is hoped that the working conerns of one

person will serve to confirm that standpoint as of use to artists and philosophers alike. The substance of this chapter will be an exploration of these working concerns set forth in the context of the six observations outlined above.

III.2 The Pursuits of a Landscape Painter.

III.2.I A Painter's Need to characterize his concerns.

Consider the case of Ed Kinsey. Landscape Painter.

I shall begin by giving some account of features of his concern which, while of particular interest to him may help us to understand generally what an artist means when he speaks of having an idea for a painting.

Kinsey is an easel painter. He uses traditional materials: oil paint and canvas.

He concentrates upon forms encountered in nature but deals with his material in a semi-abstract manner. He is not primarily concerned with topographical paintings.

He is not a plein air painter. That is, he does not feel that a landscape painting must be undertaken in conditions of immediacy. Even though he sometimes uses drawings made on location, it would be reasonable to regard his painterly concern with places as mediate.

Given Kinsey's mediate approach to landscape painting we may appreciate that there could be some difficulty for him in identifying the locus of his attention. He uses landscape forms in his painting; particular places provide him with material. What is his matter, since it is not primarily the portrayal of any particular place? He is concerned to discover what his prospect

might be, which I shall show, is the first order problem. The second order problem for him and for us is how he should address himself to his matter, his prospect. How he should characterize his concerns in a manner which is primarily painterly, however extensively he need plunder the diversity of language, memory, and emotion in its expression. He does not seek the intelligibility of language. Language can indeed be an impediment to him as he seeks to characterize his concerns, just as a visual medium can be an impediment to a linguistic creation. It is at this early stage that the artist may find himself, by virtue of his concerns, standing somewhat athwart his own endeavours. The difficulty resides in reconciling the account he intends, which will be pictorial and material, not in his head, not verbal, with his attempts to come to terms with his own personal complex response to the landscape. In short, he has to undertake the task of objectification. The problem of characterizing concerns is a feature of landscape painting of whatever tradition. A painting has many phases of development. No matter how many reversals, slurs and overlaps occur between the phases, we need to regard them distinctly. Kinsey has himself outlined a progress to the processes involved for him in painting landscape which I here include:

"The Process.

a. Identification of a feature or type of landscape which one immediately recognizes as sympathetic to one's need to create. This identification generally occurs after a period of involvement through direct observation, memory, imagination, and photographs. This period of time can be either short or protracted.

"An incubation period seems necessary, when the 'mental stance' becomes an all-consuming preoccupation. The visual appearance of these landscape features are not enough in their own right. I am not interested in displaying my ability to observe and record. The image must match up with my need to express personal qualities. When these two things coincide (the visual image/feature and my inner expression/feelings) the production of artwork is a logical progression. The hindrance of this progression results in great personal frustration." (see III.8.2).

"b. Having established a 'mental stance' there follows a great deal of drawing. This drawing relates to the compositional problems of organizing the 'visual language' e.g. shape, line, form etc. The drawing is very rarely done from observation of the landscape. It is generally produced in retrospect, isolated physically from the location by time and space. In addition to the formal organization of the visual composition the attempt to introduce the wider personal emotional content of the picture becomes a consideration. This is the matching up of image and emotions that I spoke of as being paramount to my beginning to work. It becomes more than just a 'mental stance' but seeks a physical, visual evidence or existence. Producing this 'evidence' is a complex matter; many factors contribute, such as memory, imagination, training, accident/chance, photographs.

"c. The production of many drawings (which in many ways are complete in their own right) serve to stimulate the natural desire to produce a more finished or resolved statement. Other considerations now become the preoccupation. Choice of media, scale, technique and the organization of my physical working environment. The translation into colour from what appear to be

black/white drawings (but which in fact have always been conceived in colour) is very important. Generally colour is used intuitively and not governed by any set rules. The activity of painting is totally absorbing and the production of a painting can occupy either a matter of hours or weeks (see also III.5.3). During this physical activity the 'mental stance' recedes only to re-emerge when one once more begins to question the 'finished' visual statement. At this stage one becomes aware that other unidentifiable aspects have crept into the work. It is this 'unknown' element that enables you to proclaim that the work is 'finished' or 'successful', (at least for the moment)." (see III.8.4 re serendipity).

There is some dificulty for Kinsey in developing his 'mental stance'. He speaks of great personal frustration experienced at any hindrance to progression. These hindrances threaten the development of the work at particular points and are of critical concern, as will be made clear in distinguishing the conceptual field of the painter. Clearly, although the quotation suggests that what greatly frustrates is being prevented from painting when once the "coincidence of visual imagery and feeling" is established, as for instance might be the case at having to fulfill other duties just at the point of being ready to paint, I do not think that this is the only sort of frustration for him, (but it can be ruinously interruptive nevertheless). The "incubation period" he speaks of can quite easily be unproductive. (see also III.8.2).

It is with this bleak possibility in mind that I approach the matter of recognizing the importance of the 'mental' or reflective stance of the painter, for unless he settles the matter to his

personal satisfaction he would, he would claim, be unable to get any further with a work of any importance. This surely must be the worst kind of frustration for one whose concerns require practical expression.

III.2.2 In Outline: an Approach to Kinsey's Concerns.

During the earliest stages of the activity I shall regard him as taking up a reflective stance. He feels it is important that he has some kind of prospect in mind. This prospect embraces his feelings towards the world and himself in an intention to paint a picture. It is not and cannot be an inflexible plan of action; it is by nature malleable and incomplete. I have called this reflective stance 'prospecting'.[4]

Secondly Kinsey engages in activities which will take him from the business of prospecting towards the full material activity of painting. He makes drawings and notes. In so doing he is attempting to make his malleable prospect intelligible. The intelligibility of a painter's ideas is necessarily pictorial. Between the mental stance of prospecting and the act of painting Kinsey endeavours to develop his pictorial concerns. This is a predominently reflective activity yet he is committed to the practical business of drawing. Where a painting is intended this is a transitional stage of the process. Less malleable, more determinate than the prospect it yet must be to an extent malleable, indeterminate. In such cases as occasionally arise, where the matter is fully worked out at the drawing stage, there is no point in going on to make a painting. We may say that the transition may be completed equally possibly either later or

sooner. However, this does not deny that some transitional stage is necessary to the fullest development of pictorial concerns. For convenience I shall assume a case in which a painting continues to have point.

The drawings and notes Kinsey makes are a means by which he gives form to his ideas and impressions. The visual relationships of line, tone and scale are explored in this endeavour. The prospect so flexibly envisaged becomes intelligible in terms of its eventual expression. The ideas literally take shape. Drawing is a form of cogitation.

Yet what is there to distinguish this stage of the process from the full practical activity of painting? Something fundamentally distinguishes these activities which in some ways are similar in that they both involve making observable marks by a material means, given that in our example such drawings are not made as a preliminary marking-up or plotting out of what will go where on the canvas. (that is a matter of planning and somewhat different. The transfer of a scale drawing, for example, succeeds and is usually dependent upon some preparatory sort of drawing and note-taking). What distinguishes this activity from that of painting is that as an activity it is predominantly reflective, while painting is a predominantly physical or practical activity. This does not mean that either excludes the other. In some measure painting is a reflective activity; in some measure drawing is a physical activity. But drawing of the cogitating sort is a transitional activity, whose function is to take forward the prospect, insofar as it is possible by such means, towards the moment at which the mainly reflective aspect of the work is set aside, if temporarily, for the "full, concrete activity"[5] of

painting. It is my contention that in the activity of painting pictorial ideas are developed to their fullest determinacy. It is a paradox that their greatest determinacy as ideas is apparently achieved at the setting aside of predominantly reflective activity.

Having set out the matters for consideration let me return now to look more closely at, first, what it is to settle the nature of a pictorial prospect.

III.3 The Mental Stance of Landscape Painter: Prospects.

III.3.I The Need for a Mental Stance.

In painting a landscape there is at its commencement a deal of difficulty and significance in recongnizing what Wordsworth has called a "prospect in the mind".[6] The term covers most aptly the earliest distinguishable phase of the making of the work. The hunches, the preoccupations of a painter lack focus until he has settled what I might refer to as their 'colour'. (see II.4.2). The prospect he seeks directs his recurring interests towards a context of conceptual and practical development. What exercises a painter in accounting for the direction of his attention, his mental stance, has to do with wanting, requiring the establishment of its kind from the outset. Notwithstanding the philosophical reservations surrounding the notion of a prospect "in the mind", the term will yet be worth the trouble of its defence.

First, however, something might be said about the enthusiasm a painter feels for his subject. Constable has remarked upon the pleasures: "Paley observed of himself that 'The happiest hours of a sufficiently happy life were passed by the side of a stream.',

and I am greatly mistaken if every landscape painter will not acknowledge that his most serene hours have been spent in the open air with his palette in his hand".[7]

Constable's content rests upon the unity of his endeavours. It is, as Bacon remarked "a great happiness when men's professions and their inclinations accord".[8] Constable knew his prospect. Happy man. Painting 'plein air', in great and disparate traditions from Constable to the Impressionists, the Newlyn painters and the Fauvists, constitutes an attempt to capture the prospect in the most direct manner. This is but one way of furthering a concern with Landscape and we shall see that it is not without problems regarding the reflective aspect of landscape painting. At the present time concern for landscape exercises the painter and sculptor in broadly two directions: the descendants of the plein air school concern themselves with Nature as Material. A recent exhibition with just that title showed painters and sculptors working with collections of natural objects, ash twigs, even such events as a walk in the country (Nature as Material, Arts Council travelling exhibition, 1980). The idea informing these works being that the presence of the artist, interruptive, material, acting upon and acted upon by an immediate landscape is the ultimate expression of the plein air tradition. However there are still easel painters working mediately in their studios. For them the problems of prospect might seem to be more complicated, but they are not problems which the plein airist avoids. It would be a mistake to suppose that an immediate approach is any less mindful or reflective an endeavour than that involved in more traditional ways of working. For any artist concerned with landscape the problem of settling the nature of his prospect







13

Pembrokeshire
I — IV





VI



13

V–VII
Pembrokeshire

VIII. Lamure Beach.





occupies a major part of his attention. How might Kinsey set about the business of settling the nature of his prospect? Consider his observations. Kinsey is currently working on a series of landscape with notes of another landscape than that which surrounds him. Most of his notes refer to the countryside of South Wales, but as some of these illustrations show (viii - xiv) some of his studies are based upon a visit to Canada. However he himself acknowledges that Wales seems to dominate his paintings, in some way, whatever the distance. "No matter how bright or hot the light is, I should still be painting black pictures." However, while recognizing the influence of a place upon his work his pictures are not topographical. Pictures of places are not his concern at all. Rather, it is that his feelings for that landscape and his interests as a painter are mutually, importantly happy. This particular landscape prevails as a good place for him to consider as he sorts out his concern with Landscape. Just being in it is not enough. Indeed he might want not want to spend too much time in the places which move him to paint pictures (see III.7.3). Sorting out his concern is the matter to which I shall now turn.

III.3.2 ".. something to pursue"

Wordsworth's "prospect in the mind" presents a useful analogy to Kinsey's "idea for a painting". Both present the reflective pursuits of artists, whether painters or poets, concerned with directing their efforts towards some sort of making new. That the kind of the artefactual product shapes the sort of reflective activity that occurs does no damage to the usefulness of the analogy. The painter and poet are alike engaged in working a

balance of reflective and practical activity. This worked balance has issue in particular expressive forms. At its earliest stage, there is little to show publicly what goes on. However distinct as forms poems and paintings are, consideration of Wordsworth's conception of a "prospect" and Kinsey's "idea" bring us to problems of close similarity. I shall look, for example, to the relation between sensible observation and imagination. There is matter to be made of the tension that comes of putting them into juxtaposition.

Part of the usefulness of the notion of the prospect lies in its flexible and inclusive character. Although constrained by the paradigm of the agency of the artist it is not determined by it. The mental prospect is oriented towards something of a different nature. The comprehensive scope of the prospect - which covers the painter's stance towards himself, his environment, his faculties and skills, cannot at this stage be fully intelligible. For what is not yet made cannot yet be seen.

For Wordsworth, concern with the poetic prospect is itself a poetic topic. He speaks of that prospect as "something in myself", barely defined yet drawing on

> "faculties still growing, feeling still
> That whatsoever point they gain, they yet
> Have something to pursue."[9]

That "something" can only be pursued through the creative agency of the poet, and it is precisely in that pursuit that the Wordsworthian 'Self' has its possibility. As he goes on to point out, in walking "with nature" Wordsworth retains his "first creative sensibility". He speaks of a "plastic power", an "auxilliar light" from his mind, [10] subscribing to the power of

Nature as he observes and experiences it, he regards his observations as active rather than passive: The world 'comprehends' him - his poetic task is not to construe the world but to add something to it. (see III 7.2.3.)

"..the bodily eye
Amidst my strongest workings evermore
Was searching out the lines of difference
As they lie hid in all external forms
..an eye
Which..
Could find no surface where its power might sleep,
Which spake perpetual logic to my soul,
And by an unrelenting agency
Did bind my feelings ever as in a chain." [11]

This is, in all save the chosen form of expression, the experience of the landscape painter. When Ed Kinsey talks about having an idea for a painting he undergoes much that he would recognize in these lines. As he observes and responds to the landscape he is imaginatively "searching out" his material. His agency as a painter makes his "idea" a painterly rather than a poetic one.

The prospect, or idea for a painting, being a constitutive part of the mental activity which is constitutive of the creative agency of the artist, is, as I have claimed comprehensive in its scope. The "prospect in the mind" of Wordsworth, and, or may, I believe equally be said of Kinsey, binds together sensible observation and imaginative excursion. It is the prospect, oriented towards material expression, which invests the imagination and the findings of sensible observation with

meaning. For Wordsworth, as for Kinsey, Imagination leads on sensible observation and, just as surely, is itself tempered by the findings of observation.

If the prospect or idea for a painting were concerned merely with picturing we should have to posit an asymmetrical relation between the picture and that which is pictured; this inevitably would narrow the scope of the prospect. As Andrew Harrison has pointed out, if a picture is to "show how things are", then, in pursuit of a good transcription, "pictures tend normally to be simpler than what they represent and cannot be more complicated - cannot add, can always subtract."[12] This is a useful way of looking at the transcriptive aspect of making an objective drawing, discussed in Chapter I.3.4. This, if it were all (which is by no means Harrison's contention) would be a restrictive account of what Kinsey and Wordsworth are up to; it would be to set their best efforts down as ever less rich than that to which they must attend. This would be to speak of what Harrison calls 'aspecting'. Prospecting involves aspecting but does not, for it cannot, reduce to it. While a certain degree of accuracy of picturing is important to the artist in any concern with representation, it is not his whole concern (see I.7.I) but must serve him in his wider interests. Where those wider interests combine, in prospect, attention both to the real and to the imaginary, the terms of the relation are not fixedly asymmetrical. That is to say, the painter is not subtracting all the time. Prospect binds imagination and observation into a dependency of flexible and sensitive bias. In this respect, the realities of sensible observation do temper the wilder flights of fancy. For a negative comment upon this constraint consider, for

example, the disappointed expectations of the poet as a tourist confronted with Mont Blanc:

"the soulless image on the eye
That had usurped upon a living thought
That never more could be."[13]

Yet consider also this, where Wordsworth later attests to the central importance of the Imagination:

"..the Power so called
Through sad incompetence of human speech..
.....to my conscious soul I now can say -
'I recognize thy glory: in such strength
Of usurpation, when the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The invisible world doth greatness make abode,
There harbours;..."

The artist's business is as much with something "evermore about to be" as it is with "the light of sense".[14] Both count - it is the artist's work to make matter of the relations betwixt sense and imagination.

Interestingly Wordsworth apparently recognizes the centrality of this imaginative aspect of "prospecting" from a point of physical distance. On native soil he speaks incessantly of Nature as his mentor, his emotional and creative counsellor. The role of the "Power", or of "Imagination" in that process is most clear to him when he is away from familiar surroundings. Now this is a recognizable feature of Kinsey's experience, indeed he actually seeks out his distance, both temporal and spatial, from the stimulus of the sensibly observed in order to consider a

"prospect". Since he is a painter this must further his own "invisible world" or, as he might prefer to say, his mental stance towards the act of material painterly expression, its factitious and visible product. (see II.4.2)

Both the poet's and the painter's prospect can be regarded as including both sensible observations and imaginative possibilities. We can also say that it is directed towards a material expression which is publicly accessible. The ensuing material expression within landscape painting and poetry requires much of the prospect in the mind. When a painter speaks of having an idea for a painting it may be some time before he gets to his sketch book, let alone the canvas. In the case of Kinsey his idea for a painting tends to be quite a while in mind and will sooner or later require a perhaps prolonged period of drawing to develop visual intelligibility. As the poet develops his prospect the field of its scope reduces though it never disappears. (A work of art cannot be fully determined. "The painting doesn't exhaust its content." [15] Its role in the response of other people ensures a continuing mutability and the prospect is thus capable of transference from artist to reader or spectator - (see section on Authority II.4.3). The form of its expression contains and enriches those flights of fancy and sensible observations conjured by the artist in prospect. In syntactical and semantic devising the poet makes his prospect intelligible. Similarly, in drawing, a painter will develop his prospect which is for him the means by which he takes his idea for a painting forward into statement; pictorial statement. His manner of thinking as a painter tends

towards some pictorial entity. Having a prospect is part of the process of painting which cannot be neglected, since recognition of that prospect takes the painter towards some personal material expression. Prospecting is, even within the constraints imposed by observation and the intention to paint, necessarily malleable by nature; allowing innumerable shifts in emphasis to the point at which drawings and studies are started (see I.7.4).

We need different ways of characterizing response to a landscape and having a prospect of Landscape. Prospecting has to be regarded as part of the daily life of the painter or poet. The imaginative constructions which by training and creative interest inform his prospect or idea for a painting are needful to his further use since they provide material from which he can develop ways of addressing himself to his matter. The business of developing patterns of salience is part of a painter's concern. A good deal of his early training has to do with recognizing this to be the case. Exploratory drawings, working drawings and studies are, in this sense, classificatory in intention. The growth of the pictorial idea depends upon both these transitional activities, which Wordsworth has made it his business, as a poet, to characterize and describe. Characterization of a mental stance is something which the painter, cannot, just by beginning his painting accomplish. Development takes time.

It is worth restating the relationship between the activities which so centrally concern a painter at this stage. The landscape painter engages in phases of reflective activity, which are distinguishable from each other but related in that each has a bearing upon the progress of the other and both are

oriented towards the practical business of painting. Both may be said to be predominently reflective or mental activities but they differ in that the earlier phase need involve no practical expression whatever, while the later phase necessitates drawings and note-taking. Prospecting, the earliest part of the process, anticipates this second phase of activity.

These terms, "prospect," "intelligible object", are not interchangeable. Yet they are related in that within the context of producing a landscape painting they are constitutive of the mental stance taken up by the painter and as such are constitutive of his practical endeavour. They effectively constitute the form of the landscape painter's thought. Working in a principled manner involves a process of sorting, deliberating on a special kind of directed classification. For example, at this stage, a possible direction to Kinsey's concerns could, perhaps, be as follows. Since he paints away from Wales and does so, not because he happens to live elsewhere, but because he need not, for the sake of his painting live or work on site, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his attention was held by the notion of its being possible to paint so as to present generalizable truths about landscape. In that case we might have to say that Kinsey was in pursuit of The Landscape. However, I am constrained by the particular and thus recalcitrant temper of a live example to accept that Kinsey is not in pursuit of a Universal statement regarding landscape, since he says he is not. For he sees that option as one he must reject on the grounds that it is not possible to achieve one ideal picture: a Right and True Account. Veracity in this case is not constrained by truth conditions. Yet he does entertain recurring concerns and while

they have little to do with places they have quite a lot to do with place as a pictorial preoccupation (see also i.7.6, II.4.2 & III. 4.2.1). Whatever his 'prospect' or 'idea' for a painting may be, it is not sought in terms of an Ideal Landscape.

III.3.3 The Three-term Relation: Painter, Environment, Pictorial Idea.

"The inseparability of maker, picture and what is pictured." [16]

Concerning a sense of Place we may say this: since Kinsey does for most of the time carry a workbook in his pocket we can at least suppose that his paintings have something to do with such sketches and notes as he makes, since they are in some part occasioned by his having been in specific and locatable places. Yet these notes do not serve to replenish an imperfect recollection. They may possibly be done on location, but often they are not. Painting 'plein air' would not obviate the need for his workbook. His notes and sketches may be considered as exploratory material: a means of settling the character of the "prospect in the mind". In such cases we should see the taking of notes as important in the establishment of a three-term relation of person to Place where the person is a painter. The third term of the relation is the painting (see also III.7.2.). Where a painter professes a complete lack of interest in topographical pictures we must ask what he is after that requires both that he takes his notebook around in his pocket, draws sometimes at a distance, sometimes on the spot and that he abjures pictures of places in the paintings he undertakes. From this point of view

the moment has been reached at which the matter of characterizing the painter's thinking is more than germane to his work; it might, if neglected, prevent him in his ideas.

From my point of view Kinsey's position with regard to the importance of what he might for the moment term the prospect is generally significant. As a painter I am myself familiar with the problem; it is not simply of anecdotal interest; it is vital to an account of the artist as agent. What counts for the painter is that his regard for matters pertaining to landscape painting is an integral part of his work. That regard, or mental stance is fundamental to action, for if it is subtracted from the activity he is left without a basis for the deliberation or reasoning needful to his activities.

An artist's agency stands through this relation between himself as painter, the world of external events and conditions, and the picture he paints; this three-term relation is a consequence of agent-deliberation. To posit the artist as agent is to posit his deliberation with respect to external conditions for the sake of that which he wants to make. We may see how it is of consequence that he at least recognizes the problematic nature of what might be called his mental stance; it matters to him in proportion as it matters that the painting he does manifests his thinking. It is of the first importance that his thinking is successful. An unsuccessful painting is a real possibility for it is not at all certain that a painting will manifest clear thinking. Now it can seem as if, where this happens, there is some gap between the idea and its expression. Recollect T.S. Eliot and Prufrock's lamentation: "That is not what I meant at all. That is not it at all". [17] I shall shortly return to

Prufrock but for Kinsey, we must recognize that implied in his knowing at least enough of what he means to avert disaster is the fact that poor painting is poor thought. This might help to explain why he is so exercised. Should his stance be equivocal with regard to his concerns, or should he fail to recognize the existence of problems of the kind outlined, then such equivocation, or shortsightedness must, he would correctly maintain, show in the content of his work. He does need to sort out his ideas. The three-term relation implies the need for a locus, or loci, of creative attention.

III.4. Finding the Locus of Attention.

With regard to the landscape painter's pursuit of some locus of attention there are certain considerations he must ponder. Firstly, he must adopt a stance of some sort towards the data at his disposal. To examine this requirement I will put forward as an example a wish to celebrate landscape. How would this accord with his concerns as an artist? Many features of the observable landscape may give him cause for joy and wonder but how does he address himself to such features? Arising out of this it must be asked just how he is to establish a locus of attention whose terms are fundamentally pictorial. Is there a threat of circularity in his position?

III.4.i. Celebration.

First the notion of 'celebration' needs some explanation. In the Romantic tradition the relationship of man to nature is

frequently expressed by painters and poets in celebratory vein. Consider the remarks of a latter-day would-be Romantic landscape painter.

H.H. Price in a lecture given at Reading University in 1950, 'Painting and the Theory of Knowledge', has this to say about his own adventure into landscape painting. "I had (a) motive of..an emotional kind which made me want to take up painting.... it was just this - that I happen to like Nature and always have. The great Nature poets, Lucretius, Virgil, Wordsworth - are the poets who move me most. How well I can sympathize with the Nature-worshippers of old. I want also to be allowed to admire Nature as a spectacle ... far surpassing all the works of Man."[18] This is an understandable point of view - and a rather moving one - yet it is as a current basis for pictorial celebration in some ways bothersome. A love of Nature may inspire a desire to write or paint. That seems unexceptionable as a starting point, but it is perhaps worth a doubt or two, also since I believe it is an approach which is attended by error concerning the nature of the activity. Let me show this by first distinguishing, for example the celebratory stance of Wordsworth and Keats. The English Romantics of the Eighteenth Century and the Nineteenth Century frequently use Landscape not so much in celebration of Nature, as such, but rather as a starting point in pursuit of the role of the individual. There are of course very considerable differences as to regard for that role between Romantic poets. Wordsworth's personification of Nature embodies a supernaturalism - the poet is taught by Nature to recognize the Divine in himself and in things. Some lines from 'The Simplon Pass', Book vi of 'The Prelude', illustrate the point.

"The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens,
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light -
Were all like workings of one mind, the features
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
Characters of the great Apocolypse,
The types and symbols of Eternity,
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end." [19]

But we would distinguish the earlier from the later Romantics; In the works of the late Romantics, Keats and Shelley, there is growing emphasis on human rather than supernatural power.

The patterns of sensation employed by Wordsworth "tumult and peace, the darkness and the light" evoke an "experience" in which people "respond with awe to something which dwarfs them. In Keats, however, what dwarfs them is ultimately another human being."[20] Keats takes on the issue that perturbed the earlier poets, the possibilities of human action. The Ben Nevis Sonnet ("Read me a lesson, muse and speak it loud") extends Keats' scepticism towards a supernatural level of being ".. the sonnet interprets the mist which surrounds the mountain as an emblem of man's incapacity to attain reliable knowledge of hell, heaven, himself, or anything else". It is a matter of underpinning a prospect, a poetic prospect, with a pertinent structure of ideas. The need is timeless, but that which is pertinent must change.

We are obliged to admit that in the Twentieth Century the relationship of Man to Nature has further altered. A celebratory stance about Nature if such is possible, would be different again for we might be moved to admire Nature as "Far surpassing all the works of Man" but should not forget that an atomic explosion can yield, at least, and best, a year of fiery sunsets. Current scientific capabilities rob the artist of some valuable

uncertainties; thus the analogy so profitable to Keats' purpose, having diminished applicability, would serve the modern poet to rather less point:

> "I look into the chasms, and a shroud of
> Vapours doth hide them; just as much I wist
> Mankind do know of Hell." [21]

Hell is no longer that kind of problem; we can produce it at will, from particular knowledge. I am in no position to take Price to task in his sympathies. Neither should I want to. What seems doubtful is the possible, artistic, measure of his "sympathy with Nature-worshippers" and Nature poets. It would be easy to read too much into the notion, but Price could be read as if he had overlooked a possible difficulty about the artist's need to establish appropriate sympathies. If this is indeed the case, then it is probably due to a common enough misunderstanding about the nature of the activity of Landscape painting. What counts is not so much the landscape or Nature, but Landscape Paintings, or Nature Poetry or even Nature Rituals. It is the recognition of this that informs the deliberate denial by Kinsey of a concern to produce topographical paintings. Emulating landscape is not his concern. Insofar as making pictures of places involved merely doing that, he would want to avoid it. Price cannot emulate his landscape, but he could yet take up a stance with regard to the landscape, or Nature, and turn it to pictorial account, centrally that. We do not need to establish exact sympathies to make a case for there being an important continuity in the notion of the poetic or painterly prospect as such. The relationship between the artist and Nature is always to be regarded as oriented towards

his making something, his factitious prospect. We may need to ask 'Is the painter still concerned with some sort of celebration of Nature? How can we view this in 1985?' Having regard to the calculable and the incalculable changes Man brings about in Nature, the painter as agent perhaps does need to reconsider, though with the deepest apprehension, what it is to be "all one" with Nature. The Twentieth Century landscape artist may be unhappy about celebrating "eternity" - but he may well lament his condition in its passing. He needs for his prospect to develop as an idea, to begin from a viable position. He obviously cannot be in Wordsworth's position. Yet he needs, as Wordsworth needed, a pertinent structure to his ideas. The point is that a celebratory or any other sort of stance can be taken up only in the context of a prospective entity which is necessarily other than his starting point, that is, in the factitious work of his own making. (That indeed is itself a truly celebratory matter.)

The relationship of Man to Nature, deperately precarious and subject to our will, as it is, lends poignancy to the reading of Wordsworth and Keats. But it is out of place simply to mourn a change in situation over a hundred and eighty odd years. The question is the viability, the factitious plausibility of pictorial, or poetic stance. It always was. It is readily shown in this connection that personification of Nature is matter for Wordsworth, but for Keats is untenable; identification with Nature, as a Twentieth Century device, or vehicle of composition, seems now a different matter altogether; deeply problematic. If now, regretfully, the artist recognizes himself in "the features of the one face" he must adopt a different stance. The agency of the artist ties him into concerns for the conditions in which he

finds himself. That is a function of the three-term relation. So nowadays there is surely no easy place left for the celebrations of an itinerant limner. Perhaps, no, of course, we can with Professor Price, celebrate "the way nature works". Yet if the Romantic tradition is to survive the threat of nostalgic decline then what neither he nor any one of us can honestly do is celebrate "the eternal hills". The Twentieth Century artist is put to it to establish a fresh basis of objective distance. But that is an old problem. Recognizing it as a concommitant feature of concern with pictorial or poetic making is the problem which lies at its foundations. (see also III.7.2.) At the end of this chapter I shall show that a Twentieth Century celebratory stance is indeed a posibility (III.7.3).

III.4.2 A Problem of Circularity.

In the last section I showed the necessity to the artist, whether painter or poet, of establishing a basis for objective distance. In this section I mean to take things further in order to expose the threat of circularity which apparently besets the artist as he seeks to further his creative purpose. I shall begin by showing that, accepting the need for objective distance, there yet remains a question as to what that need amount to. We may regard this matter as of two-fold importance. I shall accordingly approach it first in terms of the artist's response to the observable world. Under this heading I shall discuss Kinsey's sketches and use of Enclosed Forms; the use of symbols in painting; and the function of memory in mediate cognition.

Secondly, I shall concern myself with the conceptual status of the need for objective distance. This will be centered around a discussion of Price's Theory of Representation and Thinking and will explore the Analogy from Language; the question of intelligible objects as it relates to painting landscape; and the notion of conceptual manifestation.

I intend to show that the supposed problem of circularity turns out to be an empty threat. Furthermore I shall argue that wrong thinking about the nature of concept development leads to an impasse whether the field of action is painting or philosophy.

Part of the problem arising out of the artist's need to establish objective distance seems to be that of characterizing a particular kind of knowledge of the world, pictorial knowledge. This is a puzzle about the nature of the need to achieve objective distance, whatever that might be. It is a necessary aspect of painterly thought and, of course, of poetic thought. Regarding the pictorial I have suggested, in Chapter II, a curiously close comparison to be drawn between the communicative relations that obtain between an artwork and a spectator both in the context of the Erotic and in the apparently dissimilar genre of Landscape painting. I shall, later in the chapter, show that there is a point of logical significance to be made of relating these pictorial concerns. (III.7.3) So far as the reference to Chapter II is concerned the following may be said of the putative parallel: The requirement of good faith, which may seem at first to obtain quite particularly in connection with the erotic turns out to be just as surely connected in with the business of looking at and responding to Landscape art. A painter's prospect does not stand to the spectator's attention as an instrument of sensible

stimulation except insofar as it irreducibly relates him, as agent, in the pictorial content of the painting; but this is a question of good faith and not one of logic. It is, logically speaking, all too easy to disvalue and abuse the true nature of that relation. An objective stance is a positive requirement and by no means is this a denial of response as personal; as emotionally important.

It is clear that the difficulty of achieving objective distance attends many aspects of the landscape painter's work. Just as he is obliged to question his possible personal detachment from nature, so he has also to question the standpoint from which he idertifies his matter, (by which I mean the content and substance of his painting). It is not that the objective presence, existence, of external events and conditions is in question; but there is, as I have already suggested, a problem: if a painter is worried about the way he thinks about landscape painting he is also worried about how he can think about landscape or nature. The conceptual difficulty he appears to be faced with is that he cannot begin, as a painter, to consider what to use of nature or landscape without some basis for doing so. He is, after all, part of it and is no more detached in this concern than he is in Figure painting, erotic or otherwise. It is not like looking at the box on the table.

It is worth pausing to attend to the structural distinction often given in the discussion of Landscape and Figure painting. It is a common observation that, compositionally, a landscape is characteristically concave whereas a Figure painting, or for that matter an objective study, is characteristically convex. I find the distinction hard to sustain on these terms. Consider the two

stimulation except insofar as it irreducibly relates him, as agent, in the pictorial content of the painting; but this is a question of good faith and not one of logic. It is, logically speaking, all too easy to disvalue and abuse the true nature of that relation. An objective stance is a positive requirement and by no means is this a denial of response as personal; as emotionally important.

It is clear that the difficulty of achieving objective distance attends many aspects of the landscape painter's work. Just as he is obliged to question his possible personal detachment from nature, so he has also to question the standpoint from which he identifies his matter, (by which I mean the content and substance of his painting). It is not that the objective presence, existence, of external events and conditions is in question; but there is, as I have already suggested, a problem: if a painter is worried about the way he thinks about landscape painting he is also worried about how he can think about landscape or nature. The conceptual difficulty he appears to be faced with is that he cannot begin, as a painter, to consider what to use of nature or landscape without some basis for doing so. He is, after all, part of it and is no more detached in this concern than he is in Figure painting, erotic or otherwise. It is not like looking at the box on the table.

It is worth pausing to attend to the structural distinction often given in the discussion of Landscape and Figure painting. It is a common observation that, compositionally, a landscape is characteristically concave whereas a Figure painting, or for that matter an objective study, is characteristically convex. I find the distinction hard to sustain on these terms. Consider the two





Torso. Per Ahlmark '85

etchings opposite. The Landscape might superficially be despatched as a concave composition - it is as it were, a cycloramic bowl whose rim is constituted by the edge of the picture plane. But if this is to work at all, it requires an opposition internal to its structure. That is to say, its very concavity implies and is implied in its convexities. The cloud forms the foreground of rocks and the figures themselves are not concave, yet their placing is the key to focal distance. The tension is unavoidable; the spatial rhythm of 'coming and going' is crucial in any concern with pictorial space.

Now consider the torso. What cannot now be said of the concavities, the tensions of plane movement, which may so readily be remarked of the Landscape? It is not convincing to say that the general orientation of the composition is convex, notwithstanding the point made above - for there might easily be a figure drawing or painting whose orientation has a prevailing concavity. Why not? Equally a still life may be of one compositional 'direction' or another. What of a still life in an interior?

The point of abiding significance is that the comprehensive nature and scope of a pictorial prospect is not confined to the business of painting landscape. I have remarked the obligation of good faith. Alongside that must be the fundamental apprehension of the objective demands internal to the concept of pictorial space. This is the stance of objectification of such importance in the working concerns of any artist. This it is for which the exercise of objective drawing is preparation. An objective drawing of a box may serve equally as preparation for landscape or

figure painting. It is therefore not to the purpose to distinguish Landscape from the Figure - or either of these from an objective drawing - in terms of directed plane. They may, however, be distinguished as forms of painterly thought - In this, it is clear that whereas for present purposes Landscape and Figure painting may be significantly comparable the exercise of objective drawing is in a different category of conceptual attention in that the exercise is designed to set questions about the task of objectification. On a pedagogical point, sometimes it is a help to new students painting Landscape for there to be a window through which to look at it and better still, a viewfinder stuck to the glass. This is a way of effecting the transition from doing an objective drawing exercise to establishing an objective stance towards this comprehensive world.

Let me now consider some of the ways which a painter might respond to his observation of the observable landscape: the artist may as he opens his notebook opt to draw attention to certain observable features; for example, possibly relatively enduring features are what he wants, such as those presented by geological strata. Alternatively he may consider quite transient features like the shadows of clouds across high places; he might choose to take a nostalgic stance, in the Nineteenth Century manner - whatever he does it does not affect the status of his problem, whichever he selects for attention, for he has to regard any such features in terms of his pictorial concern. His question to himself is what use are these features and how is he to decide that he wants them? It is clear that sorting out the supposed circularity of this situation constitutes the major part of his problem (see III.6.I).

The difficulty is to establish the terms of his concern, within which he distinguishes observable features of the landscape. In philosophical areas of concern about having concepts, current thinking would regard language as central in pursuit of this question. For the artist this is a dubious option. We can try saying that for a painter any sort of condition for a 'mental stance' is set by the prospective activity of painting. But the point is that this does not as it stands help him very much for he cannot get that far, without settling the character of his concerns with the prospect. "In the making of art a concept enters into, and plays a crucial role in, the determination of what is made, indeed an activity cannot be engaged in, except inadvertently, unless the agent posesses the concept of that activity". [22] But for Kinsey the prospect embraces the objective landscape, the field of imagination and the Landscape painting itself, and is essential, materially, in the conceptual cohesion of thought and action in the finished work. Yet he cannot resolve his problem purely out of the activity of prospecting - neither can he yet paint, for he is significantly unsure of himself. It needs to be mentioned that the prospect whilst having some of the attributes of a mental image, differs in that it is to be characterized in practical terms, as integral to the activity of painting. How he is to remove the threat of circularity is the question I now intend to treat.



13.

Lannie beach
Deep River





III.4.2.1. Response to the Observable World.

The example of Kinsey's use of the Enclosed Form: Another possible Locus of Attention.

For the moment we may usefully approach the matter of the painter's mental stance by way of his response to observable objects of his attention. First we can ask by what means he identifies what he wants. Perhaps he begins by considering, then making notes, and discovers he wishes to make frequent allusions to features of prevailing similarity. We already accept that we are considering a painter who is not concerned with representational verisimilitude and must look for another reason for his drawings of reference. Kinsey has claimed not to be concerned with some ideal, or universal, Landscape, but we might usefully pause over what it is about such a concern that would make it something he actually must reject in terms of the point outlined in III.3.2. Suppose for a moment that he is viewing these features primarily as instances of some objective reality. But what would he settle for? If he tries to identify such entities what will they be? Let us suppose for example that a landscape painter again and again makes use of a particular feature : "X", an enclosed form. Suppose that one way or another he keeps on considering and seeking enclosed forms like this one. The illustrations opposite show that for Kinsey this is a prevailing image. We might make the mistake of saying that he is doing this in an attempt to get as close as possible to an essential feature of any landscape. But if such a feature were essential as a feature of the landscape it could not be restricted to any particular place. Rather it would have to be that any and all particular places provided instances of the same

feature. In any and all natural landscape this artist might be concerned with enclosed forms. This might be true of Kinsey; his work could be regarded in that way, so it might seem. Yet if such were the case would this feature not be accessible to us all? Whilst Kinsey might in such a state of affairs, persuade us all to consider landscape in new ways, we might object to being told that, since such features were universal, any painter setting out to paint landscape must sooner or later stumble upon the objective reality of such Enclosed Forms, (see above). The fact that he does seem to be concerned with this feature whether in Deep River or Pembrokeshire does not prejudice the case that Kinsey does not wish to sustain any pursuit of the Ideal on such terms. He rightly sees that option as one he must reject on the grounds that it is neither possible nor desirable to think in this way about his work, for his concerns are expressly not with natural landscapes as such. They are, however with his painting, as such, such as it might become. Any concern with 'essentials' would have to take its place as a pictorial issue. So he does entertain recurring concerns and while they may have little to do with places, they have quite a lot to do with place, as a pictorial preoccupation. (see also I.7.6, II.4.2 & II 4.2.1). In terms of his agency this would not be a case of regarding the natural landscape in terms of these features being inherent to it. The pursuit of some pictorial Essence would in no sense jeopardize pictorial irreducibility, (cf. Paul Klee I.7.6, also II.4.2).

III.4.2.2 The Use of Symbols: Kinsey's problem in a Philosophical Context.

What exercises any landscape painter is the way he might think to pictorial purpose. How may we regard this as his object?

The activity of prospecting is one in which an artist in some way considers his preoccupations. We need now to characterize this activity and in order to do so will have to look both at the endeavour itself and at its product. It is in consideration of the work of art that we ask questions about its content and the relation of content to conceptual inception. Looking to philosophical terminology this might be expressed in terms of symbolic cognition. What is usually meant by this is that by means of symbols cognition of the absent is possible.[23]

How does this sit with an account of the activity at issue? A painter might make use of symbols. But there would be no parallel system of meaning; no reference to language for example. "Blue" does not stand for "p". Let us consider this further. For the philosopher concerned with language and thinking the problem is to understand how it is that merely by operating with symbols one can be in cognitive contact with absent objects or events. Being aware of anything beyond the symbols themselves is the puzzle. For the painter, however, even being in the presence of the 'objects or events' of landscape does nothing to reduce the puzzlement, for he is about a business which exceeds the constraints of transcription. Further, the problem may be compounded in the very 'symbolism' in use, and in the view held by many regarding their autonomy. Some would reject the use of symbols altogether. "Symbols are my bête noire. They are supposed to represent reality, but in truth they don't represent anything.

If one looks at a thing with the intention of trying to discover what it means, one ends no longer seeing the thing itself, but thinking of the question that had been raised." [24] (René Magritte). This is a cry from the heart; a plea against instrumentalism. (see IV.5 for further discussion, also III.3.2, penultimate paragraph). It seems that our parallel must break down for the philosopher seeks to understand the relation between the symbols of language and objects and events (in absence). The painter is sometimes accused of abandoning the analogous pursuit, but in either case nothing is solved for we still need to know what governs the 'symbols' used by painters. If the painter is not concerned with verisimilitude; does not, and indeed cannot, seek to show direct parallels between brushstrokes and the visible objects and events of landscape, then his problem looks to be somewhat distinct from that of a philosopher of H.H. Price's persuasion, at least.

Yet he does refer his picture does owe something to the observable world. In order to explore this apparent distinction I want now to stay with Price a little longer. For it may be instructive to pursue the question of what it is can be said to possess an artist of the colour of his preoccupations in the context of Price's dispositional account of concept cognition and development. I will look first at his work on the function of memory and will then concern myself with what he has to say about thinking and representation. My interest is two-fold: one, to question the role of revisionary procedures in the development of an emergent idea; two, to show that, because of the irreducibly pictorial nature of the artist's ideas, we have, perhaps paradoxically, the clearest case possible for showing the

redundancy of the search for 'hidden' concepts: of well-known relevance to the discussion of language, but far less well-documented in the case of the visual arts. My intention is to show that if we look at what is going on in the painter's working procedures we shall discover common ground on the matter of the conceptual status of ideas of pictorial and verbal sort.

How much does memory have to do with an artist's purpose? Does he carry around in his head the perfect recollection of observational reference? Does he carry around a picture (in his head) all ready for him to transfer to canvas? What happens to his idea when the picture is painted?

III 4.2.3. Memory.

In his discussion of the development of concepts Price argues for the active function of memory. He is out to contest the notion of intelligible objects considered as subsistent propositions. His example is of interest to the present enquiry: a concept, he claims can be in mind without being present to the mind. "The concept in the mind of the craftsman manifest itself in what he does without being present to his mind as an object of inspection." [25] This is a significant case for me to consider, since it shows up with particular force the dilemma in which Price finds himself. He wants to be rid of intra-mental objects of inspection; seeks to show that concepts are manifest in practice yet retains the notion of the concept "in mind".

How then, may Price's argument be assessed in the present connection? His case is that the active function of memory obviates the need for intra-mental objects of inspection. How does this not meet the needs of the case? This is his position: in conceptual cognition, he claims, the memory serves not just as a repository for symbols of past experience; it enables us to conceive that for which we have no symbols, by means of other concepts which we have in mind and for which we do have symbols. It is a working faculty. As far as the craftsman example is concerned it is possible to think of the trained man turning his hand to objects he has never made before on the basis of his recollecting, his knowing how to cut and fix three kinds of joint. Certainly I would concede a painter would be put to it in addressing himself to his pictorial prospect if he had never practiced pictorial handskills. But would that in itself provide the grounds for him to settle the question of some locus of attention? No. This does not really help the artist to solve his problem for while he would share Price's objection to the notion of pictorial concepts as objects of inspection and would certainly and in a far more thoroughgoing fashion, say that such concepts as he has do manifest themselves in what he does, yet there remains a persistent and critical gap. For a painter, somewhat as the philosopher seeking the "general sense of a complex passage", [26] seeks the general sense of his creative intention regarding his prospective landscape painting. The concern to conceive of a pictorial idea seems to ask something different. Regarding the functions of memory two things are amiss: firstly, it needs to be understood that looking for a pictorial locus of attention is not a case of re-apprehending, not yet, insofar as it is as yet not

available to the regard, it is capable of apprehension. It can as yet only be intimated. It is not, for example, like another case Price puts forward in which we might say that if a man possesses the concept of Dog he has acquired the capacity of re-apprehending Doghood.[27] If we now take the matter at one remove and ask not about the cognition of concepts but about their development can the dispositional account offer an explanation to meet Kinsey's apparently absurd difficulty? Can he find the locus of his pictorial attention merely by engaging in revisionary procedures? Conversely, must he abjure these utterly in pursuit of some pictorial prospect whose outcome will be an entity of a factitious nature? It would be unwise to assert exclusively in either state of affairs. However, whilst it may be obvious that out of nothing nothing comes, it is less easy to show that despite the truth that "after all, there is such a thing as the art", skill in the executive part is not the whole exploration of emergent ideas. So one of the two points I would like to make is that if the dispositional account of concept formation fails to stretch this far it has to be supposed inadequate to the present case. It is not what a body can do, it is what a body does. Even the best dispositions cannot be deemed reliable enough to ensure success to the painter pursuant of his pictorial focus.

Regarding skill, it is true, incidentally, that sometimes indeed "knowing how" can be a hindrance to a painter for the very habits of training suggest set moves and countermoves, effects and manipulations which can actually rob the emergent idea of its point, which, whatever it might be, cannot be born solely of habitude. The rules of skill and trained recall have sometimes to be flouted, though admittedly flouting them involves knowing

them. There is a need sometimes to be deliberately rough, rather than refined; even to the extent of perversity, transgressing the guidelines of compositional harmony in order to refrain from ease of device in tackling perhaps obscure problems. In any artist's experience a thorough working knowledge of a skill can on the other hand, lend such attention to its own beguile that it ceases to be other than a diplay of virtuosity. Being "effective" is in the pejorative sense oddly destructive as I have already pointed out, and there is, as they say, a lot of it about. Obviously since skills assist performance, I am not suggesting that they should not be practised and polished up.

I come to my second point regarding the function of memory in this connection: there is actually a need to be rid of the idea that memory alone can offer the way through such procedures as attend the modification upon a pictorial idea. This is quite simply because pictures do not present a world of partial recall. That is not the point of the pictorial idea. The revisionary procedures of the painter do not occupy his attention to that purpose. He is no more trying to recollect what he has seen than he is at any time learning to see.

III.5 The Conceptual status of the Need for Objective Distance.

Let me look at the way in which a painter of Landscape considers it, at some remove, mediately; pursuant as he yet might be supposed of pictorial possibility. How does he think about the world as his pictorial matter? Is it possible to find a way to overcome the painter's cramp, which is so threatening to his agency, by attending to the nature of a mediate concern?

III.5.I Thinking and Representation. An Analogy from Language.

The difficulty is to establish the terms of his concern, within which he distinguishes observable features of the landscape. This is one major aspect of the business of Representation.

The traditional Representationist is exercised upon the relation between words and objects. The parallel case for me to take would be the nature of the relation between pictorial images and objects. Yet the proposed fit seems poor; the painter is concerned to regard the objects of his observation in magpie fashion, being set upon pictorial purpose. Such relation as may be said to exist between the painting and the world has obviously more to do with pictorial intention than with any supposed fit between image and observable object. I have, of course considered this not only in the previous section but also in the discussions on pictorial space in Chapter I. But it is worth pursuing in this context, for it is my belief that what can be said to be true of pictorial thinking is of significance for the philosophical position on thinking and representation.

It is of interest to me that Price attacks the view that a Representationist view of thinking can be addressed in terms of perception theory; it is more useful, he says, to put the case the other way about. "The capacity to form images is a prime condition of the possibility of visual perception"[29] Indeed yes. But as I have pointed out this does not, for it cannot, extend to the factitious image-making of such predominant concern to the

artist. That he can envisage, can think to see things, offers no guarantee of pictorial images. To do that requires his deliberative agency as an artist. To indicate capacities for perceiving is to do no more than to indicate a range of physiological constraints. The "forming of images", for the artist, requires his hand as well as his eye. It means drawing or painting, not the seeing of visions or dreaming of dreams.

It is precisely on this point that we may offer the landscape painter a way out of his supposed problem of circularity. We know that his matter, his prospect is not an intra-mental object of inspection; we are bound, upon the conditions of his agency to accept that his prospect requires, for its fulfilment, making, of a rather particular factitious sort. It is not a matter of physiological constraints or capacities, it is a matter of working things out in pictorial terms. It is also on this point that I am uneasy regarding Price's position regarding Theories of Representing and Thinking.

Traditionally the Representationist concerns himself with the relation between words and objects. Price's diagram illustrates two theories:

Nominalism		Idea Theory	
	Mind		Mind
(present)	Word	(present)	Word
		(present)	Idea
(absent)	Object	(absent)	Object

Under the Idea Theory, Conceptualists and Imagists are taken together; Conceptionalists make some distinction between abstract ideas and images; words are not the only form of our ideas. Imagists take all ideas to be images; words could never be the

form of our ideas. Taking first the Nominalist position I think that a painter would support Price's refutation of the idea that, when we think, words are what we are directly aware of. As a putative parallel an artist's brush-marks, lines, points, configurations in short, are the things of which he might, as a nominalist, be supposed directly aware. This is unacceptable on two grounds. Firstly a painter's imagery requires the material fact of production. Secondly, a painting when it is done, comprises a good deal more than configuration. What I am after is some parallel of use in the artist's case. I believe that an analogy is possible but the relation of the painter's prospect to his intelligible object does not seem to fall into this pattern. Neither, however, is it at all clear to me that an Idea Theory (Conceptualist or Imagist) of representation offers a good alternative. It may sound as if the Imagist has the best of it. Somebody might believe that since painters are characteristically preoccupied with pictures then it is not unreasonable to suggest that fleeting pictorial images comprise their mental experience. But it is very clear to me that they do not - the painter doesn't get to be that lucky; he has decisions to make and the solutions do not come up on mental picture-cards. However this does not make the painter look more like a 'conceptualist'. Despite their differences, Imagists and Conceptualists are just as well taken together. In either case something or other, as it might be a code, is supposedly directly experienced and stands in for that which is, as it were, absent to the experience. For the artist this is nonsense. The notion of his reflective activities being such as deal with some sort of picture-coded stand-in for extra-mental objects is absurd. So, insofar as Conceptualism

proposes that a concept, or image, symbolizes an absent object about which he is thinking, the artist cannot accept this as a parallel either. Further, on the orthodox account, words are regarded as secondary symbols which apart from their relation to ideas, have no meaning at all. The analogy is once again hopeless, tantamount to suggesting that content is somehow secondary as being no better than symbols, to the extra-mental pictorial concept. Clearly this will not do as an account of the way in which a painter reflects. Neither will it do as an account of pictorial content. A painter's configurative brushstrokes are not, if I may so put it, extra-mental stand-ins for ideas. Indeed what I suspect troubles Magritte in the use of pictorial symbolism is the danger of suggesting that the painter does not deal in content as such, but only with symbols for content. Note that to say that content and configuration are indivisible does not commit us to the view that a painting is no more than the marks upon its surface (see IV.2.). It is in this connection that I must pursue the analogy between language and painting but suspect the philosophy. If the problems faced by an artist do not answer to this philosophical position then I am not prepared to accept that the artist's case doesn't count. I put it that something is adrift in the philosophical position and it is qualitatively similar to the state of affairs in which the painter believes himself faced with the threat of circularity. No account of reflective thinking which commits me to the view that words stand in some relation to ideas, such that hidden concepts may be posited, is acceptable. Therefore, it cannot be set as a parallel case in consideration of pictorial thinking.

III.5.2 Mental Images.

A picture does not stand in for anything, present or absent. That is not the point of painting it. A picture does not express some intra-mental idea or object. A picture does not stand as a collection of secondary symbols whose meaning rests in their relationship to some collection of ideas. Certainly I welcome Price's despatch of intra-mental objects of inspection but given the nature of the activity of prospecting and the need for the artist to get further so as to paint, I must propose that this does not argue the need to be rid of the notion of intelligible objects. The practical orientation of the artist's prospect requires focus, as we have seen. Intelligible objects are for him the very stuff of concepts. A painter's prospects, or mental images, are his unfulfilled business. Thus for an artist there are grave problems in attempting to be rid of them; he knows that developing the intelligibility of his prospect is the major part of his work. He further knows that it is an intelligibility whose terms are irreducible. For the artist it is, according to Sartre, proper to regard "imagining as a kind of doing".[31] Indeed, yes and the nature of the prospecting activity requires us to regard it as a form of working intimation. Now it is significant to remark at this stage that Price has seemingly a wish to support the possibility of mental images, for he says, "The fact is that we really know very little about images. It would do us good to be a bit more puzzled about them than we are."[32] Really, of course, the fact is the puzzle must remain insoluble for Price. He is committed perhaps against his inclination, to a notion of concept development and usage which disallows enlightenment on this point. Despite his aversion to subsistent ideas he is

constrained against their absolute despatch by adherence to tradition concerning the notion of expression. The concept is "in the mind" in some way - the practical deed shows no more than a fit, more or less successful. The product is in that case none other than an "expression of an idea". Small wonder that Images are so profoundly worrying to Price. As a self-confessed would-be Romantic Landscape painter, he inclines to the truth but is prevented in his academic habits.

Looking to the painter's concerns the position clarifies. Images are his daily business - a constant preoccupation, for their existence is essentially dependent on his agency. The "fact" may be deeply mysterious, but it is not puzzling. The relation of "fit" is simply not sought, for it is not an issue. It is certain that we cannot rob an artist of his locus of attention. Yet we know that for an artist this cannot be satisfied in terms of a wholly reflective activity, which prospecting might be described as being. Regarding the nature of the prospect the notion of the mental image cannot be done away with, yet for the artist this is necessarily an incomplete thing; he must make his images. Prospecting envisages this necessity. But for Price there is, as I have shown, serious difficulty in being rid of intra-mental objects of inspection and attempting to keep hold of mental images - a difficulty which can be seen at work in his example of the craftsman. Now if, on the other hand, we recognize that a work of art, (or craft), is a form of thought it is quite clearly absurd to look elsewhere for its conceptual content - it is pointless to look, that is to say, beyond its manifest content. The concept manifest in a painting is very certainly an object of inspection - but not, and never "in the

mind" of the artist. I am admittedly looking now to the artefact, the product of a certain sort of activity, whereas it might be said to be to the point to stick to examining the activity itself. But if Price is able to move from the business of thinking about a something - as it might be a chair - to the business of making it, then there is no problem about considering that chair in terms of either the craftsman's thinking or making, for they ought not to be utterly distingished. Price's problem is in not recognizing the value of his own elision. As Wollheim concisely puts it, "in the making of any work of art a concept is operative". [33] This does not permit of the separation of concept and expression. When Price speaks of the "concept in the mind of the craftsman" I do not feel that he has entirely embraced the consequences of conceptual manifestation, even although he sets it out as if he had. Somehow for Price the concept of the craftsman is condemned to its own overlasting discretion. That it is forever in the mind sits awkwardly with an intended dismissal of objects of inspection. There is some equivocation in Price's position.

It is vital that my position is unequivocal with my conviction regarding the indivisibility of concept and expression. For me there can be no question of characterising pictorial ideas at any stage of their development in terms of stand-ins of any kind. Regarding the business of prospecting the emergent idea is the entity itself, factitious as it must be, in a formative stage of its progress. There is certainly a difference between an idea which is being worked on and an idea which has been worked out. In terms of a picture what we should then be looking at would be a picture that is finished. A prospect we

cannot look at at all.

For the landscape painter to reach the point at which his concerns are pictorially manifest he does not, for he cannot, keep checking his progress against some conceptual template. He needs to engage in a transitional activity that his concerns may gain clarity. To speak of the thought knowledge of an artist towards an object is meaningful only in respect of the artefact he is in the process of making, in whatever respect of its progress he may be engaged.

III.6 Conceptual Manifestation.

III.6.I The pursuit of Pictorial Intelligibility: working drawings.

A prospect is potential, permeable and easily enough stifled. It always, by definition, envisages but never defines; promises fulfilment but never fulfils itself. To settle the question of a locus of attention depends upon the painter coming to the point at which the form of reflective action changes. Pictorial effort is required. The problem of circularity turns out to be a chimera. (see III.4.2) The relief of painter's cramp depends upon exploratory drawing. Just prospecting will get him nowhere and we have seen that just starting in with the paint will not of itself yield any solution in the circumstances. It is clear that the artist needs to recognize from the start that an attempt at a record of partial recall is not his object; he does not seek to replicate the world. He recognizes the need to stand in some sort of objective relation to his observations,

recollections and, indeed, to his training. Thus if an idea is to achieve pictorial life it requires that it visibly, of necessity, attains pictorial intelligibility. There is a need to draw. This therefore is a transitional activity; a process whereby the pictorial concept, or idea, is materially mooted. This is a process in which what the painter now makes - (drawings which set a focus of intelligibility on his prospect) - are not in the category of being complete works. His ideas are not yet clear; he is cogitating.

Transitional working drawings occupy some ground between that which is constituted in the prospect and that which is constituted in the pictorial determinacy of the painting, the one in its malleable being and the other in its determinable becoming. This is the usefulness of the painter's workbook in which prevalent concerns with certain shapes, colours, express aspects of his prospect and help him to sort the pictorial nature of his intention. It is worth noting once more that prevailing and recurring motifs, colours, formal disposition - any such features as are found to predominate in his workbook may or may not be brought to stand as symbols for aspects of his prospect but they do not have to do so (see III.3.5 and IV.) It is much more useful to think about these features sketched in his notebooks as being those things with which, as a painter, he is most concerned. They may not be, even on acceptable terms, symbolic at all; they may simply occur because they themselves go on being interesting. He needs, whatever form his idea takes, to work in a principled manner in order to produce some cohesion of thought and action in the artefact. Working in a principled manner involves a process of sorting - a special kind of non-verbally directed

classification. The painter's "intelligible object" is his eventual pictorial statement. The intelligibility of a painter's working drawing is to be distinguished from the fully fledged intelligibility of his painting. The stage at which his ideas attain their fullest expression marks the completion of the work. However many reflections and hesitations accompany the activity of painting, this is the fullest possible manifestation of his ideas. Where a painting is intended the drawings are necessary but incomplete. To be sure, some drawings become complete statements but this is not to deny that we may distinguish the reflective business of working something out from the practical physical business of working it through. Kinsey has commented upon the need to establish his concerns as primarily pictorial. The point is a general one. He is exercised by the need to establish the intelligibility of those concerns in other than verbal terms. To this aspect of his requirement I now turn.

III.6.2. Intelligibility: Another look at the analogy with language.

Traditionally intelligibility is associated with verbal stability. The intelligibility of pictorial concerns is of course available to description. For the painter there is the strongest case for holding that the intelligibility of pictorial concerns is not statable in verbal terms. What is proposed is the possibility of non-verbal meaning. Freed from the constraints of the word I might presume to make "breathings" for not wholly "incommunicable powers".[34] For the painter his locus of concern gains its intelligibility in becoming pictorial. His meaning is pictorial in kind and does not reside in the proposition. Thus it is that a



xviii



13.
Deep River
Ontario



xx



great many drawings might be needed to bring the prospect towards its fullest development as a pictorial idea. Incidentally this might have something to do with the extreme reluctance with which a painter will show the insides of his sketchbook to any but the most trusted enquirer.

One way of looking at what is involved in this part of the endeavour is to turn from the moment from the painter's delicate standpoint and to look from the point of view of such a supposed enquirer. Without detriment to the insight of Wordsworth it is yet instructive to put the matter of the intelligibility of works of art on a par with the intelligibility of language. For there are features about the ways if understanding language which without prejudice to pictorial irreducibility, do relate it to the ways in which we can understand picture. The analogy with language has a certain force.

Andrew Harrison has shown that, paradoxically, one way of seeing how pictures are intelligible is to recognize the importance of picturing in seeing how language is intelligible. He expands the Wittensteinian case that picturing is by no means confined to the business of looking at artworks. "Explanatory models of all sorts, all have an underlying pictorial structure. The underlying constraints of intelligibility on a picture are both general and deeply suggestive of the nature of the deep grammatical constrains of any language. Knowing how language works is not just to know what it refers to, it is also to know the system by which it refers". [35] The pictorial meaning of artworks can be grasped similarly. It is not just a matter of

XXII



XXIV



13

Deep River
Ontario

recognizing (in an example like landscape painting or objective drawing), "some pictorial reference in the world, it is also a matter of recognizing how the marks on the paper are to be read."[36] Furthermore I would add that that is a matter of recognizing the kind of the marks for therein rests the focus of their reference.

That the constraints upon the intelligibility of artworks are not markely dissimilar from those which set the conditions by which we may grasp the meanings of language does support the case for regarding a painter's work in conceptual terms. It is worth noting, however, that there is very good reason for suspending judgment regarding the need to establish or define the nature of any concept, pictorial or otherwise. It is far more useful and far less dangerous to examine what goes on in the use of concepts. There is no difficulty about regarding pictorial endeavour as a conceptual activity. It is not simply that in describing a work of art after the event, we use concepts to characterize it or to catch its characteristics. "Indeed, one criterion of a description's adequacy is that in it the concepts that have helped fashion the work re-appear. In this way, the description of the world is parasitic upon the description under which it was made." [37] To be sure; but it has been argued that the concepts, the pictorial ideas are manifest in the 'characteristics' we can see. Ideas are developed. As I have shown this by no means implies a hidden world of concepts 'expressed' in, instantiated by, painting. In a successful picture the relation of thought and expression is seamless; there is no distinction. Adequate thought is adequate painting. It is in this connection that the limitations on Price's account for

language as well as for painting are very clear. We cannot, in the circumstances of painting, hold on to the dichotomy of idea and expression, of thinking and making. This being so it is clearly redundant to seek the nature of concepts 'expressed' either in works of art, or in language. Recall Wittgenstein's rejection of the notion of there being some conceptual attendant upon utterance. Prufrock's problem is a sorry case in point: "that is not it" does not mean that some wrong thing slipped out by accident - in saying "that is not what I meant", Prufrock is lamenting, once again, an inadequacy in himself; a failure of agency, (a point to which I shall return). We may take it that Prufrock isn't making a slip of the tongue; he isn't talking in his sleep either. Conditions being not extraordinary, talking is a form of thought. The point is that he isn't thinking very successfully. But even if he were we should be falling into error in regarding his 'success' as a matter of fit.

In these last sections I have been considering the progress of a landscape painting. In the light of Price's work on concept development, it appears that, for one thing, insofar as the artist is involved in producing artefacts of a factitious nature, his ideas in development are quite wrongly characterized under a dispositional account. More seriously, it is clear that any notion of concept development on cognition which forces a dichotomy between idea and expression is misguided.

III.7. Pursuit of the Self.

III.7.I. An Existentialist account as it relates to the Three-Term Relation.

What I now want to do is to take the enquiry at one remove, as it were, from an account of man's capacities, to an existential account of man's physical relationship with his environment. This is to explore two of the three terms in the relation of the painter, the world and the painting, and it takes me to the core of my concern for the artist as agent. I shall begin by considering, once more, the activity of prospecting as a predominantly reflective endeavour and will examine the possibility of distinguishing stages of reflectivity in terms of a bodily response to the perceptible world.

III.7.2 The Emergent Idea.

It is helpful to the case to examine work done by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in connection with psycho-analytical research regarding the possibility of distinguishing between reflective activities. The idea is that physical interaction between a sentient being and his physical interaction between a sentient being and his physical environment, a stage termed pre-reflective, puts him into a state of implicit and sensible but as yet unspecific preparedness. It is upon this that the kind of reflective thinking which leads to objective knowledge depends. This is a state of cognitive activity in which thinking become specific. It is posited that there are two aspects of the single process during which ideas, initially vague and tentative, becomes clearer, more particular.[38]

If tenable, this view has certain advantages, one of which is that in placing emphasis upon the earliest stages of thought with respect to abstract thinking we might thereby have a means of relating prospecting, as an activity, to the activity of developing pictorial intelligibility. There would be further advantage if it were possible by this means to give a further explanation of creative thinking flexible enough to accommodate both verbal and non-verbal thinking. There are, however, difficulties for me: one is the suggestion that an idea could be grasped implicitly, pre-reflectively, and then, on refelection, conceptualized explicitly. This suggests some sort of premonition of a position which on my account cannot yet have been reached. Either this makes some stage of that process redundant or it deprives pre-reflectivity of a certain innocence. It also suggests that, if we carry the notion across to the visual arts, the artist might in some central aspect be subject to his matter while prospecting. This would be inimical to my professed concern. (see IV.2.3.3).

First, consider what would be involved for a landscape painter in undergoing some pre-reflective level of experience. I will approach this by supposing there to be from the outset and whatever follows from it, an integral relation between a sentient being and his environment; the one interacting with the other in a two-way physical relationship. On the face of it this would be consistent with what I hold to be the case in the context of a three-term relation (see III.3.3).

In terms of my example it is possible on this view to think of perceiving not in terms of an objective relation, separable by analysis from the mutable content of Kinsey's experience, but in terms of a reciprocal relationship between Kinsey's intentions, his behaviour as animated by intention and the environment in which they occur. This would be to posit an existential relationship between Kinsey as a sentient being, with the motivation to act, and those properties of things he reveals by means of his being where he is. Two terms of the relation would be satisfied hereby, but what of the third, the prospective painting? One consequence would be that the locus of his attention would be fixed more or less firmly by the bond of interaction between himself and his environment. So his prospect would appear to be less malleable, after all, than I had supposed. Indeed, on such terms, insofar as his prospect could be said to intimate intelligible focus, such meaning as he seeks could thus be comprehended as primarily existential. He would on this account orient his thinking in such terms He would thereby say, with Merleau-Ponty: "I comprehend the world because there is for me near and far; foreground and horizon, and because it thus spreads out and takes on a meaning for me; that is to say, finally, because I am situated in it and it comprehends me..(the body is) our point of view of the world".[39] This is a valuable remark to which I shall return. For the moment I will limit my attention to its existential implications for my position regarding prospecting. The integral physical relation does not alone provide a sufficient account of the early stages of the artist's thinking to allow us to claim that his reflective activities are governed by, or could be a consequence of only such interaction. If "pre-reflective thinking", if the idea of there

being two distinct though related aspects involved here, is retained it could be said that a painter's reflective stance is affected, but not that it is effected, by a pre-reflective state. I have doubts about the justification for retaining the distinction as drawn, as the following problems show. If we do try to retain the case, three difficulties arise.

III.7.2.1 A Threat of Objectivity.

The factitious orientation of the prospect is threatened by the nature of the claims for meaning implied by this account. A meaning which by definition is pre-objective effectively denies an objective stance with regard to the perceived world. This as we have seen is a stance sought even at this stage; there is something odd about leaving the matter over, pending as it were the endeavour of fully 'reflective' thought.

III.7.2.2. Just being in the Landscape isn't enough.

If a distinction is to be sustained between the pre-reflective and reflective aspects of thinking we cannot go about putting a reflective activity where only pre-reflective activity is supposed to be taking place. Merleau-Ponty's "comprehension" cannot be supposed to be much delayed upon his physical experience. If he is not suggesting the occurence of such a delay than either we must take it that pre-reflective and reflective activities are overlapped in experience, which would make his distinction a little suspect, or I may complain that he is comprehending where he ought just to be

reacting or responding, to the environmental disturbance in which he is involved. It is common to speak of the "blind incomprehension" of one who has not reached understanding. Yet not to have reached understanding is not to have been entirely unaware of the possibility. But could anyone say "I comprehend" and still be in some pre-reflective condition? I think not. Now Merleau-Ponty is, I suspect, not suggesting any such thing either. What he wants us to accept, however, is that comprehending even in my requisite pictorial sense is possible by way of the existential relation. The metamorphosis, gap or no gap, from pre-reflective to full cognitive awareness has to be accounted for within the context of the existential relationship. This might better suit the pretensions of the latter-day plein airist. He might claim that his affairs are not inadequately told within that framework. But I would suggest that his affairs may in that case fall seriously short of pictorial intelligibility. It will not, however, suit a painter like Ed Kinsey. The locus of his attention is not sufficiently given in an existential relation between himself and his environment. Kinsey's pictorial horizons may be elusive, but even in his least troubled excursion into Wales, his pursuit of prospect accompanies him, perhaps actually directs his travel. He does know that just being in the landscape is not enough to settle the question of concern to the development of any prospect of his. (see III.3.1) This would suggest an awareness of another sort than that proposed by Merleau-Ponty; something more like a hunch that it is like pre-reflective awareness (see III.7.2.3).

III.7.2.3. A Threat to the Agency of the Artist.

This brings me to the third difficulty in using Merleau-Ponty's account, which is that whatever informs the painter's prospect it is, on these terms, going to be characterized within an 'organic' description. Now however helpful such a characterizing description might be in psycho-analysis, it is wrong at a critical point as an account of the self where the self is an artist; it is to make a case for the artist as a being rather than as an agent. This runs counter to my interests, for it robs artistic agency of one of its crucial characterizing conditions: namely, concerns with pictorial space as a factitious enterprise. The artist's predominating concern with the world is in adding something to it. What, if anything, is left of advantage to the artist as agent in this view? One thing I would want to acknowledge as of value is that it gets rid of the idea that being in the landscape consists in the merely passive receipt of sensation. The claim, which I would not disparage would be that the notion of 'going out' to discover meaning in the seen and felt this requires the landscape painter to regard his intentions regarding the focus of his prospect as inclusive of a "reciprocal relationship" between himself and his environment. To say that 'the world comprehends me' does not of course imply a personification of the world; it does imply that the world incorporates me - is comprehensive, rather than comprehending, of my responsive presence. This ties in to the point made earlier in this chapter about Wordsworth and "The Prelude". (see III.3.2) But the three-term relation of agent, environment and artwork must be sustained. On Merleau-Ponty's account the painter seeks a locus of attention in terms of a

dependency, an existential dependency, of himself to his environment. In that case an account of pictorial orientation is not the explanation for Kinsey's concerns with the landscape; whereas I want, if course, to say that it is: to make pictorial irreducibility a necesary condition of the three-term relation. His is a pictorial intention.

Consideration of Merleau-Ponty's account of the creative use of a construct points up the difficulty for me in accommodating to his argument. Consider the following case. Central to Merleau-Ponty's account of Intention is his theory of Perception as this example shows. The construction of a triangle, he says, "involves the outward and explicit expression of the motor intentions of a subject who is able to place himself at a certain point and so to project lines to other spatial positions.. Thus do I grasp the concrete essence of the triangle which is not a collection of objective 'characteristics' but the formula of an attitude, or certain modality of my hold on the world, a structure, in short".[40] Since a pictorial locus of attention is not be construed in terms of a hold upon the world but in terms of his agent-concerns with making picture, a kind of doing rather than a mode of being, it is very clear that this account, which may be informative at least in part about the way in which we perceive things, will only result in compromising pictorial irreducibility. It is the familiar problem of the nature and reference of the construct (see Chapter I.7.4). The 'hunch' (see III.7.I) is a pictorial anticipation which as an artist, both takes Kinsey repeatedly to Wales and sustains his thought and work in absence. The status of the "reciprocal relationship", as put forward, I would agree requires us to consider the landscape

painter as "synthesizing things through the intentions he has towards them, the fundamental form of cognition is personal...in the sense that intentionality implies an involvement in the environment and not a detached attitude".[41] Indeed, yes. Yet of course some sort of detachment is a requirement for art is something we do (recollect III.4.I). A painting is not merely a product of an existential relationship between an artist and the world.

III.7.3 The Self as Being and the Self as Agent.

The difficulty is to reconcile Merleau-Ponty's study of reflective and pre-reflective thinking with an account of this sort of agency. The example of the triangle will not serve my case.

How does he characterize "personal involvement"? The organic model puts a strain on the notion of such involvement being consonant with the conditions under which we may postulate personal artistic agency. For Merleau-Ponty the exploration is primarily the nature of the Self. For my part there would be a problem about the adequacy of describing a painter in existentialist terms. It would be inconsistent with a view of the artist as agent to deny that the Self, the person he is has centrally to do with the development of creative ideas. This is the point at which I must qualify my position regarding Merleau-Ponty. In talking of the "personal nature of motor intentionality" we need to be reassured that the "expressions of motor intention of a subject", [42] that is our painter, Kinsey, as it might be, in relation to his environment, have at least as much to do with what Kinsey wants to make as they have to

do with aspects of the relationship which lie outside the sphere of his agency: such aspects, as for example the weather being bad, his being afraid of heights, burning too easily in the sun, having been born in Liverpool 8 and other such hypothetical misfortunes. It is not to disregard the opportunities that such aspects might present, but rather to say that such things are not enough, even taken as an integral relationship of factors in his personal life, to mark his "involvement in a real environment" as personal (see also IV.2.3.3.). It is his agency in the situation which gives us the crucial three-term relation: Kinsey-environment-painting. In Kinsey's situation I want to say that it is agency and not the social or physiological accidents of his bodily presence that marks the relationship between Kinsey and the environment as personal and, indeed, reciprocal. He can, indeed, only discover himself-as-agent. We must acknowledge that, as I said earlier (see III.3.1), just being in the landscape is not enough. We might regard him as being in a state of occupational preparedness. It is not like an organic state, and it is mistaken to write as if it were. A painter's preparedness is a mark not of his dispositions and capacities; it is a mark of his agency as a painter. He is constantly on the look-out for material to his intention which is to paint a picture. The world serves that turn to his account. The artist might doubt his agency in the matter, where his intentions are said to depend on an immediately perceived reciprocal relationship of body, his body, to the environment in which he finds or places himself. Reciprocity is a mark of agency. A 'symbiotic' account is just as unavoidably inadequate to the case as is Price's account of dispositions and capacities.

Now it is of more than passing interest at this point to remark a progress within a progress. I have been at pains to develop my case for the artist as agent and have had ever in mind the thinking of John Macmurray. It is in this connection, in looking to the nature of the Self, that I believe Macmurray come to the fore and proves true. It is interesting to speculate upon what might have transpired if Merleau-Ponty and Macmurray had met. It is true that Macmurray's concern with phenomenology was in advance of his compatriot generation and out of temper with his time. But what it seems to me exciting to suppose is that in looking to the case of the artist as agent it is possible effectively to fill out the gap set by the limitations on both Macmurray's account for art theory, sadly dismissive as he is, and Merleau-Ponty's pursuit of the nature of the Self; Merleau-Ponty wanting the Self as Agent, rather than the Self as Being; Macmurray wanting but the passage of time and some further thoughts about the nature of agency involved in producing works of art. The progress of the irreducibly pictorial prospect of the landscape painter is the example, which by virtue of being discrete, can succinctly and comprehensively characterize the nature of the Self. If we attend to the Self as a Being we have but a partial account of the Self. It is only within the conditions under which we may posit the Self as Agent that we may come to an adequate apprehension. Loss of Self, as I remarked in Chapter II, has to do with some failure of agency. In terms of my case the artist as Being quite simply cannot get to the point of entertaining a factitious irreducibly pictorial prospect. He has, as an artist, to be the Self that acts. Two references are illuminating in this connection. In looking at Rembrandt's

self-protraits, from his youth to his old age we may perceive them as manifest statement of agency, tantamount to his proclaiming, over and again, "I am what I make". Being an old self makes no difference! For the obverse, we must look to Wordsworth whose intimations of Self-loss are clearly to be read in fourth book of 'The Prelude'. It is quite clear that in the figure of the soldier encountered by moonlight on the fell, Wordsworth personifies a fear. The soldier is not only his own self's shadow. As a metaphor for Wordsworth's own eventual failure in writing, the soldier is the mirror image, the Doppelgänger, to the poet's future loss of self.

"...solemn and sublime
He might have seemed, but that in all he said
There was a strange half-absence, as of one
Knowing too well the importance of his theme,
But feeling it no longer."

Bk.IV The Prelude. Lines 441-445.

It is worth concluding upon a speculation which arises quite naturally out of a concern for Landscape and a concern for the nature of the Self; for they turn out to be curiously at one.

The point has been put to me that for the artist of the Eighteenth Century the Mountain Top, the "Type and character of the Great Apocolypse" and so on - charged as they are with intimations of Awe and Supernaturalism - constitute, among other things, an exploration of the Creative Self. The context for this exploration and, indeed, its locus, is the notion of the Sublime. As I have already said, the Twentieth Century artist may well be put to it to establish a fresh basis for objective distance since the Eighteenth Century tradition is concomitant with a religious

or quasi-religious stance. Yet it should be noted that the conditions constraining that tradition do not attach inseparably into interpretations viable for current use. That which has no more than a concomitance of usage may well be superseded, without prejudice to the continued life of an idea, by other interpretive relata- for "the relation is the principle thing". (Mondrian) What now is conceivable as an object of awe; what is currently viable as a celebratory locus of the Sublime?

I shall speculate upon the possibility of the Sublime by looking for the pertinence of the notion to contemporary preoccupation. It is abundantly obvious to those who are not artists that a perennial concern with the human body, its presentation, expression, health and substance is about us all in great prevalence of image and intent. The dangers to the integrity of the self, most notably the woman's self, may be relentlessly enumerated in the thrall of feminist exchanges - ever missing the point - but what of the artist? The artist truly cannot shrink, as I suspect artists have for far too long tried to, from a tradition of Art which actually logically presupposes the self as agent in a great and existential domain of reference. He has an obligation to consider the point of these wholly human preoccupations. It is for the artist a point to be put in some factitious combination of equivalent Twentieth Century objective salience.I put forward an updated case for the Sublime. I am not thereby committed to a religious or quasi-religious stance. Feelings of the deepest awe and reverence attend, it is surely true, upon the power, the delight and impermanence of flesh. "All flesh is as Grass" is for me precisely the point I might celebrate, for above a great many things I like grass - but

centrally it is a factitious point; a point of Art which is well put in the context of the human figure (and, by extension in the Erotic see Chapter II and III.4.2) Yet it is aptly conceived as a notion of Landscape. Consider once again what may be drawn from Wordsworth's account of his meeting with the soldier. Surely this is a poetic portrait of a moribund creative self - not merely a character sketch of an old campaigner. It is a portrait which compositionally requires a landscape of elusive evocation - ghostlike, thin, of no colour or substance. The very 'self' of the landscape is given in sympathetic abeyance. There is no dichotomy (or pathetic fallacy either) for Wordsworth between his poetic attention to the nature of this forlorn non-self and the nature of this barren fell. All grass is as flesh. "The world comprehends me because for me there is a near and far."

By such means it is possible to put a conceptual case of some significance in the discussion of Art. To differentiate landscape painting from figure painting is not to differentiate in terms of a genre of subject matter; it is to distinguish the one from the other as a genre of painterly thought.[43] I do not need to apologise for moving with such ease from Poetry to Painting - the parallel has already been argued for. In virtue of this intelligence it now becomes possible to link a concern for landscape into a concern for the Nature of the Self without submitting to any charge of metaphoric borrowing. It is the orientation of the objective stance which makes for - or disallows - any elision of the terms of the one with the terms of the other. It is not, and never was, some sort of anthropomorphic exercise. Recollect the discussion of Paul Klee in Chapter I. It is a condition of artistic agency that concern with the

world reveals the self that acts as ineluctably engaged upon factitious making. This once again is the force of the three term relation. The obligations upon the spectator set by this being so have already been spelled out in Chapter II. Together these arguments have considerble force. Veracity is the touchstone of the Sublime. And that is an issue of determinacy to the sufficiency - as the three term relation is the determination of necessity - of the conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist.

Now to resume my account of a process, I shall suppose that having cogitated as fully as may be - and having put a pencil, or a knife, through the useless, the ill-considered, though with ever half an eye to future use - the moment has been reached at which there is nothing for it but to stretch up a canvas and commence the business of shifting paint; to engage upon the "full, concrete activity of the self".

III.8 Painting the Picture

III.8.I A Writer's Account

What then is this "full concrete activity of the Self"? My difficulty is to characterize, without resorting to excess, the activity without which prospecting is empty and pictorial intelligibility no more than part way given. In any account of the progress of a Landscape, whether it takes the form of a drawing, fully resolved as it can well be, or a painting, whose terms of resolution are of a different character but not of a different order, the culmination of the business resists analysis. This, for all its significance, will therefore be a

section of no great length. Attempts to describe the activity readily succumb to figures of speech. Consider this example: "It is just like diving into a pond - then you start frantically to swim. So far as I am concerned it is like swimming in a baffling current and being rather frightened and very thrilled, gasping and striking out for all your worth. The knowing eye watches sharp as a needle; but the picture comes clear out of instinct, intuition and sheer physical action,. Once the instinct and intuition gets into the brush-tip, the picture happens, if it is to be a picture at all." [45]

It would be easy enough to dismiss this in its entirety, as just another bit of Lawrentian hyperbole. I find it quite persuasive, nonetheless, for the truth is, as a description of what painting feels like, it is half-right. The nature of the activity is such as to be emotionally and physically exhilarating and it is true that at any point in this stage of picture-making anything, everything, can go wrong. Equally, it can seem on a good day, as if the picture takes over, making things go right. That is the way it feels, at least. Lawrence's account begins to be worrying once he leaves the simile for the 'straightforward' account. His statements beg questions: how can the eye as part of the body be "knowing" while the rest of the body is given over to "instinct and intuition"? The difficulties besetting these notions are legion. The account seems either to ignore or to dismiss its problems, to take as given the very questions which give particular point to an account of the activity.

My intention is to show that the business of painting, which depends in considerable part upon contemplative, reflective activities, is yet to be distinguished from them. Further, it is



x



xii



13

Deep River

Ontario



14. Ed Kinsey
Lamure Forms I.
Oil on Canvas. 20"x16"



15. Ed Kinsey
Lamure Forms II
Oil on Canvas. 20"x16"

at the same time true that the full concrete activity of painting constitutes the most complete expression of pictorial ideas. The ideas, the intelligible content of an artwork are most fully manifest at the point at which reflective activity is least prominent. Lawrence is convincing on this point, though once more he takes on the unexplained as given, "Theorize all you like - but when you start to paint shut your theoretic eyes and go for it with instinct and intuition."[46]

III.8.2 Dealing with Lawrence's Account of Instinct and Intuition.

How should Lawrence's remarks be regarded? The usefulness of his assertions is that they have the gist of an account which is acceptable, if only it were possible to take up the notions of instinctive and intuitive action on which he quite unquestioningly rests his case. Unfortunately, it is problematic at a critical point, for if by instinct is meant something like the cry of the hungry child then this is at odds with everything so far said about the artist as agent. Even Kinsey's "frustration" (see III.2.1) has a context which takes it out of Lawrence's frame of reference. If, on the other hand "instinct" is being metaphorically deployed to characterize what might better be termed plainly as "feeling", in the sense of having emotions, then it may be no easier to deal with, and I shall not try here, but it at least might come within my brief. I suspect that, being Lawrence, the former would be preferred. Regarding "intuition": this is so difficult to deal with that it is, in my view, quite unhelpful to try. It has the doubtful reputation of being a term people use when they want to talk is, once more, feeling - meaning

in this case, hunches, premonitions, and at a rarefied level, something which is far more fruitful,though its connection with Intuition is dubious; that is, heightened awareness. Not that an analysis of "heightened awareness" would be without difficulties for it would compromise my account of agency to characterize such feeling in terms of dispositions, or mental states. Yet "heightened awareness" is apt enough expression in the circumstances - very much better than "premonition"; particular where "intuition" cannot be, and it will at least be informative to ask in what particular respect awareness can be so rarefied, so as to distinguish this feeling, in the activity of painting, from those feelings of awareness attending the artist as he settles the nature of his mental stance in reflecting on his prospect, and in the transitional activity of developing its intelligibility.

III.5.3 Painting as a Way of Thinking

That which marks out this part of the activity is a quite remarkable though not necessarily peculiar bodily effort. it is in my experience quite correct to say that once painting starts, awareness of almost everything else stops. The physical business commands complete attention of the body. The remarkable feature of this activity is that hand and eye must work together; it is as if the hand, as well as the eye, were brain tissue! The feel of the brush is in some literal sense the command of the pictorial content. The phenomenology is difficult to describe and I shall abjure figures of speech as far as I can, until plain words fail, when I shall stop trying.

Kinsey also regards the activity of painting as "totally absorbing", (see III.2.I), a matter of putting on paint, pushing paint around, taking it off; scraping, cutting, all the time tactilely, visually aware of the stuff as a substance and as pictorial content. Colours look good, appear to be right, then feel wrong; then feel and look nearly right, so nearly right that it produces great tension. Then it is done. All the way through this rather frantic business the hand and eye work asone. I do not really see that the eye "watches" at all. What happens is much better described in terms of a sensible peculiarity; the active work of the two senses, sight and touch, to the extent that they effectively conjoin into a unified active sense. Other activities may occasion this state of affairs perhaps. I do not want to make outrageous claims for painting, as such.

But the real meaning of heightened awareness, in this connection, lies in the pictorial orientation of that occurrence. The reflectivity engaged upon in early stages of the process is ever oriented towards this full activity of the agent. It is not the case that reflectivity ceases when the painting starts; it is far more true to say that the kind of thinking towards which everything accomplished in the early malleable, incomplete stages is moving, is, in this activity, wholly pictorial factitious and necessarily gestural. Thinking does not stop. Painting <u>is</u> thinking. This does not mean Lawrence is mistaken in exhorting the painter to put away his theories. The theory, if it was part of his concern, is at his painterly disposal but it needs no consultation in the deed, true enough.

The agency of an artist is unavoidably a bodily concern. (Action, because it terminates in the objective world, is inherently particular). "The dependence of the deed on the doing of it is in the full sense an existential dependence and this is involved in the definition of action".[47] The conditions under which we may posit the agency of the artist require that we acknowledge his reflective and physical involvement in factitious deeds whose product is a pictorial form of thought.

III.8.4 Serendipity.

It has to be said that, given the extent to which the artist gives himself over in the pursuit of his pictorial concerns, there is something seriously adrift in the suggestion that the picture just "happens". The painter is not to be regarded as a medium, a voice through which something or other speaks - or worse an automatic paint brush. It is a persuasive idea, however, and one which begs serious attention, for it is quite often true that once a picture starts to go well it seems to go forward on its own; it seems to "happen". As Kinsey says, "At this stage one becomes aware that other unidentified aspects have crept (my emphasis) into the work" (see III.2.1). Are there "unknown elements"? I want to say that it is not at all unlikely, but that this does not commit me to saying that what happens in their occurrence is irrespective of Kinsey's agency. Unlooked for possibilities most frequently arise out of a situation in which thinking is effective; productive. As the jazz clarinettist Peewee Russell put it. "The more you try, the luckier you are". In painting there is cohesion of reflective and practical activities which, if it is sustained, is more likely

than not to create possibilities not initially envisaged (see II.4.3 and II.6). Much as effective functioning in any field may yield solutions and problems not specifically anticipated, so the painter about his agent-concerns will, if he is working well, turn up all manner of ideas. They are not truly accidental, since the artist's activities are the source, the hopeful source at that, of their possibility; yet they seem fortuitous and it would be a pity, as well as doubtful, to deny the pleasure of the 'accidental' by suggesting anything so firm as that they must be anticipated or deliberate. That the artist is agent need not preclude him from the pleasures of surprise at his own accomplishment. It need not commit him to full or advance knowledge of the effective range of his capabilities and deeds. Neither, in reserving to himself that satisfaction, need he feel obliged to deny responsibility for the happy result. That is false modesty. Neverthless, I do know how it feels to believe that it might never happen again.

Conclusion.

The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the force of the three-term relation as a characterizing condition of the agency of an artist. This has had two related implications.

One, in his necessary concern to create entities of a pictorial kind I have shown that the artist engages in reflective and practical activities; we cannot force upon the activity of painting any dichotomy of thinking and making. Idea and expression are indivisible. I have further pointed up the case for regarding artworks in terms of their being irreducibly

pictorial ideas. It is my contention that the artefactual product of artistic agency should be regarded as having pictorial intelligibility. In painting a landscape an artist takes from the world, of which he is a part, such matter as pertains to his pictorial purpose. This he works, not as a mirror of reality, not as its grid or construct, it cannot be explained in terms of the landscape to which it might refer. His terms are the terms of Landscape and that is a factitious matter; an addition to the world, not its abstract. Herein is the particulatity of the three-term relation, since this it is that which characterizes the agent as an artist.

The second implication of accepting the conditions of the three-term relation is that an account of the Self necessitates an account of the Self as Agent. In pursuit of this relationship of the painter, the world in which he finds himself and his pictorial idea. I have explored the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as having a bearing on my concerns and as it deals with ideas perhaps unwittingly close to the heart of John Macmurray. It has been my wish to show the relevance of my thesis to Macmurray's theory of the Self as Agent. In attempting to account for the activities of landscape painter I have been able to demonstrate the limitations upon an account of the Self as Being. The self that an artist or poet, or anybody else, is , depends for its being upon his doing, his agency. To posit the Self is to posit under some characteristic description a three-term relation of agent, world and agent-intent. In taking the agency of the artist as the starting place for investigation it is possible to relate his refelective to his active doing without prejudice to the importance of either to the outcome, that is to say, to his eventual accomplishment.

A painter is one who paints. His agency is characterized as the creation of pictorial ideas whose full expression depends crucially upon an inherently particular "activity of the Self"; the progress of ".....steady moods of thoughtfulness

Matured to Inspiration, "

In the last chapter I shall look to the matter of such particularity as it informs the fourth condition.

CHAPTER IV THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF THE AGENCY OF AN ARTIST

IV.I Introduction

In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies the product of endeavour as a manifestation of his agency as personal.

In this chapter I shall be examining the relationship between the artwork, insofar as it is a factitious object whose properties are available to observation, and such claims as might be made by the spectator, and by the artists themselves, regarding the agency of the artist. I shall contest the view that in consideration of the properties of works of art we may leave aside consideration of the agency of the artists who made them. Attention to the standpoint of the observer will indicate the problems of sorting out grounds for positing the agency of the artist.

Firstly, I shall consider what it would be to regard a painting, in terms of its physical properties, as evidence of human rather than inanimate agencies, arguing that we cannot get from an account of inanimate agencies at work between substances to an account of the human agency at work in making use of them.

Secondly, I shall attend to possible grounds for positing the artwork as evidence of artistic agency, giving some head to the clues in whose

consideration those grounds are decided; clues such as the location in which an artwork is found; the conventions of the gallery space; and, in particular, the claims made by artists themselves.

Thirdly, a word of caution to the spectator against the unquestioning acceptance, even at the assurance of the artist, that evidence of human agency is as such all that is needful in order to posit the agency as that of an artist. An example of a spurious claim will serve to show that it is a concern with creating pictorial space, a factitious entity, upon which the agency of the artist is conditional; without which all that can be claimed is at best human, rather than inanimate, agencies having been at work.

From the standpoint of the artist I shall be looking to the status of claims to personal agency, examining the significance to an artist of right attribution of authorship. In so doing a number of related points arise concerning the suppositions attending the notion that ascription presumes personal agency: I shall put forward a case for the individuation of artworks, arguing for this in terms of the conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist.

There is, from the standpoint of the spectator and out of proper regard to the nature of artworks, a need to postulate an artist. We are brought back to review the first consideration of this chapter: that in attending to the proper-

ties of artworks the spectator must acknowledge, be cognisant of, the agency of the artist as manifest in the configurations upon the canvas. There is no divorcing the form or substance of an artwork from the reflective and practical concerns of the artist.

I shall examine the possibility that claims to artistic agency, in the form of claims to authorship, may not in all cases in which authorship may be sustained be informative concerning the properties of the works at issue as artworks. In such cases it may only be feasible to posit the endeavours of a human rather than inanimate agency. It may be possible to show that the human agency at work has aspects which mark it out as evidence of personal agency. I want to say that human agency is personal, that human action is particular, of necessity. My argument will be that something distinguishes personal agency as that of an artist. For it to be possible to posit personal agency as worthy of consideration as a property of artworks it is necessary to demonstrate artistic agency as characteristically concerned with the creation of entities of an irreducibly pictorial kind.

IV.2. Attention to the Standpoint of the Observer.

In calling Ed Kinsey a painter we acknowledge his activities. A painter is one who paints; we

mark him off by this title from others. Tacitly we separate him from others in terms of his, as distinct from their doing. It has from the outset been my concern to contest the suggestion that a painter's activities and concerns segregate doing from being. It is a common tendency to mark out artists as beings of a special sort as if it was that which accounted for the marvellous and strange things artists do; this sort of claim embodies a refusal to admit to the agency of the person who paints. To put the attention, deliberation and hard work that contribute to the product down to temperament or a 'gift', is to dismiss as irrelevant the hard work that, even given great natural endowment of ability, attends the making of a work of art. Kinsey's agency as a painter both takes bearings upon and expresses his temperament and feelings; but we remark him upon the evidence of his activity manifest in his work. The very self that he is depends for its being upon his agency as an artist.

If a painter is so-called because of the character of his activities we should be concerned to consider the evidence of his agency as regards both the observable effects of his doing and the doing itself. My concern so far has largely been to explore the doing from the standpoint of the agent. But recollecting Chapter II. in which we noted the need for the artist to take into account the fact of there being an observer, I want now

to return to consider an observer's point of view; to further the enquiry regarding the agency of an artist by turning to examine its observable effects. This is, of course, the preferred approach to discussions of human agency. However its usefulness to me is that in taking the standpoint of the observer it is possible to gain a clearer insight into the standpoint of the agent. The observable features of a painting should not be regarded as the explanation of painterly agency although they are its manifestation. The observable feature of a painting should rather be regarded as being explained by a theory of painterly agency. It is the standpoint of the artist as agent with which I am primarily concerned. With this in mind I will consider what can be said of the doing by concentrating on the artefact in order to see what may be learned from regarding a work of art as evidence of the agency of the artist.

IV.2.I The Limitations of a Material Account

In regarding the observable features of a work as evidential there is a need to clarify the explanatory stance. It may be felt to be obvious that marks on a canvas, however strange, are not wholly accidental. So it may seem just as obvious that such marks are due to human rather than inanimate agency; but their explanation is not too readily given. How to regard the observable effects

is problematic. A strictly material account is insufficient to explain the configurations before us. Suppose for example that by concentrating solely upon observable effects I hope to distinguish human from inanimate agency in terms of material causes. I might for example ponder the effects of the physical and chemical action of pigment, oil and varnish. Unfortunately I soon discover there is a gap in the account which can only be filled by making a guess which is that there was, rather than that there was not a human hand and eye 'behind' it somewhere. Moreover I wish to claim something particular about the human agency concerned. This, I want to say, is not the doing of just any human agent; the person who did this is a painter. But the evidence of those inanimate agencies effectively apparent to the eye do not, in themselves, presuppose it. The explanation of what is thus apparent must take account of, but then must exceed the materially substantive facts of the canvas, for in the attempt to get from an account of inanimate agencies to an account of human, painterly agency something else must be presumed besides the inanimate agencies at work between materials. As regards attention to the surface, Wollheim puts the case clearly. " The putting of paint on canvas is a necessary but it is not a sufficient condition for our seeing one colour on another: even when the first colour

is that of the paint and the second that of the canvas."[1]

If I wish to say that the object before me bears marks of human agency, of painterly agency, I will get further by addressing myself to matters of concern common at least to discussions of human agency. It is necessary to look to the intentions, the deliberations, the reasoning that attends the production of this object, the painted canvas. I am, in regarding a painting, to some extent encountering the thoughts and actions of the person who put them there. The use to which that person puts his understanding of physical laws concerning his materials is to be discussed in terms of his agency as a painter. But yet it could be asked, how do we tell that the object we are looking at is a painting, the work of a human agent and not merely some product of inanimate agency? On what grounds do we seek explanation? Obviously I am not suggesting that in the usual way anybody actually stands perplexed before the gallery wall wondering " Is this really a painting?" For one thing, a painting is not, many would want to maintain, like anything that naturally occurs, it seems to me that it is of some interest that as spectators we do not usually make mistakes about regarding paintings as paintings and that a theory of human, painterly agency is required to account for this being the case.

IV.2.2 Aspects of an Observer's Expectations.

The manner in which we sift the evidence drawn by observation reveals an expectancy in us as the observers which we may say presumes the agency of an artist. It is informative to take for consideration some of the aspects which colour that expectancy. The observer looks for clues.

IV.2.2.I The Status conferred by the Gallery.

Finding an object displayed on a gallery wall is a reasonably good guide to the manner in which he might regard it. Finding the same object in a farmyard would perhaps leave him short on clues, particularly if the object had but few of the characteristics popularly associated with works of art. Suppose a painting were not done on canvas; had lost its frame; were constituted by configurations not unlike those commonly remarked upon the floor of the farmyard. Would an observer perhaps be doubtful? It might at this point be objected that the status conferred by the gallery wall is a questionable matter. Since it is the case that inclusion in an art exhibition does confer status upon objects and insofar as I am concerned with assessing evidence of human agency in terms of animate rather than inanimate agencies, I am bound to give some heed to the matter. It is true that however much an observer might protest at the inclusion of outrageous exhibits he

does not actually doubt their status as exhibits, as these hypothetical cases show:

A. Suppose a visitor to a gallery discovers something on a wall. It is a painted canvas, surrounded by the cusomary accoutrements of exhibition He takes it to be the work of a painter. So he asks the curator for a catalogue, hoping to extend his knowledge about the painter.

B. Then suppose he discovers something else on a wall in a gallery. A cavity, surrounded by fragments of plaster, rather mildewed, blackened ; a clear view through to the timber frame which is itself under some sort of attack. He thinks the curator should get on to the Department of Public Health. He does not ask for a catalogue, because he does not mistake this hole for an artwork.

C. But suppose he comes upon another hole, surrounded by mouldy plaster exposed to the timbers, evidently somewhat damaged, but seemingly arranged and surrounded by the accoutrements of exhibition. Outraged, he makes for the curator to demand a catalogue, remarking that there ought to be a law... Somehow or other he takes it that this hole is an exhibit.

What is interesting is that however great an outrage and puzzlement the observer may feel, he is not so puzzled that he mistakes his case. He is outraged and this bears witness to his recognition

that it is intended as an artwork. As far as the observer is concerned, a hole in the wall is only outrageous if he thinks he should take it that it has been set up as a work of art. He reacts unfavourably, is outraged where he senses that claims for deliberations of human agency of a certain character are suspect. However profuse or scanty the clues the spectator is moved by some response to the proddings of the artist. For the artist is claiming personal agency. In such cases there are always clues (see IV.2.3). Finding the battered painting in the farmyard may be an indication of its present status, forgotten, lost or disregarded. But recognizing that it is indeed a painting is to recognize the nature of the agency of its making as at least not inanimate. It is not just the fact of the conventional setting that informs the spectator's stance with regard to artworks as opposed to natural or accidental events, differentiating this from the stance he might adopt with regard to natural agencies. This fact counts and must not be disregarded, but it is another which is worth remarking. What we see in B. would not in the usual way be explained by its being discovered on the walls of an art gallery. Another sort of explanation would be the sort to expect of the man from the Department. What is seen in A. and C, on the other hand has undeniably some history of inanimate agencies, but the recognition of something as an exhibit in a gallery

is scarcely furnished out of even the fullest explanation of that kind. The status conferred upon the object by its inclusion in an exhibition prompts a search for explanations of another kind. The man asks the curator for a catalogue because he wants to know not whether the exhibit is an artwork but why it is presented as an artwork when so little, other than the set-up, apparently distinguishes it from a fall of plaster.

I have chosen the sort of example which generates the most confusion for the observer and serves well to illuminate the distinctions as remarked. However, the matters that interest me regarding the 'avant-garde' are no less germane in accounting for the observable features of the works of the 'Old Masters'. It may be quite usual to express confidence as to how one should regard the familiar but we should be chary of leaving our assumptions unexplored just because they do not trouble us very much. In the present connection the agency of the artist is what concerns me. Whether the gallery visitor stands before Saskia or a hole in the wall the basis upon which he recognizes or fails to recognize clues is the same: he confidently expects that the object of his attention shows the marks of the deliberations of a thinking being. However vehemently he expresses himself about the hole in the wall he is not denying that it is intended that he takes it to be a work of art which is so presented. His doubts are addressed perhaps to the justification for presenting an object of this kind as a work of

art when the only evidence of artistic agency that he can see is the name of the artist, suitably affixed to the exhibit.

IV.2.2.2 The Function of the Gallery.

This leads readily to the question of how to regard the function of the gallery. If the situation in which the observer discovers the object gives him one reason to regard that object as particular evidence of human agency it must be of some concern to look to the conditions attending the situation given in the gallery spece. All the conventions of gallery space presuppose the agency of artists.

Take the complex functioning of the art gallery. There may be disagreemnt as to the function of the greatest importance. There are several to choose from and they overlap. It is true that a connoisseur regards the gallery as a good place to look at collections of particular classes of artefact . He maybe sees the gallery as predominantly a store from which he might add to his own collection. Names are very important. He also, one would suppose, enjoys being in the presence of works of art. It is also true that an artist regards the gallery as a market place for his own work, so names are very important for him; but as well as this he regards it as a kind of powerhouse. By which I mean he engages with the expressed

concerns of other artists. He denigrates, mocks or reveres, sharpens his own ideas, is hopefully filled with new enthusiasm and is moved, often, by emotions he cannot well define. A chance visitor may become a connoisseur or a painter, or may simply drop in now and then for pleasure or for interest's sake. The collector takes his pleasure also and doubtless gains in more than financial interest; a painter may himself be quite a connoisseur; a chance visitor may be inexplicably moved by emotion. The overlaps are numerous. In all cases the presence of the gallery visitor postulates the agency of the artist.

The position so far is this: in looking at an object for evidence of human agency one way of pursuing it is to consider the circumstances in which we come across the object. The circumstance of an object's being in an art gallery presupposes artistic agency. But sometimes that evidence is not given in the circumstances under which it is being considered. To identify an object as a painting presupposes agency; human, painterly agency, no matter how obscure the circumstances might be.

I am now some way towards an idea of what does not count as evidence of the agency of the artist. The material history of the work does not greatly help us on its own. The notion of convention helps us in respect of its presuppositions.

Clearly that there are such presuppositions demands that we find a way to meet the question of whence it is the observer culls his expectations.

IV.2.3 Evidence and Empty Gestures.

I put it that there are always clues to what the artist intends of the observer. I want now to expose certain ostensible intentions which turn out to be spurious, for there is a grave danger of confusion for the observer should it be the case that the clues strewn by the artist, purporting to be indicative of his effective agency, turn out to be empty gestures. Stress upon the agency of the artist is a current preoccupation not to say obsession with artists. At every turn the attention is drawn to the presence of the artist; his effective passage through space and time. Many artists are concerned with the extent to which human and inanimate agencies overlap. It is of interest that the greater the overlap that is explored the more evident and lengthy are the protestations of the agency of the explorer. Given that in calling a person an artist we acknowledge his activites and are able to do so only by attending to the work he puts up for us to look at, we tend as observers, to be confused if the overlap between human and inanimate agencies is too great. I think it is fair to say that the more the artist leaves in the charge of Nature the less he may credit to himself. I suggest it is the fear of a diminishing role which occasions the prevailing

tendency to explain. Now, no artist can have things both ways in this matter; but it is often apparent that this is exactly what is attempted. The artist sometimes seems to want to leave everthing to Nature and then to assert his part in the production.

IV.2.3.I Evidence as Art.

Quantities of evidential material adorn the gallery walls and it is well to examine it insofar as we are interested in its status as evidence. Remembering that the sort of evidence with which I have neen dealing so far has taken the form of an object on exhibition, I have regarded such objects as evidence of the agency of their makers. Now let me turn to a different approach; the exhibits on the gallery wall which are set up as evidence of works not on show. Exhibitions of study notes are often shown as contributing to a fuller understanding of the finished statement, whatever its form might be. For example, exhibitions of photographs of artists doing things. In the main, it would be unreasonable to carp at the inclusion of supporting material in an exhibition whose purpose is to show the developmental nature of the artist's work. There is often point in including records of works not included in the current show, although it is questionable that an understanding of what stands before us rests upon such

information. Some would argue vehemently to the contrary. I myself find such exhibitions helpful and informative.

There is no disputing the fact that recent work on show seems to specialize in putting up evidence of artistic agency. Some exhibits wholly consist of evidence. Consider a work by Lizzie Cox in a travelling exhibition mounted by the Arnolfini Gallery. The exhibition was called 'A Sense of Place'[2]. The exhibit includes photographs, samples of sheep wool; several (sealed) strips of slides; copious notes, mostly illegible, a couple of preparatory sketches; all on sale in expensive frames and supported by a video-tape recording, not on sale, of the artist talking about being an artist in the West Country. The very few legible notes are amusing but not very informative; and where is the statement, the culmination to all this business? The point might have been to hood-wink the spectator into expecting something which never happens: to show what it is to prepare and then to omit that for which the preparations were laid. But I do not believe this is so. Somewhere, somebody would have to have said so. No, this is by way of being a statement. No statement is present but the exhibit is got up in the trappings of statement. Before becoming too haughty, it would be well to identify the quarrel. Putative Evidence - as Art-material should not be

confused with the kind of material which is often usefully put up with the purpose of extending the amenity of the gallery and of widening the observer's visual vocabulary, as it were. Whatever the short-comings of Cox's exhibition it would count as evidence of study. My quarrel is that what it lacks is any attempt to draw the multifarious comments and jottings together into some resolution . As spectators we are justified in doubting whether this exhibit is intended to be regarded in terms of evidence as Art or evidence of Art.

IV.2.3.2 Dubious Claims.

In order to expose the difference between these two intentions let us consider an imaginary observer exposed to two other works. Our observer is much like any other who puzzles over the visual arts. I shall take an example other than a painting to do so since it will better illustrate the point and because also my remarks are not confined to the concerns of painters. We will start out of doors. Let us suppose an observer is out walking, coming through the fields. He sees a man taking a walk in one field and in the next he comes upon a curious trench which, because of its configurations he does not reckon can be to do with drainage. Its shape draws the attention however and he spends some time looking at it and pondering its origins and idly considers what it would be to dig up the Home Counties, to re-arrange the Pennines. Both objects of his observation are, as it happens of some artistic significance; he has not realize it yet but both are art works.

One is 'X's Walk through a Field'; the other is 'Undulating Trench'. In the case of the first our chance observer could have no possible notion of the character of X's ramble. There is nothing about X's walk to mark it out from the pleasant afternoon stroll of any casual observer. The trench, on the other hand is remarkable in that it is clearly a work of some sort. Its creator, it is true, must have walked through the field but unlike X he made significant alterations in passing. And he is not present. The problem for the observer in recognizing the 'true' character of the solitary rambler's activity is that as a ramble it is much like his own. How can he get to see that unlike his little stroll this is indeed a work of art? Just to help the case along let us suppose our unknowing observer should chance to visit his local art gallery some little while later. With some surprise he comes upon the exhibition of some very smartly got up photographs, one set of which bears the title 'undulating Trench' and the other, 'X's Walk through a Field'. The first he regards with great interest and enthusiasm. "Why, certainly!"he declares, "I knew it wasn't drains." The other photographs are very puzzling. He vaguely remembers having seen someone who could have been X and he knows the place in the photograph well. But how is he to regard these photographs? Which is the work, the walk as photographed or the photographs themselves? Let us give him

a little more to go on. There is a catalogue for him to read and a very long piece in it about 'X's Walk'; which leads him to believe that the photographs are by way of evidence. Though quite nice photographs, they are not the work (see IV.5.I.5). The walk is supposedly the work. Does this help? Not a lot The record of the event, that is the photograph, we are intended to suppose, gives us the clue we need to know that such events are to be regarded as works of art. Our observer might be forgiven for asking should he not also be provided with a record of the photographer who was presumably in the field at the same time? And so on.... If we are to tell something about the agency of X by attending to such evidence we are constrained by the fact that X needs to put forward something besides the event of walking through a field to distinguish it, not as human agency, that is not in doubt, but as the product of artistic agency. That which distinguishes the event, namely the photograph, does not constitute the work of art. The photograph is put forward not on its own merits in such a case, but as evidence. I submit it does not stand as evidence of the agency of X as an artist. It is only evidence of a claim regarding an event which is itself indistinguishable as a work of art. Not even its inclusion in an exhibition can fill the logical gap. It can only deepen the sense of mystification suffered by an ever-larger band of gallery visitors. Mystification thrives on logical confusion. If, as in this example the

so-called work of art is constituted in its evidence, in that photographs are necessary to distinguish it thus, where the evidence is not held to constitute the work of art, in this case X's walk through a field, then we are most surely left with a gap. And if we should query the justification for setting up a situation in which, in effect, there is nothing more on the gallery wall than a record of nothing, we may feel there are grounds for suspecting the artist of perpetrating a deception; pretending to an agency, artistic agency, which he cannot in good faith claim. Alternatively, we may more kindly suppose that a dangerous confusion attends the thinking of the artist, who perhaps in truth supposes that he can boast personal artistic agency in this work. He may suppose that he can have it both ways. It is high time to show that he cannot, however ingenuous his intentions, continue in this fashion. The truth of the matter is where there is no visible or tangible product other than photographic evidence of X's having been in several parts of the same field neither he nor anybody else can distinguish X's deeds as an artist from the deeds of our chance observer, or of some local shepherd who may in pursuit of his business inadvertently at any time stray into focus.

IV.2.3.3 Assessing the Status of the Evidence

We are now in a position to distinguish the evidential status of the photographs. They are far from similar though at first they may have seemed to be so. 'Undulating Trench' has been photographed because it would be impossible to

organize transit for the work. There is a good case for saying that 'X's Walk through a Field' is not a work of art. If that is right, then putting out sharp photographs as if they were evidence, turns out to be an empty and perhaps pretentious gesture. My point is that the ethos of the gallery space may lend status to both sets of photographs but it should not blind us to the folly of supposing the adequacy of that status as such, for constituting something as a work of art.

To return to the matter of the artist's putting out clues; whether the observer is the victime of error or deception it is very unusual for artists to omit to give weight to the matter of their personal agency. Where there is no justification for claiming authorship, there is no case for positing personal agency. We must suppose that in exhibiting, any artist is making such claims. Should his claims turn out to be empty we may say that he has been mistaken or is practising a deception. It is not my task to advise anybody how they might disentangle true claims of agency from the mistaken or false. However in noting the possibility of error or deception we have some indication of the importance to an artist of the matter of the personal nature of his agency. Should he forfeit this he would have no justification for regarding himself as an artist.

In positing some object as a work of art we posit the agency of its maker. No artist can ignore

what this entails: such agency diminishes in proportion as undifferentiated agencies take over. Lest he should fall back upon the convenient supersition of the artist as a special being endowed with extraordinary Powers or subject to Inspirations, let him bear in mind that in such contingencies no claim to personal agency could be sustained. Personal agency cannot be accounted as a natural endowment (see III. 7.2.). Either he must renounce his role as agent or he must clarify his position and renounce superstition. He cannot have it both ways.

So far I have been concerned to adopt an observer's eye view of the artist as agent. Being on the recipient's side has been useful insofar as it has shown the value of examining certain indications.

a. It has become clearer for one thing that however informative the history of the physical make-up of a work may be, it cannot provide an adequate account of the object as a manifestation of human agency. It follows that something must be added to that story. The explanation needs to be broadened.

b. In filling out the account it is possible to look to the function of the gallery. Conventions attach to the description of its role but the functions of the Gallery presuppose the agency of artists.

c. Before an object can be regarded as a manifestation of artistic agency it is needful to attend to the question of the means by which this comes to be recognized.

d. We have noted this: if the artist has any concern to make known the fact of his personal agency he is wont to leave clues, or pointers. Not all clues point true. Examples show that they may be mistakenly or falsely laid. From the fact that clues are laid it may be taken that the artist is concerned to indicate his personal agency. The very fact of his putting his work on exhibition in a gallery is supposed to indicate the nature of his agency as artistic. But it has been shown that the status conferred by the gallery can be a spurious affair in that respect(see also IV.3.4).

IV.3 Attention to the Standpoint of the Artist

It is now clear that if I wish to fill out the explanation of the work of art to account for the agency of the artist concerned I must look to the claims for personal agency made by the artist, if only insofar as they have to do with his belief in , and public recognition of his agency as an artist. The very act of observation is in this connection, consequential upon the promotion of the agency of the artist as personal. It is reasonable to suggest that this being so, the activities of artists reach out to and affect the activities

of others. The artist's agency involves the response of the observer. This was the substance of the second chapter. I regard the agency of a painter as having a necessary relationship to the painting he makes, recognizing that the observable features of the painting provide the only access we have to that relation. The artist wants to say that a painting or any artwork is as particular as an entity as the person who makes it. So looking to the configurations on the canvas would, in that case, presuppose that relation.

IV.3.1 Some Suppositions attendant on a Claim to Personal Agency.

As individual attribution is of account to the artist I want now to look to the suppositions which attach to his assertion of personal agency. What I am after is that which counts as a mark of his personal agency.

The painter may suppose the following:
Uniqueness of statement is a mark of his personal agency as a painter.
Novelty of statement marks his personal agency as a painter.

That he is materially effective is a mark of his personal agency.

IV.3.2 Concerning Uniqueness.

I have looked at the progress of ideas and practice integrally involved in the making of an artwork (see I.3.4) I now want to look at what is involved in a series of works being instances of one idea or group of ideas and yet being individually distinctive works (see II.4.2). Artworks in series offer a good example. As Elizabeth Frink commented on a series of her own sculptures, "Each is a work in its own right and each leads on to the next".[3] Artists do not suppose themselves to be alone in their concerns. One landscape painter would expect another to understand something of his interests. Yet he would hope and trust that no other landscape painter had made or could make exactly the statement of those interests that he himself is making. A number of matters arise which are of interest about the individuation of artworks, which I shall now discuss. In order to establish that it is possible to individuate the products of a painter's agency I need to show the following to be true about Kinsey: that Kinsey's concerns are not identical with the concerns of any other and that it is the very contingency of the case which is important.

In order to show how this is true I might begin by distinguishing between works done by Kinsey himself; the different ideas he develops

in his several works. I will then move on to discover what would be needed in order to distinguish his from the works of any other in terms of personal agency.

IV.3.2.I Distinguishing between the Works of One Painter.

Firstly, to distinguish between the works of one painter suppose that Ed Kinsey makes a painting. The pictorial statement, which his painting is, shows some aspect of his concerns. Kinsey adopts methods and chooses materials which he thinks will best serve him in making that particular statement. It might be supposed that the difference between one work and another, where both are the work of the one painter, rests upon its being true that only such means as he has elected to employ adequately differentiate his concerns. Any other form of expression would make for a different picture. However though this is quite correct, it will not do. True, should Kinsey select a different palette or schematic system then he will produce a different painting; but suppose he decides to prepare six canvases, exactly similar in size. He may also decide to use exactly the same colours and the same system of composition in each. Yet it would, we know, be possible for him to complete six distinctively different paintings. The variations open to him are many at a given time, and over a period will be increased despite the fact that he has employed the same techniques and materials in the production of each one.

It is not denied that the relation of means and eventual end are integral. Indeed, it is not sensible to distinguish between the statement and its material or formal content at all, for a painting simply cannot be subtracted out from its matter or its form. But the example illustrates what we already must know: that this state of affairs does not work both ways. A choice of materials and a variety of systems is not the guarantee of pictorial concerns being various. A painter pursuant of his matter has a broad field of possibilites from which to choose. It is a field he may plunder and from which he may retreat. His several conceptual concerns may involve him in diverse means, but they need not.

Another way is worth trying. It is possible to posit a certain unity to Kinsey's concerns, in which his statement and his chosen means are in an integral relationship such that all save Kinsey himself, as agent, may be regarded as variable. Kinsey, as an artist, pursues many ideas. However many ideas he pursues, however diverse or similar the means he employs, however many statements he completes, they are unified in that they are Kinsey's . However minimal a unity this may seem, it should not for that be despised. Indeed, such as it is, it poses some interesting questions. Given that Kinsey may be regarded as a constant factor in an otherwise flexible and variable relationship of factors, these other elements

may be viewed as indefinitely malleable. The agency of Kinsey requires and governs the unity of the relationship. But Kinsey may by recourse to diverse means express numerous conceptual concerns in numerous statements. Where there is more than one statement, by whatever means it is accomplished, some difference in concerns must be acknowledged. Yet they do have in common that they effectively express Kinsey's agency. There is some continuity of ideas in that they are Kinsey's ideas. I shall now explore this as the means by which we may distinguish between works in terms of personal agency; that is to say, mark out any or all of those works by one painter from any or all by another (see II.4.2).

IV.3.2.2 Individuating Artworks.

This is a bold claim but one which I mean to substantiate. Numerous approaches have been made to the problem of individuating artworks. They tend to proceed along the lines of dealing with the problems attending the spectator in his attempts to characterize the evaluation and assessment of artworks. Should he, for example be able to remark his enjoyment of artworks as a special kind of experience? Can he characterize, in some distinctive way, the language of art critics? The first approach involves enquiries about the nature of response and seem to me, however valuable an exercise that might be, unlikely to yield any sure

answers on behalf of the spectator and they take us in any case no nearer to the individuation of artworks. Finding some special experience which is associated only with an enjoyment of artworks would not tell anyone very much about artworks as such, for there can be no comprehensive account of experience in this area. Anyway, some objects might give us enjoyment so close to the 'requisite' kind to be indistinguishable and yet not be artworks. Consider the sudden sighting of a new moon. A further worry about this approach would be, as Strawson has pointed out,[4] that even if indeed there was a special experience accompanying this kind of enjoyment would its presence be what made it this kind of enjoyment? The objection to this would be in line with objections to the notion of artworks as instrumental. The very idea of looking for an identifying experience is not only daunting, but misleading. The apparently "limitless elasticity" of art criticism defies analysis. At best it is "departmental and limited",[5] at worst it is a threat to the unwary, an industry of verbiage whose effect is to reduce the artwork to the status of an emetic. Of course my sceptical rejection of 'language' analysis-attempts relates to my rejection of 'special experience' analysis-attempts, for I regard both in terms of concerns with spectator response. The question of assessing enjoyment or evaluation provide no clear access to the status of artworks regarding

their individuation and can yield only an inadequate account of spectator response. The other way of looking at the question is usually to attempt some general statement about properties of objects, such that artworks may be distinguished as objects of a certain kind. "The uniqueness demanded of a work of art is that consequent on its essentially being evaluated for itself and not for its instrumenatal potentialities".[6] In what sense can a work of art be unique, evaluated for itself? To suggest that this can be answered by referring back to the spectator's standpoint as Strawson suggests, does not seem entirely satisfactory if, by doing so, we get no further than to assert the "criterion of identity of a work of art is the totality of features which are relevant to its aesthetic appraisal".[7] It comes back to criteria which have doubtless shown to be themselves highly problematic. Nevertheless, the kind of an artwork is not given in the terms of its appraisal; its appraisal is rather a response to the artwork as an object of a certain kind.

My contention is that artworks have in common with each other, but not with other works or things, a concern with pictorial space. They also have in common that any artwork whatsoever manifests the pictorial concerns of an individual agent. Even in cases of multiple editions the point remains good. However many copies exist the properties

of the object do not cease to be a manifestation of the pictorial concerns of the artist who designed the artwork for edition. We cannot dissociate the person, the painter, Kinsey is, from the pictures Kinsey paints. This is the force of the idea of the agency of an artist; the relationship of a kind of deliberative doing to a kind of active being. The artist self as agent is, that is to say exists, only in his reflective and practical activities. In the case of an artist that agency is not to be separated out from the things he has done, or is doing. In terms of the conditions upon which we may posit the agent as an artist it is thus not merely possible but imperative that if the agent is rightly to be regarded as personal - then that upon which, as agent, he depends for his being - may no less be individuated. Action (see p.315) is inherently particular* Thus the uncertainties and doubts besetting the attempts to individuate artworks in, merely, terms of spectator response can be abandoned; concern for the properties of artworks is the key to their individuation. But rather than look in vain to the appearances and categories of artworks, consider instead that in the visual arts, any work of whatever sort, is a manifestation of the pictorial concerns of an individual. As an artefact it is, as I have already claimed, (Chapter I, Introduction), a fictitious entity.

Its being so owes as much to the reflective activities of an individual agent as to the stuffs and surfaces by means of which his prospect becomes a public matter.

IV.3.3 'Novelty' Despatched.

I turn now to the supposition that novelty of statement is a distinguishing mark of the personal agency of the painter. This may speedily be despatched. If a work may be distinguished among the works of one painter and may also be singled out by authorship, as has in both cases been my claim, it may in either category be remarked as unique. This is to render the question of novelty spurious. As a distinguishing mark of the personal agency of the painter, 'novelty' is a redundant supposition.

IV.3.4 The Material Object.

Thirdly, consider the supposition concerning the material character of the artefact as it supports the claim to personal agency. This supposition is substantially endorsed by points raised in other chapters in the following way: I have noted that a painter's concerns are oriented towards some material statement. In Chapter I. the agency of an artist was stated as conditional upon a concern with a factitious pictorial entity. In Chapter III I endeavoured to show the central importance of

positing cohesion between thinking and doing; the interdependency of thought and action in the reflective processes of painting and drawing; their manifestation in the artefact. In Chapter II. concerning the public aspect of artistic agency I endeavoured to show the significance of that cohesion as the occasion of response of any whose standpoint is that of a spectator. In any discussion concerning the extent to which the concerns of an artist may effect the responses of anybody else what must be posited is the existence of a work of art; a necessary artefact. Where we are attending to suppositions as they concern a painter's claim to personal agency we should bear these considerations in mind. The claim of the painter may be substantiated by virtue of the fact that his personal agency as a painter is given in the character of his concerns, as being the concerns of some particular painter, in this case Ed Kinsey. Such concerns do not guarantee artefactual expression but as I have shown they necessarily envisage it.

Here the moment has been reached at which the matter of personal agency, from the standpoint of the subject, meets with the matter of the personal agency of the artist as it is observable from the standpoint of the spectator. From the spectator's point of view there must be something to attend to: some artefact. Where this is so, there being obvious problems about attending to Minimalist exhibits, then, sure enough, the material effectiveness of the painter is one mark of the agency

of that painter. From the painter's point of view it is very difficult for him to sustain a credible role as an artist in cases where the material character of his work is in question. It is worth recollecting the point that where the character of the artefact is seriously questionable as a work of art on terms already discussed in the chapter (see IV.2.3.3) the observer should be ready to set to work to question the terms of his response. It is all to easy to be mistaken about the object of attention. This in no way suggests a standard of response; but there should be some caution on the part of the observer in receipt of what rightly or wrongly passes as evidence. In IV.2.3.3 it was suggested that the relation of agent to artefact might not as such be enough to show the character of that relation as peculiarly the agency of an artist. I now offer some appraisal of that problem by way of a very obvious statement: that Kinsey's concerns are painterly is shown by the material and compositional evidence of the artefact. The surface as content, as configuration, is the evidence for the observer. Kinsey's claim to agency is acceptable on the basis of there being an integral relation between his concerns, his chosen means of expression and his eventual statement in the form of a painting. We may not distinguish his agency as painterly in kind.

I now turn to a closer examination of the personal agency of the artist as a matter of regard for the spectator.

IV.4. The Postulated Artist.

This is a matter which seems to require the spectator to remark that which might not be all that accessible to the eye. Since the artwork, whatever it might be, speaks for itself and does not depend on any additional apologetic by its maker the spectator might well wonder how to go about the business of discerning the personal agency of the artist. Some might say it was unnecessary and mistaken to attempt it when what matters is not the painter but the painting and the configurations upon its surface. Some indeed would have us believe that consideration of the agency of the artist does not enter into a consideration of the properties of the painting. This would be one way of cutting down on the spectator's difficulties, but my claim is that the personal agency of the painter is intrinsic to the properties of the painting. "The painter is included from the start".[8] The spectator's difficulties I shall argue are capable of resolution within this framework. It is necessary to look, for the solution, to the concerns of the artist for whom the question of attribution, or authorship, is crucial. This is not just a matter of pride; from the standpoint

of the painter his painting is a complex statement of concerns of his at that or some other time. It presents to the observer, in irreducibly pictorial terms, his thinking as a painter. Since the reflective and practical activities he has undertaken are manifest in the configurations upon the canvas it is a little strange to suppose that this complex activity, his very agency, might, by adopting a certain stance, be divorced from the spectator's field of attention. What is needed is that without straining intelligibility we can accommodate the needs of agent and spectator in such a way as will do a disservice to neither.

IV.4.I The Agency of the Artist as a Consideration with regard to the Properties of Artworks.

We must ask what the connection is between artist and artwork. David Carrier poses a possible distinction, "If we say the artwork is what the artist makes we focus on the link of the work to that person. If we say the artwork is what the artist makes we focus on the product".[9] His purpose in putting the point is to discover whether and how far we may regard the properties of a work of art as dependent upon the identity of the artist. Whether or not postulated artists are superfluous is a question we can meet only within the terms of artistic agency by asking ourselves what it adds to a description of a work to postulate an artist or , by omission, how much is lost.

Now if Carrier objects to the view that knowing what a nice man Monet was, or how he balanced the books, is any help to us in looking at "Water Lilies" then so most certainly do I. But this is surely not the kind of thing in any case that goes with postulating some particular artist. Someone of Nelson Goodman's persuasion would have us separate off the artist and his concerns, to make the question of who did what redundant in an account of the properties of artworks (see V.I.4). Conversely someone of Richard Wollheim's persuasion would assert the primary importance of postulating an artist.

A strong expression of the first view would have us accept, with Goodman (and Barthes) that "..it is the language which speaks, not the author".[10] For Wollheim on the other hand, "what we see in a picture and the artist's intentions are linked in that, by and large, an intention to represent X must express itself through the making of a picture in which we can see X".[11] And we cannot divorce the intention in such case from the intender. We do not need to fall into the spectator's trap of imposing a unifying Gestalt onto any aesthetic experience in order to maintain that if an implied artist is essential to the spectator then that sonnet, that painting or novel is necessarily by that artist. It seems to me mistaken to suppose that an artwork's properties can as Goodman claims,

"be studied quite apart from the acts or beliefs or motives of any agent that may have brought about the....relationships involved" without the qualification that certain of the acts, beliefs, and motives of the artist have necessarily quite particularly informed the material, compositional progress of the work. This is not at all the same thing as saying that the conceptual concerns of the painter can be subsumed under some culture-oriented system of symbols. These factors cannot conceptually be disregarded since the very marks upon the canvas are their direct manifestation as the conceptual concerns of the painter. In saying a work is "what the artist makes" we are not it seems to me precluded, in focussing "on the product", from postulating an artist. On the contrary; the artist is implied thereby.

IV.4.2 A Qualification upon the notion of a Shared Communicative Grasp.

What is not being suggested is that in looking at a painting we should expect it to be transparent to the painter's life-history. We are not after extraneous details of the painter's personal affairs. Even in a self-portrait (see IV.4.3), there is no need to regard the painting as evidence of anything other than is given in the content of the painting. What is being suggested is that what can be seen in the marks on the canvas are certain pictorial concerns of one particular painter and that the complex properties of the work show and cannot exclude the personal agency

of that painter. If this is understood there is no need to scan the canvas looking for clues of some extra content; nothing beyond the work need be postulated nor sought in order to discover the agent. All we need to know about his intentions is present to the attention in the work before us. To deny that consideration of the agency of the painter enters into consideration of the properties of a painting is to limit the spectator's attention to a partial field of reference. Those emphases in an artwork which we take as having the function of depiction, symbolism, representation, denotation, all to be sure are accessible to a spectator on the basis of a shared communicative grasp. Insofar as we are concerned to know how paintings represent, depict and so on, events and states of affairs as they commonly affect us, that grasp gives the spectator in some part a framework of response. As has been said "This shared basis for communication allows the spectator access to the properties of the painting".[12] This is true, as far as it goes. But any discussion of pictures in the context of a system of communication must take as its point of departure a situation in which somebody is saying something to somebody else in the context of an artwork. Presumably it is only by understanding the whole situation that we are able to tell whether a picture represents or not and if so what it represents and how. But understanding even half of the situation

cannot exclude the agent's personal standpoint, for that, surely, is contituted in the surface of the very picture before us. The point is put by Colin Lyas," It is something someone did...In the work, given the requisite knowledge and experience, we can find chronicled the choices made,.. the attitudes expressed".[13] A spectator comes to some extent informed to the artwork, but he is not comprehensively informed. He is by way of coming as a primed recipient to ideas; such is not a passive response, but it is a response. Seeing " what is meant" when it comes to understanding paintings is an acknowledgement not only of some shared system of communication but also of the contribution to that system,perhaps even an effective disruption to it, in the conceptual concerns of the agent which are presented to the attention in the content of the canvas. As noted earlier in Chapter II. the authority of an artwork is the extent to which that work engages the attention. In certain cases the spectator may not at first recognize the conceptual territory at all, and can only come to do so through greater familiarity or by sustained effort. Even with this shared basis for comm nication being rather wobbly he is attentively engaged in trying to understand what he sees.

IV.4.3 The Self-Portrait.

Returning to an earlier observation, (see III.7.3 IV.4.2) there are paintings which it seems to me expressly set out to say something of the painter's person. Van Gogh's self-portraits offer a good example. However these paintings need to be seen primarily as a sort of testimony to the indivisibility, for Van Gogh, of his person and his concerns as a painter. The content of these works does not yield to analysis of the latter to the exclusion of the former. Even in such paintings as these what the painter puts on the canvas is all that is required. There is no question of looking beyond or behind the content of the canvas. What is asked is acknowledgement of the person, the agency of Van Gogh, the painter.
Now while there is no need to scan the canvas of even a self-portrait for clues which lie beyond the content of the work the spectator is not, cannot be precluded from engaging in extensive reflective attention to the work for, as Stefan Morawski puts it, "Anything in the work of art which beyond 'telling a story' makes a commmentary on the human condition, conceptualizes the author's view point and stimulates the audience towards abstract thinking. The range and strength of cognitive response depends on the richness and intricacy of the work's structure and texture, on the author's insight and power to involve us".[14]
However intricate and extensive the cultural mesh

within which the spectator and artist communicate, the extent to which a work of art compels the spectator's attention is not confined by it. For Morawski the self-portraits of Van Gogh, and also of Rembrandt, offer,"..certain evidence that cultural equivalents can never be claimed to subsume the creation they mediate...Among these artists, the oeuvre and the personality articulate as one fascinating whole which is not explicable only by the moeurs of the moment". An artwork's range rests upon the recognitions and sharing of conceptual concerns. This is in part a cognitive endeavour. It also in large part engages the emotions of the viewer. Nowhere personally do I find this more powerfully so than in addressing the self-potraits of Rembrandt. In no other art form is the exposure of the self to another so given. The self-portrait is in two senses revelatory. The artist as agent is defined, exposed, in the terms of this form. For in any activity of painting I am my agent-self, my person. In painting himself Rembrandt gives , to any who cares to cast a glance,his person, both in its appearance and its very agency . It is undoubtedly an act of generosity and as such it should be received. Furthermore it is the very expression of the personal nature of such agency. I would therefore say that the properties of painting include not only reference to the world at large as mediated by Culture. They manifestly refer the spectator to the individual agent who put the paint on the

canvas. It is his agency, his individuality, worriting at constraints, amongst which are those of cultural context, that results in the object presented and received in exhibition. As a Landscape painter it is no less true that Ed Kinsey is not in any sense by way of trying to meet the cultural expectations of his public. Consideration of the agency of Ed Kinsey enters into consideration of the properties of his painting. If Kinsey is making a statement in painterly terms, that he is making it matters to him and I hold that its mattering is of more than psychological interest since it has issue in practical terms whose expression marks the agency evident in the painting as his and nobody else's. The agency of the painter does emphatically "enter into it". Subtract it and you may as well get rid of the painting - get rid of painters. All that will remain is a posse of spectators with only their expectations to lament. I am, as must by now be unquestionably clear, far from seeking to exclude the study of the spectator from considerations of artworks, but it is important not only for the sake of the artist but just as much for the sake of the viewer to recognize the study of the spectator as ever pointing in the direction of the concerns of the artist; for this is a communicative consequence of exhibition. Centrally, we must regard works of art as more or less cohesive complex instantiations of thought and action and as such they present, in

some immediacy the thoughts and actions of some person. The limitations of time and space have their constraining influence upon the work in progress and outcome. They are part of a 'matrix', if I might borrow a term from which we cannot subtract the artist as agent as a constant in an otherwise variable field of pictorial concerns. In this section it has been argued that works by one painter may be distinguished from each other in respect of their comprising, as statements, a widely variable disposition and use of elements; yet they have in common that each is a statement of the one painter. It is further claimed that works by one painter, however distinct they are from one another as works, are fundamentally to be distinguished from any work or works by any other painter. Whatever it might be that those works, in collections of works by more than one painter, can be said to have in common, such as thematic content, style, medium and so on they are distinct in being the works of different agents, (see IV.5.I.I). It has also been noted that the artist regards his own agency as worth notice. He leaves clues.

We have noted the inadequacy of supposing that considerations of agency need not enter into consideration of the properties of artworks. We furthermore saw that clearly it is not enough to posit that agency has in a general way been involved in the production of an artwork. This would not in itself be informative. That agency of some sort

has been involved in artworks is self-evident. If no more were being claimed for artworks than that some action or other has taken place it would be entirely understandable if the matter was held to be uninteresting. If we hold that what it is that has been done is a manifestation of reflective and practical activity on the part of some individu-al some person, we shall want to make much more of it for we now have a pointer to the character of the agency concerned since that which is or has been done just cannot be set apart from the activities involved in the doing; those activities of thinking and making are just what constitute agency in this connection. This is the substance of Chapter I. I also want to point out that in saying we must distinguish the sort of agency involved not just as human rather than inanimate but as human therfore personal, I am making a point of gen--eral significance.

IV.5 Attribution as an Informative Notion.

It might be objected that if all we are saying is that people are different, this is in itself trivial; but to suggest that an artefact is capable of expressing in pictorial terms the concerns of an individual agent is of significance. In looking at paintings and other works of art we are addressing ourselves to statements of a pictorial sort. These statements may be regarded in many connections, central to which are the concerns of their author. Artworks are actual manifestations of personal agency; that is to say the marks on the

canvas do not stand for or symbolize some conceptual position of the painter; they just are his conceptual position (see III.4.2.2.) Attribution implies a rather closer relationship between the artist and the artefact than is allowed to be the case if we segregate consideration of the properties of artworks from consideration of the agency of the artist.

In talking about the personal nature of human agency I am not making a special case for artists. What is true about painters as regards agency is not irrelevant to other spheres of human action. All the same, the examples I have taken for examination are useful in that they point up the relationship of thinking to doing with greater clarity than might some others. It is true in this case there is an artefact. Now we should understand that there being an artefactual manifestation is not in iteself remarkable, but the fact that the way of characterizing the artefact produced by an artist does not require the artefact to be regarded as instrumental in some other field of concern allows us to regard the agent re his concerns, his production and product, within something of a discrete relationship; the example is thus curiously free from extraneous diversion. The general point I want to make is that the personal character of our thoughts and actions is of account in consideration of the results or effects of our thoughts and actions and that this is the force of the idea of human agency. The agency of the artist is a good case for us to take for the particular case provides a model for what is generally true.

One way of approaching the matter is once more to pay attention to what artists themselves are concerned about. Since my enquiry is being conducted from the standpoint of the agent it is consistent that the importance to an artist of the fact of his, rather than anybody else's agency should provide us with a key to the personal nature of his thinking and doing. I shall refer to this concern an artist has as a concern with a right attribution of authorship.

IV.5.I Some Testing Examples.

I shall be looking at three cases in which claims of attribution make sense. My case will be that not all of the examples yield information with a bearing upon the properties of the artefacts concerned, but that there is something to be said for regarding the relation between artworks and artistic agency in terms of this being the case.
These are the examples for comparison:

a balloon seller's balloons
a painter's works
a knitter's socks.

They have in common that in each case someone could say of the artefacts, "They are mine." The last two examples differ from the first in respect of the probability that the persons concerned could say of these artefacts, "They are mine, in that they are my doing." The second and third cases are of a kind insofar as their being as they are involves the reflective and practical concerns of their 'owners'. I shall put it that they are to

be distinguished insofar as it may be said to be true that there is nothing about the properties of even hand-knitted socks which would persuade anyone to credit a claim for attribution with much significance. It seems to me that the same may not be said about a painter's claim. This does indicate some noticeable particularity of character about artistic agency. Certainly it is to make some sort of case for paintings being particularly good examples, insofar as they are clear indicators of the workings of personal agency. The significance of the first example is two-fold. It gives us in the present context a case in which the claim of attribution is uninformative as to the properties of the balloons as such. Further, it eventually helps us to make some useful observations about artefacts as artworks which, (whilst not committing us to an attempt to set out sufficient conditions under which an artefact may so qualify,) are significant in revealing necessary conditions under which an artefact so qualifies.

Let us look more closely at the examples. My claim is that a painter's collection of his own paintings is not like a balloon seller's collection of balloons. A painter's paintings are less like the vendor's ballooons than they are like David's socks that he himself has made. David's socks are less eloquent than the painter's paintings where both are considered as manifestation of personal agency.

However, such attribution is in varying extent informative of knitters and painters and not, in the ordinary way, of much help in charactr-izing balloon sellers. Let me elaborate on two of the examples. This will show us the distinct-iveness of the cases in question.

IV.5.I.I A Case of Mistaken Attribution.

The First Case. A and B are collections of artworks. They are distinguished as collections in that although each work in these collections is an individual work those works which comprise group A do so in virtue of their having each and every one been made by 'A'. Similarly those works comprising group B are the work of 'B'. Thus, however similar the collections A and B may be to each other in subject-matter, medium, quantity, they are fundamentally distinct as collections. This was the point made more fully inIV.3.2.2. Let me try it out in another context.

The second case. C and D are bunches of balloons. They are distinguished as bunches in that although each balloon in bunch C is quite unlike the others in its bunch, every one of the balloons is firmly attached by strings to the hand of one balloon-seller 'C'. Similarly those balloons comprising bunch D are attached by strings to the hand of 'D'. We might say that since 'C' and 'D' are separate individuals this allows me to mark out C and D as fundamentally distinctive bunches of

balloons, even though as bunches they contain the same collection of colours, shapes and so on. Since I am concerned with attribution let me now consider what might happen in the event of somebody's treating someone's paintings as they might perhaps someone's balloons. I now need to postulate particular painters and balloon sellers in order to make the point. So I will give names to the examples rather than mere letters.

In the first case, consider the plight of two landscape painters Max and Mercedes. Each has done the same number of paintings with the same subject matter; executed in the same medium and painted all in the last three years. They are preparing for a joint exhibition. The gallery by some chance gets into a muddle and switches things so that in the catalogue Mercedes is attributed with paintings done by Max and Max is catalogued as the author of paintings done by Mercedes. There is embarrassment and tension but is there any question of leaving things as they stand? Absolutely not, as we shall see.

In the second case, two balloon sellers, Tosh and McGarry, have each the same number of balloons; each has the same selection of shapes, sizes and colours of balloon and both are out in the High Street on Saturday afternoon. By some chance the wind snatches the balloons from McGarry's hand; snatches the balloons from Tosh and after

a bit of a scuffle each recovers a clutch of balloons, just as many, just as before. Except that, as it happens, they have in fact exchanged balloons. But although neither vendor has the stock he started out with neither Tosh nor McGarry make any trouble. Is there any question of not leaving things as they stand? Of course not, why should there be any trouble? So long as the balloons are not burst and are just as many and as beautiful as before then Tosh and McGarry may be content. (They have not, happily, exchanged price lists.)

What have Max and Mercedes to be upset about? On the face of it the situation is very good. The gallery has lost nothing, neither has anything been damaged; all the works are as before and each may be seen entire and appraised, as Goodman would say, in its own terms. Is it not just like the case of the balloons? What does attribution matter, where that we have is a collection of paintings and not of balloons? Can we not put paintings and balloons on a par and say that so long as nothing is destroyed or lost, so long as each can charge what he or she wants to, there is no justification for making trouble? We should not expect Tosh or McGarry to make trouble under the circumstances of their case. What we have to admit is that Max and Mercedes do not see themselves as being at all like balloon sellers and this has nothing to do with their feelings about the social comparison of artists and balloon vendors. They would claim that collections of paintings have as such to be regarded in terms of their distinctive

attribution whereas the two bunches of balloons need not be regarded in that way. There is no advantage to Tosh in recovering his original clutch of balloons so long as he recovers himself a comparable clutch. The point is he can recover a comparable enough clutch of balloons. But Mercedes claims that there does not exist in this world a remotely comparable clutch of paintings to those now wrongly attributed to Max.

IV.5.I.2 The Importance of the Contingent Case.

Can this position be sustained? Now it is only contingently true that given the diversity of the complex 'matrices' associated with each and every work of art, no two works, even by the same painter, will be the same. There is a logical possibility of repetition or exact coincidence which it is crucially important to dismiss The conceptual point at issue just is that a painting or other art work is a manifestation of personal agency; this would be threatened by asserting a logical position on replication. I argue that this is to mistake the nature of the case and it is this which allows me to regard the threat as empty. Another difficulty seems to be this: if we cannot attribute individual identity to an entity, such as a computer, we cannot usefully attribute artefacts produced by that entity with characteristics which mark it out as having been produced by that entity and no other. But suppose

we can reasonably posit the existence of machines with individual identity, is it reasonable to suppose that the attributes which allow us to posit this stop short of the material effects of 'individual' thinking and making? In other words, if machines are 'individuals,' which I admit is possible, why should we deny that 'individuals' may produce works which are thereby unique? If this is a reasonable position to maintain then would the possibilityof 'individual' work produced by some artificial intelligence threaten my position? Not unless it helps in giving an account of the product so produced, to add attributability into a description of such a product. Further, the logical possibility of an infinite variety of artefacts being produced by any, or infinitely many individual artificial intelligences is conceivable but does not constitute any threat to my position; it is only to say that certain sorts of machine would have to behave very much like human beings for it to be usual for there to be a fuss about mistaken attribution and would have to be very like a human being indeed to mind quite so badly as Mercedes. The point is really that human action is inherently particular and that this accounts for the positive value of the contingent nature of the case to the argument for the individuation of artworks. What I am now saying is that for certain objects an adequate account of the objects as such requires as part of their description some reference to their attributability to

individuals. The separate bunches of balloons, C and D, cannot be marked out as fundamentally distinct even though their owners are as individuals, fundamentally to be distinguished. There is nothing about the vendor's bunches of balloons as such that allows me to regard them as manifestations of the personal identity of the vendor. It allows me to call Tosh and McGarry balloon sellers with certain rights of possession and procedure but that is all. Even rights of possession may under certain circumstances be regarded with some flexibility. If I continue with the supposition that paintings are manifestations of personal identity how does this accord with some more usual approaches to persons and objects?

IV.5.I.3 Examination of the Idea that the Notion of Authorship is informative in Consideration of the Properties of Artworks.

I will now attend to the last example comparing it to the others.

a. Tosh-the-balloon-seller's stock of balloons.

b. Mercedes-the-painter's collection of her own works.

c. David's collection of socks that he has knitted.

In each case possession is being claimed but in b. and c. possession implies attributability in the sense that each could say, "They are mine in that I made them". We may reasonably suppose

that Tosh will not say that, though he may have inflated them. We can see that a. is obviously not the same as b. and c. But how far can c. be said to offer as good an illustration of an individual identification of the maker in question as might b. ? David's attitude towards his socks may appear very similar to Mercedes' attitude towards her work. Should someone switch their own hand-knitted socks with his we would be sadly advised in supposing David might not object. What might the basis of his objection be? The socks might well be less well-made, they may not be of a colour he approves. They may not fit anybody for whom he knits. They may be a pair short. Let us call these observable differences for David. However, although any one of these conditions would provide him with grounds for complaint we cannot with impunity say, were none of them to obtain, that David would feel there were no grounds left for objections. The socks may be equally well made; be of acceptable colour, even the same colour; they may do quite nicely for anybody for whom he ordinarily makes socks. Furthermore, there may be no more, nor no fewer pairs in the exchange. Yet he feels irritated and offended by the idea that his having not made these socks is of no account. He would put it perhaps that the person who claims to have made the socks that David in fact made is, for one thing, telling lies and that, for another, this person must want people to believe that he

is capable of knitting socks of the quality of David's socks which would at least mean there is something to this matter of attribution after all. Though as we have seen there actually might be no noticeable difference. So, that he objects on the basis of a claim being untrue is one objection he can sustain. Unfortunately it would be very easy to get bogged down by a discussion of all sorts of noticeable differences without ever getting to the differences which, being noticeable, were <u>also</u> germane to our concerns. The thing that matters is in this case the relationship of authorship to the material properties of the artefact. That David's socks are socks that nobody else made is what matters to David and more might be at stake than the truth of the other fellow's claim. Unhappily, I cannot accept, even though he might want me to, that nobody else could have made the socks that David made. For making socks involves certain constraints which cannot be disregarded - if the artefact in the making is going to be a sock, that is. Certain conditions have to be fulfilled in making a sock: it should fit some foot when it is finished. So, if it is knitted, there must be a regularity about the numbers of stitches involved in shaping the object. Certain kinds of yarn are available and these constrain the knitter as to size of needles, tension of thread, and so on. Thus it is not for David to say that nobody could

make socks just like his. And I think he is not saying that. I suggested that more might be at stake than the truth of the claim. What he is saying can perhaps better be appreciated by adding into the case an emotive factor. Suppose the socks he made were a present for Ruth. His having done something for her cannot be fulfilled by her receiving socks which, after all, were not of his making where his making was part of the giving as he intended it. Now 'his making' can be the point of the attribution even when he means to keep them for himself. It is still perhaps an emotive matter. Although it is none the worse for that, it is true to say that as a property of socks, it is not a very visible property. It has in fact, less to do with the socks as such than it has to do with his intention to make some for Ruth.

We are back to the question of socks being less good as examples of objects whose properties need to be considered in the light of their maker's agency. With Mercedes and the mis-attribution of her work, that she has done the work is on a par with David's having knitted the socks but as artefacts her paintings are capable, in ways that David's socks are not, of manifesting the personal agency of their maker. Making socks is an instrumental activity. Socks are normally for something in a way that painting pictures is not. It is a mundane but important fact that socks are for feet. This puts a limit on the extent to which socks can vary from pair to pair, from sock to sock. Socks cannot be individuated with respect to the personal agency of the knitter

for their function necessarily constrains their maker and thus the nature and appearance of the socks. The same cannot be said of artists and artworks. That David made these socks matters for him, but it is more important for him and a right regard for his feelings than it is for a right regard of the socks, except in the case of their being a present where the making and who made them is an important part of the giving. A right regard for paintings involves recognition of the irreducibly pictorial character of the work as manifestation of the personal agency of its maker as the agency of an artist.

IV.5.I.4 The Case for Sock-Works.

Now what if, just to be awkward David says, "But my socks are going into an exhibition of modern sculpture." ? Then we should seem to have to say of the work, David's socks, that they are further on a par with Mercedes' paintings and that for some fool to switch David's Sock-work with somebody else's sock-work would provoke an outburst whose grounds were quite as capable of justification as were those substantiating Mercedes' complaint in her case against the gallery. Well, yes and no. If this sock-work is constituted by a perfectly useful pair of hand-knitted socks and not by some representation of socks, or depiction of, symbol, of socks, then the conditions for its being a 'Sock-work', are two-fold.

I. The socks must fulfil the conditions of making already outlined and it is a consequence of those conditions that some person other than David could have produced the socks for his Sock-work. Thus to that extent there is some aspect of which it is not possible to say that it marks out, individuates the artist. Therefore unless David has done more than hang up his socks on the gallery wall while we may grieve with him along the lines already described, for the fact that 'his making' is not a public matter of concern, however painfully he may feel it, we must admit that here at least he is up against what looks like a problem. The work could be anybody's. (Goodman might appear to be his best hope. (see IV.I)

2. However, while the conditions on which the sock-work works as a piece of sculpture rest upon the socks being socks, with all the conditions fulfilled appropriately, more is involved than that David's socks mostly fetch up on someone's feet. These socks are on a gallery wall. For all I know they may have enjoyed a useful life on somebody's feet already, or perhaps if they do not sell as sculpture, they will yet serve Ruth as socks. But this makes no difference to the fact that they may happen to constitute an exhibit in a show of modern sculpture. So long as David's socks are so exhibited, it should be possible to set the work alongside Mercedes' paintings and discuss them as artworks amongst whose properties the personal agency of Mercedes and David as artists, cannot but be of account. Yet David is up against the

problem of having in good faith, let us say, made a piece of sculpture whose success as a work in part rests upon his doing something which by virtue of its workaday function could well have been done by somebody else. He may yet rescue himself from difficulty by claiming, that exhibiting his socks is tantamount to some pictorial statement or other. If he merely hangs up his socks and just calls them artworks then, whatever we want to say about objets trouvés as art, which I presently do not, he cannot get over the difficulty, if it matters to him as a sculptor, that there is every chance that anybody's socks would do as well, and that for anybody else to have put them up would, equally, serve. He would therefore have much less good grounds than Mercedes for complaining if his works had been switched for somebody else's Sock-work.

Let us think about this objection a little further. Interestingly, although we can show that in some situations David's socks are to be distinguished from Tosh's balloons, such that it is unremarkable that Tosh should not get fussed over a switch of his stock with McGarry's, and no more surprising that David should take on so should his socks be swopped with, say, mine, we find that the situation is somewhat altered by suggesting that both balloons as well as socks might take on the character of artworks. The problem encountered over David's Sock-work is relevant to consideration of Tosh's putative Balloon-work. I have put the case that sock-work could be attributed to

anybody and not necessarily specifically to David, and Balloon-work could similarly be attributed to anybody and not just to Tosh. Now this makes a point as to whether there is a way to distinguish between David's socks and Tosh's balloons regarding attribution. As artworks it is now true of both that there is little about their properties to indicate who it was that actually manufactured the parts which make up the works, whether they are Sock-works or Balloon-works.

David, Tosh, McGarry, Max and Mercedes will exhibit what they please as artworks. But are their works as described, exactly comparable when it comes to positing the personal agency of the people concerned? There is nothing to prevent David from hanging up his socks or Tosh, in hope of greatly enhanced returns, from hanging up his balloons as artworks. It would be difficult to show that balloons or socks could not be artworks. If this is right, then what is the significance of right attribution in cases in which attribution does not refer to the majority of the properties of the work? We seem to be making out that for one category of artworks, paintings, a right account of the properties of the work includes attribution to the personal agent, the painter; for another category of artworks such as Sock-work and Balloon-work, a right account of the properties of the work leaves out in large part reference to the personal agency of the artist. If I want to say that both sorts count as works of art then this could be

a threat to my professed view, which is that in any account of the properties of an artwork the pictorial character of the agency of the artist must not be disregarded. I could simply refuse to accept the second category for consideration as an artwork, except that in so many such cases I find myself supporting the artist against his critics. There are charlatans; there is deception, yet this being so does not on its own allow us to get rid of that second category. Conversely, it is regrettably the case that believing that the artist is exhibiting in good faith yields insufficient grounds for retaining it. We should have to look for some fundamental conditions of acceptability as regards the properties of both categories if we are to defend a sympathetic attitude towards balloons or socks, as described, as artworks alongside paintings.

IV.5.I.5 Accepting some Unpalatable Implications.

The position is this: concerning paintings, paintings are distinctive; individual. Works of one painter are distinguished from other works of the same painter in that we may characterize each as a manifest (matrix) involving the prospect and conceptual concerns of that painter in some particular statement. What ultimately counts is that firstly each and every painting is an irreducibly pictorial statement. Secondly these statements or paintings, are distinctive aspects of the conceptual

life and development of one painter. The paintings of one person are fundamentally to be distinguished from paintings by any other person. The observable features upon the canvas cannot fully be accounted for without that the personal nature of the painterly agency involved be taken as fundamental to the properties of the work. Regarding Sock-work; insofar as Sock-work is comprised of socks and only socks the work might have been done by anybody. For an artefact to be a sock certain conditions must be fulfilled. The constraints of sock-making do not permit the knitter too-extensive self-expression. It follows that given compliance with conditions of manufacture, anyone can knit socks. Knitting socks is thus not like painting pictures even given that certain conditions attend the artist in respect of painting, as for example against print-making or sculpture. It is possible to attend to the properties of a sock without either taking into account the personal agency of the knitter, or the agency of the knitter as pictorial in kind, though agency is assumed. It is not possible to attend to the properties of a painting without taking the personal pictorial agency of the painter into account.

Whatever might be said about the distinguishing characteristics of artworks, it looks as if neither David nor Tosh should take exception to their artworks being wrongly attributed. If McGarry happens to be credited with Tosh's Balloon-work then

however much Tosh objects he really cannot say that there is no way in which McGarry could ~~not~~ have produced 'Balloon-Work.' Similarly, if I, for example am given the credit for David's Sock-work, he cannot say, even if he knows something of my knitting, that I could not possibly have produced just such a work. But Mercedes knows that there does not exist in this world a painting that having been painted by herself could have been done by Max or anybody else. Aside from the question whether David and Tosh are producing artworks, or are not, it does seem that any case they might want to make for those works as theirs and nobody else's is threatened insofar as the properties of the works concerned may be considered aside from the personal agency of David or Tosh. A problem for me is that if I want to include Balloon-works and Sock-works as works of art it may be difficult for me to retain my sympathies and sustain my case that in consideration of any artwork whatsoever the personal agency of the artist, pictorial of its nature, enters into consideration of the properties of the work. If I am consistent then a pair of socks cannot on its own become an artwork merely because it is called Sock-work, any more than I believe a walk through a field can become a work of art, unless something is done by the walker which removes it from the usual run, as it were, of walks. A big expensive photograph does nothing to make good the gap in that account (see IV.2.3.2).

Finally, it turns out that however much I wish David's Sock-work or 'X's Walk through a Field' were artworks I cannot really offer a good justification for saying that they are. That which separates them in my view, from being artworks is not to be waived. Fundamental to anything's being rightly called a work of art is that the work is a factitious manifestation of the integral nature of the relationship of one person's pictorial prospect and working conceptual concerns. Such are the properties of these pictorial statements. A person cannot just walk through a field and make a claim that this is an artwork unless he can by so doing show that something distinguishes what he did from a thing anybody might do such that 'what he did' constitutes a factitious entity of a pictorial kind and thus may rightly be called an artwork, where 'what anybody else does' is not rightly to be called an artwork. It might rightly be called taking a walk, knitting socks and so on for that would be agency of another character, no less particular to its kind. Moreover such a work, if it is to qualify as an artwork, must be both a factitious pictorial entity and be such that nobody else could, contingently, have produced it. To give the usual account of actions being unrepeatable will not do here. Insofar as walks through fields can be made by anyone and are not, as walks, rightly characterized if and only if they are 'X's walks', then walks are not artworks in the requisite sense.

Attributability thus takes on great significance in this account. While we would not need

to put a name to every artwork before agreeing that it qualifies as an artwork, we do need to take every so-described work as showing by its properties the reflective and practical pictorial concerns of some one individual. Where no such conditions exist then the most heated claims to authorship in the requisite sense are as empty gestures.

IV.6 Conclusion.

Attribution is a key notion in settling the question whether and in what sense an artwork is an instantiation of agency. Such that not only do we, in looking at an artwork, posit the effective agency of a human being, rather than merely inanimate agency; but, furthermore in any claim that might be made regarding the agency as that of an artist and so as personal, the notion of attribution as of professed concern to artists themselves, provides the means to test out the significance of the claim to authorship.

Where the first chapter set out the conditions under which it is possible to posit the agent as an artist this last chapter is primarily addressed to the characterization of the artist as a personal agent. I have put it that the artist is not, in respect of agency in general, a special case, notwithstanding the character of his agency as that of an artist rather than, say, a balloon seller.

Two concerns have been expressed and explored in these last sections. Firstly, it is my contention that we should regard consideration of the properties of artworks as centrally involving consideration of the agency of the artist. Secondly, partly to substantiate that contention, and partly as substantiated by it, I put it that we may nicely regard artworks as particular cases of agency. That is to say, we should look to the properties of artworks both as factitious entities and as manifestations of the agency of the artist who produced it, as personal. Furthermore we may regard these observations regarding the agency of artists as having application in any context in which the particular nature of human action is at issue. Finally, this indicates grounds for the individuation of artworks rather more convincing than those put forward in terms of spectator experience, and offers an alternative to the view that the uniqueness of an artwork rests upon the totality of features relevant to its aesthetic appraisal.

If, in examining the examples and attempting to characterize the importance of right attribution, I have stumbled upon some means of discussing what does or does not count as a work of art then this is wholly fortuitous. It was not my main concern. What counts is the status of a claim to agency in the context of the visual arts.

V. CONCLUSION

My concern in this exploratory text has been to show that the characterization of a person as an artist must be in terms of his agency as an artist; it must be in terms of a certain kind of doing. The structure of my research has been to establish the conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist. The four conditions I have established form the substance of my thesis. Within the framework set by their constraints I have addressed myself, not only to the question of what an artist may think and do but also to the concerns of the reponsive spectator with respect to what artists think and do. I have shown that in fulfilling the conditions under which we may posit the agency of an artist certain implications have to be recognized, on both sides. I shall now, in conclusion, assess the implications of meeting the four conditions of artistic agency as they affect both the artist and the spectator, as party to his concerns, and will remark such points of general significance as are raised by consideration of the case as a whole.

First I will restate the four conditions.

I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies that his concerns are pictorial. An artist creates pictorial space.

II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies a communicative stance.

III. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies an artefact, a product, characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective and practical endeavour. This product is a pictorial form of thought.

IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies the product of his endeavour as a manifestation of his agency as personal.

From consideration of these conditions it is clear that the agency of an artist cannot adequately be discussed in terms of what is going on solely from the point of view of the artist. Neither is it acceptable to regard attention to artworks as quite to be set in terms of the standpoint of the spectator. Each is implicated within the terms under which we may posit the agency of the artist. It is to the assessment of these related implications that I shall now turn.

From the standpoint of the artist the following may be said regarding his agent concerns: as an artist he is necessarily engaged in the development of pictorial ideas. For an artist, failure in the production of pictorial entities is a failure of agency. This is tantamount, within the terms of his agency as an artist, to a failure of being; a loss of self.

An artist's regard towards the matter upon

which he bends his attention must be primarily pictorial in character. Thus, so far as his attention to observable objects may involve transcription we should not take the activity in which he engages as having primarily to do with learning to see. This does not commit me to the position favoured by Gombrich, however; for insofar as constructs are ways of seeing the world the artist is not centrally concerned with constructs. The artist's making is not matching; neither is it something which comes before matching, if by that is implied the consequence that, after all artworks function primarily as accounts of the world, What is sought, by recourse to all manner of things, is a pictorial prospect whose fulfilment must be a particularity, that is a factitious entity of a material sort. Thus the doing is to be characterized in terms of a peculiar orientation: an inherently particular manifestation of a pictorial kind.

That the agency of an artist necessarily implies some artwork ineluctably engages the artist in a communicative relationship, for the observer is, whether the artist likes it or not, party to his thinking, by virtue of that thinking being pictorial, observable, thus public.

In positing an agent as artist we recognize his personal characteristics and preoccupations as having some bearing upon his work. This does not commit me to the view that his agency is subject to dispositions to the extent that dispositional

factors determine his activites. Rather it is that his pictorial intentions set the direction of constraints of his preoccupations, painterly, sculptural and so on. The pictures Kinsey paints need to be considered as manifestations of his agency as personal.

Since the observer necessarily features in the agent concerns of the artist it is fitting that I now turn to consider the implications of my thesis from the standpoint of the observer as agent. Thus I choose to term his role, for the active nature of his response is a two-way consequence of exhibition, in the following way. The first concern of the observer in the communicative context of exhibtion is that he should attempt to enter into the artist's pictorial context. This puts him as observer in a position of some vulnerability, since he may particularly when confronted by the unfamiliar, feel himself to be at the mercy of the artist, whose evident claims to agency may sometimes be questionable. An observer needs a critical eye. If the claims of the artist may be questioned, however, so may the expectations of the observer. This is the substance of the second consequence. The reflective and practical cohesion of pictorial concepts is in simultaneity accessible to the attendant eye, but understanding what is observable is not always to be accomplished at a glance. The spectator's attention is first

taken but not necessarily held by a first impression. Some further work may be needed on the part of the observer in order that he put himself in possession of what is going on. He comes as a primed recipient to pictorial ideas, yet may be required to set aside his expectations; for the artwork, being particular, comes of its nature as an addition to the field of intelligible objects. The agent concerns of the artist suppose the possibility of response in the agent concerns of the spectator in the context of pictorial communication. It is a shared communicative stance.

Certain points of general significance arise from consideration of the case as a whole. With regard to artworks as manifestations of reflective and practical activities, the conditions upon fulfilment of which we may posit artistic agency bear out with particular force the truth of Macmurray's assertion that "action is inherently particular". The mark of the agent as artist is concern with the creation of factitious objects of a pictorial sort, as such necessarily particular. From this it can be argued that artworks may be individuated in that they manifest the agency of the artist as personal. Since I am not concerned to make of the agency of the artist a special case of agency the possibility cannot be ruled out that there may be other spheres of human agency in which consideration of the properties of artefacts might usefully include consideration of the agency of their makers.

However, it has not been my intention to put forward a general theory of agency. Indeed I rather feel it ought not, if I am consistent, to be attempted. But the possibility for discussing the individuation of human agents in terms of their agent-concerns being manifested might be a matter of general concern, although it comes beyond the scope of my enquiries.

Finally I will show the relationship of the four conditions of artistic agency. As conditions they are not independent for each one has a bearing upon the other three. Yet each is in a particular way informative of the kind of agency with whose terms I have been concerned. I will show the terms of each condition insofar as they distinguish the conditions from each other, and in that they are nevertheless not independent. I will then show by analysis that as conditions they cannot reduce to each other, from which it must be concluded that each is vitally informative regarding the nature of the agency of the artist.

In Chapter I. I set out to show how the following condition sets constraints of a critical nature. I regard fulfillment of this condition as fundamental to the notion of the agent as artist:

I. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies his concerns as pictorial.

An artist creates pictorial space. That is to say, an artist is one involved in making of a factitious kind. That which he produces is an artefactual entity. The terms of this condition implicate the agent in the following concerns: that there is an artefact implies a communicative stance as an inherent aspect of the agency of an artist. This invokes the second condition. Such making as is involved in the production of artworks is a manifestation of reflective and practical action. An artwork is a form of thought. This invokes the third condition. The inherent particularity of action is demonstrated in the pictorial context of artworks. This invokes the fourth condition;without such activity as that characterized in the first condition there is no agency such that it can be claimed as the agency of an artist.

Concern with pictorial space distinguishes the agent as artist. This is the particular force of the first condition.

In Chapter II. I showed that the artist is committed to an ineluctable constraint on human agency:

II. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies a communicative stance.

This supposes the engagement of spectator concerns in concerns the artist has, in a context

which is primarily pictorial. This invokes the first condition as setting the context of attention. For a spectator's concerns to become engaged in the pictorial ideas of an artist depends upon those ideas having a manifest coherence. This invokes the third condition in respect of the notion of intelligibility which presupposes a context of ideas which are capable of being shared. Failure to communicate is a failure of agency. In that for the artist, effective agency is a condition of his being, we may say that a failure of agency is tantamount to a loss of self. The personal nature of an artist's activites cannot be discounted in fulfilment of the second condition. This invokes the terms of the fourth condition.

Concern with a communicative stance reveals the artist as constrained by the terms of human agency. This is the force of the second condition.

In Chapter III. the attention turns to the status of the artefact as a manifestation of artistic agency:

III. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies an artefact, a product which is a pictorial form of thought, characterized by a manifest cohesion of reflective and practical endeavour.

That which an artist makes is intelligible. Intelligibility does not in all cases presuppose

verbal statability. This implies a communicative stance which operates within constraints of irreducibly pictorial meaning. This invokes and informs the second condition. The factitious nature of pictorial entities supposes the progress of reflective and practical activity as oriented towards the full concrete activity of the agent as artist. An artwork is a factitious object in that it is a materially wrought idea; it is an artwork in that as an idea it is pictorial in kind. This invokes the first condition. An artwork is an individual form of one person's thought. However much conceptual territory a work shares with other works, it is itself particular within terms invoked of the fourth condition. Concern with artworks engages the spectator and the artist as agents in a context of communicative intelligibility whose object is a pictorial idea. The nature of the making activity governs the intelligibility of agent concerns. This is of consequence as a function of the second and first condition in that it is informative about the entity which is an artwork.

That an artwork is a form of thought is the force of the third condition.

In Chapter IV. the question arises how it would be possible to divorce concern for the agent, the artist, from concern for the properties of artworks. Action is manifestly inherently particular:
IV. In whatever sphere of activity, the agency of an artist implies the product of his endeavour as a manifestation of his agency as personal.

Artworks are manifestations of action as "inherently particular". The implications for this notion of particularity are that artworks are manifestations of agency whose character is given in the entity which is made being pictorially particular. This invokes the first condition of artistic agency. Concern for the agency of an artist enters into consideration of the properties of artworks. Attribution presupposes such agency as personal. This invokes the communicative relation of the second condition. An artwork as an intelligible statment shows in its context the prospect, in its fullest determinacy, of an individual whose agent-concerns are primarily pictorial. This invokes the third condition. Concern with the agency of the artist as personal is a concern of significance respecting human agency in general. That which distinguishes an agent as an artist is a personal concern with the making of entities of a pictorial nature.

Artworks provide us with clear cases of action being inherently particular.

Taking a broad view of these conditions it is possible to show that being individually as well as mutually informative they can be regarded as revealing that there are two aspects to the account. The first deals with what it is to be a human agent; the second with what it is for a human agent to be an artist. In no way am I suggesting that an artist may exempt himself from any of the conditions as defined. Neither am I about to show that it is only artists who may make claims to their agency as being of a particular character. My business is to show the particular character of artistic agency; that is all.

To conclude, this, then is an analysis of the conditions under which we posit the agency of an artist.

Regarding conditions II.& IV: Both conditions are generally informative about human agency.

Regarding conditions I.& III.: The conditions mark the character of agency in some particularity as that of an artist.

That these conditions are neither independent nor yet reducible to each other may be shown as follows:

I.& III.are the characterizing conditions of the agent as artist. Each of these conditions is informative.

I. characterizes the agent as artist in terms of certain kinds of activity.
III. characterizes the product of such activity as a form of thought. A pictorial form of thought, as an artefact, is an observable object.

Thus III. is not reducible to I,. although consideration of the artwork cannot exclude consideration of the agency of the artist.
I. is not reducible to III., although the whole activity is ever directed towards the product: an artwork.

That I. & III. settle the character of the agency in a certain way does not make II. & IV. redundant as conditions, for neither can be evaded. This being so precludes the possibility of trying to make a special case of the agency of the artist.

IV. stipulates the inherent particularity of human agency. (Thus I. & III. come under the general case).
II. concerns the necessity of the communicative stance implicit in the notion of human agency.
In no way does the character of agency being that of the artist exempt such agency from the general constraint.

Thus II. is not reducible to IV. A communicative stance is an implication of agency of persons,

but is not reducible to the notion of agency as inherently particular.

IV. is not reducible to II. That which marks agent-concerns as personal is not sufficiently to be accounted as oriented towards a communicative stance. though a communicative stance is an ineluctable aspect of agency.

It is my contention that unless each of these four conditions is met the agency of the artist is critically unfulfilled. If I. & III. are left out of account the agency could be other than that of an artist. Although I have not expanded upon alternative possibilities it is clear that in terms of IV. human agency is necessarily particular in character. Thus in the event of an agent not being an artist some analagous characterizing conditions 'I. & III.' would have to be fulfilled. Neither I. nor III. can, in this connection, be left out of account without fundamental loss to the notion of the agent as artist.

In positing the artist as agent I admit to the abiding constraints of conditions II. & IV., which imply the effective dealings of persons in communicative relation and the agent concerns of human beings as necessarily particular in character.

My purpose in these chapters has been to investigate working concerns of a certain sort: to characterize the activities of artists. By looking to examples drawn from a variety of sources and addressing myself to questions which, while to an extent specialized, have a certain continuity, I have attempted to establish points of general importance about the activities of people concerned with making artworks of any kind. Clearly I have had to limit the sort and number of examples and since many problems beset the description of their making, I make no claims to have resolved the difficulties arising out of the endeavour. All I can hope is that in looking at questions that arise once an artist sets out on the business of some sort of making I have been able to structure some possibility of reply. At the least I can say this: I began by stating my position as an interested party. The two fields of interest, art and philosophy, in which I am involved turn out to be mutually informative. The matters relevant to the particular case have been shown to be of general philosophical significance. For it is, as I have earlier remarked, of fundamental importance to the artist that out of concern for the way in which he works he further his concern for the way in which he thinks.

Lady Day.1985

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. John Macmurray. The Self as Agent, p.54

2. M.Merleau-Ponty. Cézanne's Doubt, in Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, p.237.

3. Michael Podro. The Manifold in Perception, p.25.

4. M. Merleau-Ponty. Eye and Mind, in Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty, p.261.

5. J.McFee & R.Degge. Art Culture & Environemnt, p.12.

6. Ernst Gombrich. Art and Illusion, p.85.

7. Ernst Gombrich. Art and Illusion, p.99.

8. Michael Podro. Rembrandt: Fiction and Reality, Paper read to the Depts. of Philosophy & History of Art University of Bristol, 5.3.84. "The viewer is compositionally as well as functionally implied.".

9. Cf.Svetland Alpers. The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century, p.35.

10. The Observer Colour Supplement. Living Extra. "Clever but is it Art?", 2.10.83.

11. Consider the interior schemes experiment devised in 1920 by Vilmos Haszar, in which the solid rectangularity of the wall is challenged. Colour planes "float on their neutral ground, visually disrupting the planar structure of the wall surface.", The Abstract Interior, Jane Beckett, in Towards a New Art, p.123.

12. Georg Baselitz. At the Whitechapel, Sept.-Oct. 1983. (paintings 1960-83).

13. For this point I am indebted to observations made by Michael Podro regarding the "implied viewer", 5.3.84.

15. Michael Podro. ibid, 5.3.84.

16. Pace Pichard Boston. The Dead Hand on Design. Guardian 5.1.84., who designates the idea of Problem-Solving as a catch-phrase. Yet problems arise and do prompt the enquiring creative mind to address itself to their solution. I do not know that we should take very seriously any art education which did not regard this as taking up a good deal of time and study.

17. Cf.Andrew Harrison. Works of Art and Other Cultural Objects. P.A.S., 1967-68, p.118. "Drawing may be accurate, as descriptions may be accurate, when that is, they are intended to be true of something."

18. Kendall Walton. Transparent Pictures: on the nature of photographic realism, 1983.

19. ibid.

20. Theo Van Doesburg. Principles of Neo-plastic Art. p.17.

21. Stanley Cavell. Must we mean what we say? A Book of Essays, p.177.

22. Since I did these drawings I must admit to a desire to do them all again. Looking at old work usually sets up feelings of dissatisfaction.

23. Cf. D.H. Lawrence. Making Pictures. The Studio, 1929.

24. Cf. Richard Wollheim. The Work of Art as Object. Studio International, December 1970, p.231.

25. G.E.M. Anscombe. Intention, p.11.

26. Discussed by J. Koh. The Drawing Lesson. B.J.A., v.20, no.3., Summer 1980, pp.195-203.

27. E. Gombrich. ibid.

28. J. McFee and R. Degge. ibid.

29. Richard Wollheim. On Drawing an Object, p.26.

30. Cf. Andrew Harrison. Stories and Pictures, p.19. "Accurate pictures tend to be simplet than what they represent, and cannot be more complex, cannot add, can always subtract. This relation is asymmetrical."

31. J. Koh. ibid, p.198.

32. Mondrian Sketchbooks 1912-14. p.39.

33. Roger Scruton. Intensional and Intentional Objects. P.A.S. 1970-71, pp 187-207.

34. Richard Wollheim. ibid.

35. Piet Mondrian Sketchbooks, p.41.
"Clarity of thought should be accompanied by clarity of technique."

36. Piet Mondrian. No Axiom but the Plastic. in de Stijl 1923, tr. H.L.C. Jaffé, p.189.

37. Stephen Bann. Abstract Art - A language? Towards A New Art, p.139.

38. Piet Mondrian. ibid.

39. G. Apollinaire. Apollinaire on Art, p.265.

40. Paul Klee. Pedagogical Notebooks, p.37.

41. Will Grohmann. Paul Klee. p.98.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Piet Mondrian. Mondrian Sketchbooks 1912-14, p.41.

2. R.S. Peters. Authority, Responsibil;ity and Education, pp. 14,175.

3. B. de Jouvenel. Sovereignty, pp 59-61.

4. Andrew Harrison. Stories and Pictures, p.7.

5. John Macmurray, The Form of the Personal, v.1. The Self as Agent, p.74.

6. A.A. Milne. The House at Pooh Corner. Rabbit's Busy Day, p.87.

7. B. de Jouvenel. ibid., p.30.

8. Stanley Cavell. ibid., p.177.

9. Gilbert Ryle. On Thinking. Thinking and Saying, p.455.

10. R.S. Peters. ibid., p.14.

11. Andrew Harrison. Dimensions of Meaning, p.6.

12. R.S. Peters. Symposium on Authority. P.A.S.S.V. XXXII, pp. 207-241.

13. Peter Winch. Symposium on Authority. P.A.S.S.V. XXXII, pp.207-241.

14. Henry Moore. Introduction to Catalogue for the exhibition of a book dedicated by Henry Moore to W.H.Auden with related drawings.

15. ibid.

16. ibid.

17. Kerry Trengove at the Acme Gallery, Covent Garden, London, May 1978.

18. George Eliot. Middlemarch. Penguin English Library. 1971 ch.7. p.87.

19. Antonio Sant'Elia. The New City, 1914. in Form and Function. Benton, Benton & Sharp, p.71.

20. Dada and Surrealism Reviewed, p.60.

21. Peter Winch. ibid.

22. John Macmurray. The Form of the Personal, v.2. Persons in Relation, p.24.

CHAPTER III.

FOOTNOTES

1. Andrew Harrison. Dimensions of Meaning.

2. H.H. Price. Thinking & Experience, Chs.X &XI.

3. M. Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception.
The Primacy of Perception, "Eye & Mind".

4. Cf. William Wordsworth. The Prelude Book II, line 352.

5. John Macmurray. The Self as Agent, p.86.

6. William Wordsworth. ibid.

7. John Constable. Discourses, p.74.

8. ibid.

9. William Wordsworth. The Prelude Book II.1.321.

10. ibid. 1.358 - 370.

11. ibid. Book III.1.155 - 166.

12. Andrew Harrison. Stories and Pictures, p.19.

13. William Wordsworth. The Prelude Book VI, 1.526 - 528.

14. ibid. 1.592 - 608.

15. Michael Podro. Rembrandt: Fiction and Reality.

16. Svetlana Alpers. The Art of Describing; Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century, p.26.

17. T.S. Eliot. The Love Song of Alfred J.Prufrock .

18. H.H. Price. B.J.A., Spring 1981, p.101.

19. William Wordsworth. The Prelude Book VI, 1.634 - 640.

20. Fred.V.Randel. T.S.L.L., v.23.no.3., Fall 1981, pp.294-323.

21. John Keats. The Ben Nevis Sonnet.

22. Richard Wollheim. The Work of Art as Object. Studio International no. 128,p231.

23. H.H.Price. Thinking and Experience, pp.319-323.

24. Rene Magritte. Studio International no. 173, p.128.

25. H.H.Price. Thinking and Experience, p.345.

26. ibid. p.310.

27. ibid. p.323.

28. Richard Wollheim. see above.

29. John Macmurray. The Self as Agent, p.112.

30. H.H. Price. Thinking and Representation.

31. Alistair Hannay. Mental Images. A Defence, p.86.

32. H.H. Price. ibid.

33. Richard Wollheim. ibid.

34. William Wordsworth. The Prelude. Book III line 187.

35. Andrew Harrison. Dimensions of Meaning, p.13.

36. ibid.

37. Richard Wollheim. ibid.

38. Neil Bolton. The Psychology of Thinking, p.227.

39. M. Merleau-Ponty. Signs, Preface XIV - XXXII.

40. M. Merleau-Ponty. Phenomonelogy of Perception p.386.

41. Neil Bolton. ibid., p.259.

42. M. Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. Ch.10., p.386.

43. I owe this insight to a concersation with Andrew Harrison.

44. John Macmurray. The Self as Agent, p.86.

45. D.H. Lawrence. Making Pictures.

46. ibid.

47. John Macmurray. What is Action? P.A.S. 1938. p.75.

48. Ed Kinsey. The Artist as Agent, III.2.1.

CHAPTER IV. FOOTNOTES.

1. Richard Wollheim. On Drawing an Object, p.27.

2. "A Sense of Place", Travelling Exhibition organized by the Arnolfini Gallery, 1982.

3. Elizabeth Frink, in Conversations with artists. B.B.C. Radio 3., October 1982.

4. P.F.Strawson. Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art, p.6.

5. ibid.

6. Ruby Meager. The Uniqueness of a Work of Art. P.A.S. 1958-59, pp.49 - 70.

7. P.F.Strawson ibid.

8. Michael Podro. Rembrandt: Fiction and Reality.

9. David Carrier. Art without its Artists? B.J.A. v.22., no.3., Summer 1982, p.239.

10. Nelson Goodman. Symposium. J.Phil. 671,1970.p.566.

11. Richard Wollheim. Symposium. J.Phil. 671, 1970,p.566.

12. A.G.Pleydell-Pearce. Review of Goodman's'Languages of Art'. B.J.A. v.10,1970 pp.191-194.

13. Colin Lyas. Anything Goes: The Intentional Fallacy Revisited. B.J.A. v.23.,no.4., Autumn 1983, p.302.

14. Stefan Morawski. Three observations on 'Languages of Art', Erkenntnis XII, 1978, p.127.

*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations.

P.A.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

P.A.S.S.V. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.

B.J.A. The British Journal of Aesthetics.

J.Phil. The Journal of Philosophy.

Aaron Richard. The Theory of Universals. 2nd edition, Oxford and Clarendon, I967.

Adelman Lucy and Compton Michael. Mathematics in Early Abstract Art, Towards a New Art. (see Bann for details).

Alexander S. On Sensations and Images. P.A.S. I909-I9I0.

Alpers Svetlana. The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century. John Murray, London, I983.

Anscombe G.E.M. The Soursce of the Authority of the State. Ratio, June I978.

Anscombe G.E.M. Intention. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, I976.

Apollinaire G. Apollinaire on Art. London, Thames and Hudson, I972.

Bach Kent. Part of What a Picture is. B.J.A. I970.

Bann Stephen. Abstract Art - A Language?, Towards a New Art,Essays on the Backqround to Abstract Art I9I0-I920, The Tate Gallery, I980.

Beckett Jane. The Abstract Interior,Towards a New Art, (for details, see under Bann)

Benton T., Benton C., Sharp D. Form and Function. London, Open University, I975.

Bolton Neil. Psychology of Thinking. Methuen, I972.

Boretz Benjamin. Symposium of Languages of Art. J.Phil., 67, I970.

Brown D.G. Action. London, Allen and Unwin, I968.

Carrier David. Art without its Artists? B.J.A. v.22, no.3. Summer I982.

Cavell Stanley. Must we mean what we say? A book of essays. New York, Charles Scribner's, Sons, I969.

Chisolm R. Sentences about Believing. P.A.S. I955-6.

Christoffel von Ulrich. Von Poussin zu Ingres und Delacroix. Scientia-Verlag, Zurich, I945.

Chopra Y.N. Human Actions. Mind,v. LXXXVIII, 35I, July I979.

Constable John. Discourses (compiled and annotated by R.B.Beckett, Suffolk Records Society, Ipswich, I970).

Dada and Surrealism Reviewed, ed. Dawn Ades. p.60. Arts Council of Great Britain, I978. (catalogue).

Davies Stephen. Re Scruton's Art and Imagination. B.J.A., v23, no.I, Winter I983.

Dennett D.C. Content and Consciousness. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, I969.

Van Doesburg Theo. Principles of Neo-Plastic Art. tr. J.Seligman. London, Lund Humphries, I969.

Eliot T.S. The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock. Collected Poems. I909-I962. London, Faber Paper Covered Edition, Faber and Faber, I963.

Elliott R.K. Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art. P.A.S., I966-67.

Frank O.S. What is action? Symposium. P.A.S.S.V. I938, v. XVII.

Geach Peter. Mental Acts: Studies in Philosophical Psychology. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, I958.

Gombrich Ernst H. Art and Illusion. London, Phaidon Press, I968.

Goodman Nelson. Ways of Worldmaking. Sussex The Harvester Press, I978.

Goodman Nelson. Symposium on Languages of Art. J.Phil., 67, I970.

Goncourt Edmond de. Landmarks in Art History. Oxford, Phaidon, I98I.

Grohmann Will. Paul Klee. London, Lund Humphries I954.

Hampshire S. Thought and Action. Chatto and Windus, London I959.

Hannay Alistair. Mental Images - A defence. Muirheal Library of Philosophy, London, George Allen and Unwin, I97I.

Harrison Andrew. Works of Art and other Cultural Objects. P.A.S. I967-I968.

Harrison Andrew. Thinking and Making: A study of Intelligent Activities. Sussex, The Harvester Press, I978.

Harrison Andrew. Stories and Pictures. Unpublished Paper, I980.

Harrison Andrew. Dimensions of Meaning. Paper given at the University of East Anglia, November I983.

Heath Peter. "Concept" The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Hume David. Essays Moral, Political and Literary: Of the Standard of Taste. Essay XXIII. Oxford University Press I966.

Jaffé H. Mondrian. London, Thames and Hudson, I970.

de Jouvenel Bertrand. Sovereignty. An Inquiry into the Political Good. tr.F.Huntington. London, The University of Chicago Press Ltd., I957.

Kant I. Critique of Aesthetic Jidgement. tr. J.C.Meredith, Oxford University Press, I9II.

Keats John. The Ben Nevis Sonnet. (2nd Aug. I8I8), The Poems of John Keats, ed. Miriam Allott , p.376., Harlow, Longman Group, I968.

Kenny A. Action, Emotion and Will. London, Routledge,Kegan Paul, I963.

Khatchadourian Haig. The Creative Process in Art. B.J.S., Summer I977.

Kjørup Søren. Pictorial Speech Acts. Erkenntnis I978.

Klee Paul. Notebooks Volume I: The Thinking Eye. London, Lund Humphries, I969.

Koh J. The Drawing Lesson. B.J.A. v20, no.3, Summer, I980.

Knox Sir Malcom. Action. Muirhead Library of Philosophy, London, Allen and Unwin, I968.

Lawrence D.H. Making Pictures. The Studio, July, I929.

Lyas Colin. The Intentional Fallacy Revisited. B.J.A., v24, no. 4, Autumn I983.

McFee J. and Degge R. Art, Culture and Environment. London, Wadsworth, I977.

Macmurray John. The Form of the Personal v.2. Persons in Relation. London, Faber and Faber, I96I.

Macmurray John. What is Philosophy? Symposium. P.A.S.S.V., v. XVII, I938.

Macmurray John. Macmurray John. The Form of the Personal. VI. The Self As Agent. London, Faber and Faber, I966I.

Magritte René. Studio International, v.I73,p. I28, March I967.

Margolis Tomas-Vincent. Philosophy Looks At The Arts. New York, Scribbner's Sons,I962.

Meager Ruby. The Uniqueness of a Work of Art. P.A.S. I958-59.

Meager Ruby. Uniqueness: Collected Papers on Aesthetics, (ed. C.Barrett), Oxford, Blackwell, I965.

Merleau-Ponty M. Phenomenology of Perception. London, Routledge, Hegan Paul, I962.

Merleau-Ponty M. Signs tr. R.McCleary, North Western University, I964.

Merleau-Ponty M. The Primacy of Perception. North West University, I964.

Merleau-Ponty M. The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty (ed. A.L. Fisher), New York. Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., I969.

Milne A.A. The House at Pooh Corner. Methuen's Children's Books, London, Methuen, I975.

Mondrian Piet. No Axiom but the Plastic. tr. H.Jaffe' De Stijl, p.I89, I923

Mondrian Piet. Two Mondrian Sketchbooks. I9I2-I9I4. (ed. R.P.Welsh and J.M. Jooster), Paris, Meulenhoff-International, I969.

Moore Henry. Introduction to Catalogue for the exhibition of a book dedicated by Henry Moore to W.H.Auden, with related drawings. London, British Museum Publications Ltd., I974.

Morawski Stefan. Erkenntnis, v.XII, I978.

Observer, 2.I0.83., Living Extra, Clever, but is it Art? Furniture Design Project, Richard Ball and Peter Campbell, the book 'Masterpieces', Pieces shown at Hille's International, London 8th Nov. I8th Nov. I983.

Olsen S.H. Interpretation and Intention. B.J.S. Summer I977.

Osborne Harold. Inspiration. B.J.S. Summer I977.

Pleydell-Pearce G. Goodman's Languages of Art'. B.J.A. v.I0, I970.

Podro Michael. The Manifold in Perception. Theories of Art from Kant to Hildebrand. Oxford, Clarendon Press, I972.

Podro Michael. The Critical Historians of Art. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, I982.

Price H.H. Painting and the Theory of Knowledge. Reading University, I950. B.J.A., v.2I, no.2, Spring I98I.

Price H.H. Thinking and Experience. London, Hutchinson's, I953.

Price H.H. Thinking and Representation. Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henrietta Hertz Trust, read 6.2.46. Proceedings of the British Academy, I946, pp. 86-88.

Randel F.V. Texas Studies in Literature and Language, v.23, no. 2, Fall I98I.

Ritchie A.M. Agent and Act in Theory of Mind. P.A.S., I95I-I952.

Ryle G. Phenomenology. P.A.S.S.V., v.XI, I932.

Ryle G. Dilemmas. The Tarner Lectures. Cambridge, University Press, I953.

Ryle G. On Thinking. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, I979.

Scruton Roger. Art and Imagination. A Study in the Philosophy of Mind. London, Methuen, I974.

Scruton Roger. Intensional and Intentional Objects. P.A.S., I970-7I.

Steegmuller . Apollinaire: Poet Among The Painters. New York, Farrar, I963.

Steele Hunter. Fakes and Forgeries. B.J.S., Summer I977.

Strawson P.F. Individuals, An essay in descriptive mataphysics. London, Methuen, I965.

Strawson P.F. Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art. Oxford, The Oxford Review, I966.

Sylvester David. Interviews with Francis Bacon. London, Thames and Hudson, I975.

Sylvester David. Elizabeth Frink. Conversations with Artists. B.B.C. Radio 3. October I982.

Taylor Richard. Action and Purpose. New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., I966.

Vasari Giorgio. Lives of the Artists. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, I963.

Walton Kendall. Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism. Michigan, University Press, I983.

White Roger Wittgenstein on Identity. P.A.S. I978.

Whitford F. Egon Schiele. London, Thames and Hudson, I98I.

Willey Basil. The Eighteenth Century Background - Studies on the idea of Nature in the thought of the period. London, Chatto and Windus, I940.

Willey Basil. Coleridge on Imagination and Fancy. Warton Lecture on English Poetry, Proceedings of the British Academy, Read May 29th I946.

Wilson J.R.S. Emotion and Object. Cambridge, University Press, I977.

Winch Peter, Authority. Political Philosophy. ed. Quinton, Oxford, University Press, I967.

Winch Peter. Authority. Synposium. P.A.S.S.V. no.32, 1958, pp. 207-40.

Wollheim Richard. On Drawing an Object. Inaugural Lecture presented at University College, London, December 1964.

Wollheim Richard. The Work of Art as Object. Studio International, Dec. 1970, v.180, no. 928, p.231.

Wollheim Richard. Symposium on Languages of Art, J. Phil. 67, 1970.

Wordsworth W. Poetical Works. (ed. T. Hutchinson revised by E.deSelincourt.) Oxford Paperbacks, 1975.

Eliot George. Middlemarch. Penguin English Library, 1971.